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ABSTRACT 
Natalia Chernysheva: The Haptic in Lev Tolstoi’s Anna Karenina 
(Under the direction of Christopher Putney) 
 
This dissertation discusses Tolstoi’s representation of touch in Anna Karenina, 
contextualizing it within the author’s moral vision and the interdisciplinary discourse on haptic 
perception in Western philosophical, literary, cultural, and artistic traditions. Through a close 
reading, this dissertation argues that Tolstoi’s representation of the characters’ haptic sensations 
and physical contact with one another are strongly informed by the writer’s anxieties over human 
physicality. In addition, by revealing a previously overlooked link between Tolstoi’s moral views 
and his characters’ physical experiences in Anna Karenina, the dissertation points to the potential 
for fruitful haptic readings of Tolstoi’s other works. 
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Introduction 
The conflict between the body and the spirit is central to Lev Tolstoi’s thought and art. 
An examination of Tolstoi’s moral vision shows the way in which his attitude towards the body 
evolved over the course of his literary career. Tolstoi holds a manifestly positive attitude towards 
human physicality in the 1850s–60s, seeing it as an embodiment of the natural life force. He 
becomes suspicious about the body in the 1870s, and undergoes a grave spiritual crisis in 1879, 
which leads him to choose the spiritual over the physical and pronounce chastity as his ideal in 
the 1880s. Anna Karenina (1877), finished shortly before Tolstoi’s spiritual crisis, reflects an 
early manifestation of his anxiety over the body.  
Numerous scholars and commentators have discussed Tolstoi’s depiction of bodily states 
and perceptions, both as an element of style that imbues his fiction with verisimilitude and 
striking vividness, and as a means of psychological and moral characterization. While a great 
deal of research has been done on the stylistic and psychological notions of Tolstoi’s bodily 
descriptions, no systematic research has been conducted on the relationship between Tolstoi’s 
representation of the body (and particularly bodily sensations) and his moral views. This research 
thus aims to contribute to our understanding of this link by investigating Tolstoi’s representation 
of the body in his depictions of unity and alienation among the characters in Anna Karenina.  
Tolstoi’s personal susceptibility to sensory impressions seems to have contributed to his 
style. His autobiographical notes “My life” (“Моя жизнь”) (1878) include sensory recollections 
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from his early infancy, which alone can provide the key to his first years of life, the “shadowy 
region between the unconscious and the conscious” (Simmons 44). Having no conscious 
memories, he recalls the physical sensations of being bathed in a tub and swaddled, and the not 
unpleasant smell of bran (23:469–70). In his diary of 1851, he records standing by an open 
window contemplating nature with all of his senses, except for touch: “всеми чувствами, 
исключая осязание, наслаждался я природой” (46:80). The precision with which he excludes 
touch (he enjoys the world of nature while being indoors at that particular moment) underscores 
his conscious attention to sensory impressions.  
Tolstoi’s power of observation informs his artistic method as well. Tolstoi the artist 
strives to capture his or his characters’ perceptions of the world with precision in order to convey 
his “vision” to the reader as closely to reality as possible (“перелить в другого свой взгляд при 
виде природы … [о]писание невозможно” (46:65). However, as is evident from the below 
scholarly investigations of Tolstoi’s portrayal of the characters’ bodies and sensory perceptions, 
these details serve a broader purpose in Tolstoi’s fiction, pronouncing psychological or ethical 
judgments of the characters described.   
In Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Толстой и Достоевский), Dmitrii Merezhkovskii paves the 
way for investigations of the body, perception, and sensory impressions in Tolstoi’s oeuvre, 
famously describing Tolstoi as the “тайновидец плоти/seer of the flesh” (119) and highlighting 
the richness of his fiction’s sensory data. Merezhkovskii underscores the expressive power of 
Tolstoi’s bodily imagery, by which he means the writer’s “uniquely Tolstoian” manner of 
capturing a sensation in all of its physiological and psychological accuracy and complexity. For 
instance, Nikolai’s recollection of Sonia’s kiss in War and Peace (Война и мир) is comprised of 
several interwoven sensory impressions, “запах пробки, смешанный с чувством поцелуя/the 
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smell of cork, mixed with the feel of the kiss” (102), rendering Nikolai’s experience rich and 
distinctive. Dolly’s painful sensation in her nipples in Anna Karenina illustrates the hardships of 
her experience of motherhood. In “The Death of Ivan Il’ich” (“Смерть Ивана Ильича”) the 
protagonist’s sensation leads to his spiritual epiphany. Ivan Il’ich recalls the abundance of saliva 
in his mouth when he, as a child, would get to the stone of a prune. The recollection evokes 
childhood memories, causing him to compare his childhood happiness to his current dread of 
death, and his past youthful innocence to the corruption of his adulthood. A “ничтожная 
подробность/trifling detail,” Merezhkovskii concludes, leads to a “обобщени[е]/generalization” 
(102). 
Additionally, Merezhkovskii suggests that the richness and precision of Tolstoi’s 
depictions of his characters’ sensory impressions, as well as instances of synesthesia (although 
Merezhkovskii himself does not use this term), reveal Tolstoi’s “утончающ[аяся] телесно-
духовн[ая] чувствительност[ь]/subtilizing physical and mental sensibility” (103). Because of 
this acute sensory sensibility, according to Merezhkovskii, Tolstoi’s style anticipates so-called 
“Decadent” art (Merezhkovskii esteems the art movement itself, while disapproving of the term). 
Similarly, Nabokov observes that Tolstoi’s attention to physical detail is unusual for Russian 
literature of the nineteenth century, even as late as the 1880s (to which he refers specifically), 
and identifies Tolstoi’s style as “pre-Modernist” (149).  
In keeping with Merezhkovskii’s admiration for Tolstoi’s aptitude in capturing bodily 
states and impressions, Prince Mirsky points to the “indivisible units of immediate perception” in 
Tolstoi’s fiction, which endow his narrative with “unusual freshness” (263). Prince Mirsky does 
not elaborate on his observation, but he seems to have in mind the richness of Tolstoi’s 
descriptions of reality, encompassing a variety of impressions and sensations in a single act of 
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perception.  
In “Art as Device” (“Искусство как прием”), Viktor Shklovskii, too, praises Tolstoi for 
his power of observation and keen perception, pointing to his ability to capture a phenomenon in 
all of its immediate freshness, as if perceived for the first time. Shklovskii contends that Tolstoi’s 
method, which he terms ostranenie (defamiliarization), allows the reader to overcome the 
automatism of perception and experience a phenomenon, rather than recall it from memory (13). 
In other words, by describing rather than naming things, Tolstoi creates an immediate 
perceptible reality in his fiction. 
Apart from seeing it as an element of style, commentators and scholars have pointed to 
the psychological significance of Tolstoi’s bodily imagery. Merezhkovskii made the seminal 
observation that Tolstoi’s characters’ bodily movements or facial expressions can reveal their 
inner states even better than their words: “Истинную, скрытую природу человека выдают они 
[человеческие телодвижения] скорее, чем слова. Один взгляд, одна морщина, один трепет 
мускула в лице, одно движение тела могут выразить то, чего нельзя сказать никакими 
словами” (98). The outer, he contends, points to the inner: the physical points to the emotional 
and spiritual (“от видимого — к невидимому, от внешнего — к внутреннему” 98).  
Similarly to Merezhkovskii, Viktor Vinogradov’s article “About Tolstoy’s language” (“О 
языке Толстого”) contends that body language in Tolstoi contributes to the psychological 
richness of his novels. Vinogradov defines the nature of the characters’ motor expressions as 
“psycho-physiological” (210). He points out that bodily gestures and movements in Tolstoi are a 
form of language and thus meaningful—revealing a particular trait of a character’s personality. 
The characters’ body language—like their verbal language—serves as a means of 
communication: “В тех же образах речи воплощается семантика выразительного тела” 
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(209). The characters can understand the language of one another’s facial expressions, gestures, 
and bodily movements:  
Л. Толстой признает в сложении, в игре тела, в позах и движениях «такое же, ежели 
еще не большее выражение, чем в лице». Автор и герои в повестях и романах 
Толстого в одинаковой мере и одинаковым способом воспринимают и понимают 
язык тела и движений, смысл их выражений. (209) 
 
In her study On psychological prose (О психологической прозе), Lidiia Ginzburg, too, 
emphasizes the psychological role of Tolstoi’s bodily descriptions, whereby their bodily 
experiences and expressions are individualized according to their personalities: “Реализм … 
заменил дедукцию наблюдением, типовое — индивидуальным” (377). Since the characters’ 
bodily details are highly personalized, they serve as one means of their psychological portrayal. 
Tolstoi’s keen observations of characters’ gestures along with their words help him to create a 
verisimilar illusion of life, combining the psychological and the physiological: “Подвергнутый 
анализу герой погружен у Толстого в физически уплотненный мир предметной 
действительности” (376). Minute details of life (“подробности жизни”), including bodily 
expressions, do not serve his fiction’s physiological naturalism but rather its psychological 
verisimilitude. Bodily details enable Tolstoi to recover and capture a person’s “psychological 
experience”: 
Толстому необходим анализ («рассудительство», «генерализация») и 
необходим совершенно конкретный предмет анализа — прежде всего человек, 
внутренний и внешний, вплоть до его жеста, слова. […] 
Но Толстой именно и не хотел оставаться на уровне скользящих восприятий, 
психологический опыт человека он хотел во что бы то ни стало извлечь из «бездны 
равнодушного забвения». И для этого-то — не для натуралистических описаний 
(сомнения в возможности натуралистически описать человека Толстой высказывал 
уже в ранних дневниках) — ему нужны были подробности жизни в их 
преувеличенной выпуклости и резкости. (377) 
  
The Soviet critic Mikhail Khrapchenko also emphasizes the link between the characters’ 
sensations and the characters’ psychological portrayal in Tolstoi’s fiction. For example, he 
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recalls the episode in War and Peace where Kutuzov’s facial expression conveys his cordiality 
and perspicacity (“Реализм Льва Толстого” 387). Khrapchenko stresses the psychological 
verisimilitude of Tolstoi’s bodily depictions rather than their richness. Similarly to Ginzburg and 
in contrast to Nabokov, he thus considers Tolstoi’s method to be manifestly realist.  
In Tolstoy and the Novel, John Bayley points out that the characters’ bodily details not 
only serve as a means of their individual psychological portrayal but that they also contrast the 
characters to one another. For example, Bayley observes that the characters’ opposing reactions 
to the same physical sensation reflect their opposing moods and thus their alienation from one 
another. While a cool summer day leaves Vronskii refreshed, it enervates Anna, from which 
Bayley concludes: “How could there be unity between two persons in such entirely different 
physical states?” (223). In his letter to Nikolai Strakhov on April 26, 1876, Tolstoi claims that 
bodily details in general, such as Anna Karenina’s shoulders or the way that Stiva Oblonskii eats, 
are neither accidental nor merely descriptive, but constitute a “labyrinth of linkages” meant to 
convey his ideas (62:269).1 The juxtaposition of the characters’ sensory impressions, pointed out 
by Bayley, is one example of the “labyrinth of linkages” that Tolstoi describes.   
Commentators’ inquiries into the moral meaning of Tolstoi’s bodily depictions highlight 
the writer’s ambivalence towards human physicality. Edward Wasiolek aptly captures Tolstoi’s 
inner conflict between the sensuous (one can add “sensory”) and the moral: “Tolstoy had a 
sensuous hunger for life and an intellectual and moral hunger for reducing the infinity of the 
sensual data to the finite limits of his mind” (Tolstoy’s Major Fiction 13). Although Wasiolek 
mentions this conflict only in passing, he addresses an important issue concerning the 
                                                 
1 On Tolstoi’s discussion of the “labyrinth of linkages,” see his letter to Nikolai Strakhov of April 26, 1876 (62:269), 
as well as James Curtis’s "The Function of Imagery in War and Peace," Gary Browning’s A Labyrinth of Linkages 
in Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, and Elisabeth Stenbock-Fermor’s The Architecture of Anna Karenina. 
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relationship between Tolstoi’s personal anxiety over human physicality and the richness of 
sensuous and sensory data in his fiction. Wasiolek’s observation, then, poses a question that 
inquires into the nature of the relationship between the characters’ morality and their sensory 
experiences.   
Bayley also addresses the relationship between the physical and the moral in Tolstoi’s 
fiction. His discussion of the moral implications of the characters’ physical experiences is 
equivocal and seems to reflect Tolstoi’s own ambivalence. Bayley suggests that the characters’ 
strong emotions are always expressed physically through their bodies, and are even generated 
from within, which he calls their “physical temperament” (231). Initially, Bayley argues that this 
connection often indicates the characters’ lack of moral sense. Vronskii and Stiva Oblonskii 
(Anna Karenina), for example, pay attention to their bodily sensations rather than to the feelings 
of other people, indicating that they are selfish and insensitive, and causing them to hurt those 
around them: “the state of one’s own body, not other people’s feelings, tell one whether an 
experience is good or bad” (222). He further contends that the characters remain in flux between 
right and wrong, unable to achieve an ultimate spiritual transformation precisely because of the 
power their bodies exert over their personalities. Richard Gustafson also observes the flux 
between the characters’ states of “residency” and “estrangement,” although, unlike Bayley, he 
associates this flux with the human psyche rather than morality. At the same time, Bayley does 
not seem to view the body as something that necessarily undermines the characters’ morality. 
Since Bayley believes that any strong emotion must manifest itself through the characters’ 
bodies, he concludes that instances of epiphany are also expressed in the characters’ acute 
sensory impressions—for example, those which Karenin experiences by Anna’s “deathbed.”  
Nabokov particularly highlights the metaphysical nature of the characters’ physical 
  
8 
experiences. For example, he praises Tolstoi’s depiction of Levin and Kitty’s baby’s wet diaper 
during a rainstorm in Anna Karenina. He argues that it is unclear in the narrative whether the 
diaper is wet because of the baby or because of the pouring rain. This ambiguity blurs the 
boundaries between the story’s humans and the world of nature, and, according to Nabokov, 
suggests that Levin and Kitty are immersed in nature not only physically but also 
metaphysically. He also admires, perhaps in keeping with his modernist appreciation of the 
human body, Tolstoi’s depiction of Kitty’s contracting muscles as she bathes her child (109) (I 
will discuss the significance of this detail in Chapter 4).  
Like Merezhkovskii, John Weeks, in his essay “Love, Death, and Cricketsong: Prince 
Andrei at Mytishchi,” maintains that “as it often happens in Tolstoi, a physical sensation seems 
to require interpretation in emotional or spiritual terms” (63). Thus, he also suggests that the 
outer points to the inner. He coins the term “synesthesia of moral perception” (63) to emphasize 
the connection between physical/sensory and metaphysical/spiritual experiences. However, he 
also suggests that physical sensations may not only reflect but also effect the characters’ “moral 
knowledge,” as happens to Andrei Bolkonskii before his death (War and Peace). Weeks argues 
that Bolkonskii’s mundane sensory impressions, such as the chirping of a cricket, the flopping of 
a fly, the drunken singing of an unseen stranger, and the guttering of a fungiform candle, produce 
“unphysical,” spiritual intuitions (73).  
Weeks further points out that Bolkonskii’s sensory-spiritual experiences reveal Tolstoi’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the physical, and thus the sensory. Weeks observes that Tolstoi 
highlights Bolkonskii’s sensory (“sensuous,” to return to Wasiolek’s term) experience once his 
spiritual experience has reached its peak. Paradoxically, instead of eliminating the corporeal 
aspect of Bolkonskii’s experience to indicate the victory of the spiritual over the physical, 
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Tolstoi imbues his sensory (corporeal) perceptions with epistemological and metaphysical 
(immaterial) meanings:    
What is striking in the fiction of this inveterate moralist is the way Tolstoy heightens the 
physicality of a sensation before elucidating it; he thereby implicitly rejects both 
psychological and physiological reductionism in constructing his model of human nature, 
Instead, Tolstoy offers his own synthesis, in which sensory perceptions play an 
epistemological, educative, and even—with the proper stimulus—a metaphysical role. 
(63)   
    
Similarly to Wasiolek, Weeks’s observation raises questions about the relationship between the 
spiritual and the corporeal in Tolstoi’s thought and art. One wonders if, by intensifying his 
sensory impressions, Tolstoi indicates Prince Andrei’s inability to separate himself from 
corporeal existence, or if, on the contrary, Tolstoi suggests that he transcends corporeal existence 
since these impressions are partially metaphysical (as Weeks argues).  
In keeping with Merezhkovskii’s, Wasiolek’s, Bayley’s, and Weeks’s inquiries, this 
dissertation examines the relationship between the physical and the moral in Tolstoi’s Anna 
Karenina. Since sexuality was one of Tolstoi’s major preoccupations throughout his life, and is 
central to the conflict of the novel, my research proposes that Tolstoi’s ongoing conflict between 
physical and spiritual is reflected in his representation of the most corporeal, sensual, and thus 
problematic of the senses: the sense of touch. 
Drawing from the theoretical apparatus provided by the interdisciplinary field of haptic 
studies, this dissertation often uses the term “haptic” instead of “touch” and examines not only 
the act of touching but also a variety of other bodily sensations: tactile, cutaneous, kinesthetic, 
and proprioceptive, all of which result from a person’s physical contact with the world. Using 
haptic theory, this dissertation argues that the characters’ physical contact with one another—and 
other phenomena of their material reality—reflects their conformity to or deviation from 
Tolstoi’s moral ideal. It demonstrates that the characters’ moral shortcomings undermine their 
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interpersonal and intrapersonal wholes, severing their touch with one another, distorting their 
sensory perceptions, and alienating them from their physical surroundings. By contrast, the 
characters’ conformity to Tolstoi’s moral ideal makes their touch a means of interconnection, and 
their sensory perception a means of gathering discrete perceptual phenomena into a single whole, 
immersing them into the world’s totality.  
My study therefore is informed by (1) Tolstoi’s moral views and attitudes towards human 
physicality, (2) commentators’ observations about the relationship between the moral and the 
bodily/sensory within Tolstoi’s fiction, and (3) insights into haptic perception provided by haptic 
studies. This examination will expand our understanding of the meanings that Tolstoi has 
encoded into bodily imagery in this novel, as well as ways in which Tolstoi’s own body-spirit 
conflict affects his representation of the body in his writing.        
  This dissertation consists of three main chapters. Chapter One discusses haptic theory, 
tracing the history of scholarship on haptic perception in the Western philosophical tradition 
from antiquity to the present. Since Tolstoi was raised in the Orthodox Christian tradition, which 
presumably influenced his thought, the chapter also discusses Orthodox Christian notions of the 
body and attitudes towards the senses. However, it emphasizes that Orthodox Christian 
conceptions of sensory perception only influenced Tolstoi’s writings after the writer’s radical 
turn to Christian asceticism in the 1880–90s and did not influence earlier writings such as Anna 
Karenina.  
Chapter Two discusses the development of Tolstoi’s moral vision and elucidates his 
conception of the body through the discussion of his attitudes toward human physicality, 
particularly sexuality and the other corporeal “vices.” It also examines the ways that he proposed 
to avoid, channel, or overcome the shortcomings of human flesh.  
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Chapter Three provides close readings of the haptic experiences of the novel’s major 
characters, including Stiva Oblonskii, Dolly Oblonskaia, Anna Karenina, Aleksei Karenin, 
Aleksei Vronskii, Konstantin Levin, Kitty Shcherbatskaia, and Nikolai Levin, as well as Sergei 
Koznyshev and Varen’ka. The chapter demonstrates how Tolstoi uses the characters’ haptic 
experiences to show the way in which their moral strengths and weaknesses affect their ability to 
establish unity with one another and with the world through touch.
12 
I. WHAT IS THE “HAPTIC”? 
Tolstoi’s anxiety about human sexuality engendered his conflicted attitude towards the 
body and affected his representation of the most “embodied” of the senses: the sense of touch. 
Tolstoi’s representation of touch and bodily sensation derives from three sources overlapping in 
his artistic imagination: his personal sensory experiences; Western philosophical conceptions of 
touch (especially those of Plato and Rousseau, whose works Tolstoi knew); and Orthodox 
Christian attitudes towards the body (the tradition in which Tolstoi was raised). Given the variety 
of personal, philosophical, and theological sources that shaped Tolstoi’s conception of touch, I 
propose that Tolstoi’s representation of touch can be best understood through the 
interdisciplinary field of haptic studies.  
Haptic studies is a relatively new and rapidly developing interdisciplinary field, a 
subfield of sensory studies2 which considers touch to be a multifaceted physiological, 
psychological, social, and spiritual experience, highlighting the role that bodily sensations play 
in shaping a person’s identity and interactions. The major contemporary interlocutors in the field 
of haptic studies, who shape the discipline and analyze the entire complex of human “haptic” 
experiences (not only “touch”), are the philosopher Mark Paterson, the literary scholars Abbie 
Garrington and Trish McTighe, the film scholar Laura U. Marks, and the architect Juhani 
Pallasmaa. 
                                                 
2 The Internet portal http://www.sensorystudies.org/ provides a helpful and the most up-to-date overview of the field 
of sensory studies, the scholars contributing to the field, publications, and course syllabi. An explanation of the term 
“haptics” (хаптика) in Russian can be found here: http://www.emory.edu/INTELNET/fs_haptics.html.   
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In his book The Senses of Touch, Mark Paterson introduces the term “haptic” and 
provides a helpful classification and explanation of what he understands “haptic” perception to 
be, which I will draw on in my study of the haptic elements in Tolstoi’s novel. With the term 
“haptic,” Paterson encompasses a variety of bodily perceptions, including but not limited to 
touch. Haptic experience is born of the contact between the body and the world outside the body, 
but it includes a broader variety of bodily sensations than simply touch. According to Paterson, 
haptic perception consists of the following categories: (1) cutaneous sensations that pertain to the 
sense of pressure, temperature, and pain; (2) tactile sensations that include cutaneous sensations 
but pertain particularly to the sense of pressure; (3) vestibular sensations that include the sense of 
balance, head position, acceleration, and deceleration; (4) kinesthetic sensations that originate in 
muscles, tendons, and joints, and convey the position and movement of body and limbs; and (5) 
proprioceptive sensations that include cutaneous, kinesthetic, and vestibular sensations and the 
sense of position and movement of the body in space. In addition, haptic perception, unlike 
touch, includes not only exteroceptive sensations (those coming from outside the body) but also 
interoceptive ones (those generated inside the body).  
Haptic studies considers the sense of touch to be central to haptic experience and draws 
on the discussions of touch from a variety of disciplines, such as philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, 
René Descartes, Denis Diderot, Walter Benjamin, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, and Jean-Luc Nancy), cultural studies (Constance Classen and David Howes), 
psychological and anthropological studies (Didier Anzieu and Ashley Montagu), as well as art 
and art history (Alois Riegl and Filippo Marinetti). Some haptic scholars (Abbie Garrington, 
Trish McTighe, and Mark Paterson) also comment on touch in the Christian tradition, which they 
denote as another subject of inquiry in haptic studies.   
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1. Touch in Western Philosophical Tradition 
Plato’s (427–347 BC) conception of the senses was prominent in Western philosophical 
thought and was familiar to Tolstoi. Plato’s “Phaedo”—which, according to Tolstoi’s diary, he 
had definitely read (46:117)—contains Plato’s conception of the senses in a nutshell. Plato 
associates the problem of sensory perception with epistemology and morality. He contrasts the 
body and the soul, inquiring whether man receives knowledge about the world through the body 
or directly through the soul, and which of the senses, if any, can be trusted to capture the image 
of the world truthfully and without distortion. In “Phaedo,” the protagonist Socrates poses these 
questions:  
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if 
invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and 
hearing any truth in them? are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate 
witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the 
other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them? […]  
Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in 
company with the body she is obviously deceived. (496–97)     
 
Separating the soul from the body, Plato views the soul as everlasting, and the body as something 
temporary, mortal, and thus unreliable. Such is the knowledge that man receives through his 
bodily senses. The body is an “inaccurate witness”—it deceives the soul and hinders her quest 
for truth: 
[W]hile we are in the body, and while the soul is mingled with the mass of evil, our 
desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of 
endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and also is liable to 
diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us as full 
of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents our 
ever having, as people say, so much as a thought. (498)  
 
Socrates concludes that a philosopher attains true knowledge not through bodily senses but 
through “the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or introduction of 
sight or any other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her 
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clearness penetrates into the very light of truth” (497). Therefore, a philosopher should have 
minimal communion with the body, so as to be free from its demands and needs, to disdain all 
vain, bodily pursuits such as nice clothing or indulgences in eating and drinking. Socrates 
welcomes death, because only after death is a philosopher’s soul/mind liberated from the vain, 
deceitful body in order to attain true knowledge: “that if we would have pure knowledge of 
anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and 
then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not 
while we live, but after death” (498).  
Although Plato generally distrusts the senses, his discussion suggests that he considers 
some senses superior to others. For instance, in the hierarchy of the senses in “Phaedo,” Plato 
ranks sight and hearing as the highest, presumably because both senses are mediated, perceiving 
information through the medium of air without direct bodily contact. Yet, in the famous “cave 
allegory” of “The Republic,” Plato considers sight alone to be the supreme sense, elevating it to 
the status of the mind, the incorporeal means of receiving knowledge.3 Plato describes man’s 
spiritual ascent through the allegory of his physical ascent from a cave, in which he sees only 
shadows, to the Earth’s surface, where he gazes directly at the sun. This ascension represents the 
development of man’s knowledge: from the limited, distorted, imperfect knowledge acquired 
through man’s senses, to the true knowledge, or “ideas,” acquired directly by man’s mind. It is 
                                                 
3 Plato’s understanding of sensory perception influenced subsequent philosophy:  for instance, Democritus was said 
to have blinded himself in order to “see” with his intellect (Jay 27). Democritus (c.460–370 BC), founder of an 
atomist school of Greek thought, first enumerated the senses, distinguishing sensory perception and another, 
superior form of knowledge. He expressed distrust in the extent to which the world as it appears to our senses 
corresponds to its true structure. Democritus insists that the soul or reason must clarify and, if necessary, correct 
sensory knowledge in order to gain knowledge of the finer, atomic structure of the external world (Jütte 34): “There 
are two forms of knowledge, one genuine, one obscure. To the obscure belongs all the following: sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine and is quite distinct from this … When the obscure form can no longer see, 
hear, smell, or taste the smaller things or perceive them by touching them, and the investigation has to become more 
subtle, they are replaced by the genuine form which possesses a more refined organ of knowledge.” (Fragment 11; 
Jütte 33)   
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thanks to Plato’s “cave allegory” that the sense of sight earned its reputation as the supreme 
sense in the Western philosophical and cultural tradition. Plato’s conception of the senses proved 
extremely influential, leading to the domination of sight and the denigration of the other, “lower” 
senses, particularly touch, in the Western “ocularcentric” world (Jay 33).   
Unlike Plato, Aristotle (384–322 BC) did not divide the soul from the body. Rather, he 
established a tight relationship between the two. He considers the soul to be a part of the material 
world and believes that the soul is made of the same, material particles as the body, being only 
grained more finely (13–14). Unlike Plato, who denigrates the body and its faculties as inferior 
to the immaterial being, Aristotle, in rejecting the immaterial being, appreciates physical life as 
the only form of existence and stresses the essential role of touch (and taste) as a means of its 
sustenance: “[b]oth these senses [touch and taste], then, are indispensable to the animal, and it is 
clear that without touch it is impossible for an animal to be” (104). In addition, Aristotle 
observes that touch occupies the largest organ of perception among the senses: namely, the flesh. 
Aristotle even suggests that perhaps touch is not a single sense, but rather a group of senses, as it 
perceives a variety of tangible sensations: for instance, hot and cold, or smooth and rough, in 
keeping with the field of haptic studies today. Since Aristotle struggles to pinpoint a particular 
organ that corresponds to the sense of touch, he concludes that touch is mediated, and that an 
organ of touch must be located somewhere inside the body. He concludes that flesh is not the 
organ of touch but only the “medium”—as air is for the senses of sight and hearing. Like air, 
flesh transmits a tactile signal from the object perceived to the perceiving organ. Flesh envelops 
the organ of the sense of touch in the same way that air envelops the senses of sight and hearing: 
“The flesh plays in touch very much the same part as would be played in the other senses by an 
air-envelope growing round our body” (68). Aristotle’s discussion of the sense of touch suggests 
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its spatial vastness and stresses how deeply tactile perception is interwoven into a person’s 
experience. Aristotle’s conception of flesh as a medium permanently enveloping man anticipates 
Christian anxieties about its role. Christian thought treats the senses as a liminal space between a 
person and the external world, solid or porous, protecting or exposing.                 
Although Aristotle links touch with man’s most primitive activities, associated with 
sustaining life, he considers it to be crucial for developing man’s intellectual abilities as well. 
While Plato claims that the bodily senses deceive the soul and distort knowledge, according to 
Aristotle, bodily senses are a faculty of the soul. Since Aristotle considers the mind to be a part 
of the body, though a most refined one, he believes that man develops his intellectual abilities by 
developing the discriminative abilities of his senses—especially touch. Aristotle argues that the 
dexterity of man’s hands reflects his well-developed intellectual abilities and, as such, 
distinguishes him from animals: “touch […] reaches in man the maximum of discriminative 
accuracy. When in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in 
respect of touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination. That is why man is 
the most intelligent of all animals” (62).  
Indeed, there is a certain ambiguity in Aristotle’s attitude towards touch, inherent in the 
role of touch itself in man’s experience. Like Plato, Aristotle still considers sight to be “the most 
highly developed sense” (86) and construes the sense of touch (which includes taste as well) as 
potentially corruptive, prone to gustatory and erotic pleasures, as he writes in “Nicomachean 
Ethics.” Aristotle believes that a person’s ability to discriminate sensations fosters his intellectual 
development. Thus, he argues that when man uses his senses, especially touch and taste, not to 
train his discriminative faculties but simply to enjoy their sensations, such sensory perceptions 
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are “slavish and brutish” (56) and should be restricted (even if it is only the accidental touching 
of certain body parts during exercise in the gymnasium):  
… they hardly take pleasure in making these discriminations, or at least self-indulgent 
people do not, but in the actual enjoyment, which in all cases comes through touch, both 
in the case of food and in that of drink and in that of sexual intercourse. … Thus the sense 
with which self-indulgence is connected is the most widely shared of the senses; and self-
indulgence would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, because it attaches to us not as 
men but as animals. To delight in such things, then, and to love them above all others, is 
brutish. For even of the pleasures of touch the most refined have been eliminated, e.g. 
those produced in the gymnasium by rubbing and by the consequent heat; for the contact 
characteristic of the self-indulgent man does not affect the whole body but only certain 
parts. (56)  
 
Yet, Aristotle’s warning against the sense of touch does not override its significance. The sense 
of touch should be controlled, but, if used wisely, can promote man’s discriminative and thus 
intellectual abilities. Although Aristotle does have some reservations about touch’s 
predisposition to gustatory and erotic indulgence, he nevertheless considers touch to be central to 
the development of man’s intellect, raising man above animal.  
 In keeping with Plato’s priviledge for sight, the least corporeal and most comprehensive 
of the senses, subsequent Western philosophy often regarded sight as a spiritual sense, having a 
“prospective” capacity (“The Nobility of Sight,” Hans Jonas, qtd. in Jay 24–25). Plato’s 
celebration of sight culminates in the thought of French philosopher René Descartes (1596–
1650), who inherited a Platonic attitude towards the senses and was vastly responsible for the 
domination of “ocularcentrism” in the Western cultural tradition. Descartes had reservations 
about the corporeal senses’ ability to attain true knowledge about the world. In Meditations on 
First Philosophy, Descartes concludes that sensory experiences are confusing and deceive man’s 
mind. Man can have sensory experiences whether he is sleeping or awake, and his mind cannot 
distinguish between reality and illusion: “For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, 
feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be 
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warmed” (83). Since man can experience sensory impressions while both awake and asleep, his 
sensory impressions reveal nothing about the true condition of his body and his environment. 
Consequently, Descartes concludes that one should seek true knowledge not in the external 
world, which cannot be known, but in the internal world of thought, which is the only thing that 
certainly exists. In order to arrive at true knowledge, one must contemplate his own process of 
thinking by withdrawing from sensory perceptions:  
I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from 
my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will 
regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. I will converse with myself and 
scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a 
more intimate knowledge of myself. I am a thing that thinks … even though the objects 
of my sensory experience and imagination may have no existence outside me, 
nonetheless the modes of thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory perception and 
imagination, in so far as they are simply modes of thinking, do exist within me—of that I 
am certain. (86–87) 
 
Although Descartes distrusts both the body and its senses, he proclaims vision, as the least 
corporeal of the senses, to be the closest to intellect. Similarly to Plato, he describes the act of 
thinking as seeing with the “mind’s eye” (88). In his treatise “Optics,” Descartes famously calls 
sight “the noblest and most comprehensive of the senses” (57), and claims that sight is crucial 
not only for our survival, but also for our imagination and knowledge. Unlike the other senses, 
sight can perceive longer distances and embrace vaster spaces, and thus can discover new things 
even beyond man’s immediate reach. Descartes associates the expanse of vision with that of 
knowledge. He stresses that men must empower their vision with various technical devices (for 
instance, telescopes) to attain a more comprehensive and accurate knowledge about the world: 
“Carrying our vision much further than our forebears could normally extend their imagination, 
these telescopes seem to have opened the way for us to attain a knowledge of nature much 
greater and more perfect than they possessed” (57). Both Plato and Descartes conceive of the 
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distant and least-embodied sense of vision as a powerful source of knowledge, and, by doing so, 
denigrate the proximate and most-corporeal sense of touch. Contrasted to sight, touch appears to 
be an imperfect, limited, and corrupted form of perception, obstructing man’s quest for true 
knowledge.    
Unlike Descartes, the Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) 
follows in Aristotle’s footsteps, announcing it necessary to cultivate all of the senses, including 
touch. Rousseau’s approach is daring given the “ocularcentrism” that had been predominately 
adopted by Western philosophy through Plato and Descartes (Jay 33). Rousseau believes that the 
perfection of a human being hinges on the refinement of his senses. Thus, Rousseau insists that it 
is vital that the senses receive proper training from early infancy. In Book IV of Emile, or on 
Education (1762), “The Profession of the Vicar of Savoy” (which Tolstoi knew very well), 
Rousseau associates the senses with a person’s “I.” His sensory experiences shape his 
understanding of himself as a distinct self, distinguished from the external world. Without 
experiencing sensory impressions, man would not be aware of his existence, which means, 
simply put, that he would not be:   
I exist and I have senses by which I am affected. This is the first truth that strikes me 
and to which I am forced to acquiesce. …  
My sensations take place in me, since they make me sense my existence; but their 
cause is external to me, since they affect me without my having anything to do with it, 
and I have nothing to do with producing or annihilating them. Therefore I clearly 
conceive that my sensation, which is in me, and its cause or its object, which is outside of 
me, are not the same thing. (270–71) 
 
Like Aristotle, Rousseau considers touch to be a fundamental sense and praises it as such. It is 
distributed all over the surface of the body and is always active: it is “a continual guard to warn 
us of all that can do it damage” (133). Similarly to Aristotle, Rousseau also celebrates touch’s 
discriminative capacity, confirming and thus furthering man’s knowledge about the world. 
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Unlike his predecessors, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, Rousseau does not distinguish 
between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ senses but believes that all senses should work in accord, verifying 
one another in order to allow man to attain true knowledge about worldly phenomena. Even 
sight, which Plato and Descartes pronounced to be the supreme sense closest to the intellect, may 
deceive. It extends far beyond man’s reach, so that the impressions man receives (for instance, 
the sizes of the objects and the distances to them) may be incorrect and distorted by distance. 
Touch alone can confirm or refute a person’s “defective” visual impressions:    
As touch concentrates its operations in the immediate vicinity of man, so sight extends its 
operations beyond him. That is what makes the operations of sight deceptive. At a glance 
a man embraces half of his horizon. In this multitude of simultaneous sensations and the 
judgments they call forth, how is it possible not to be deceived by any? Thus of all our 
senses sight is the most defective, precisely because it is the most extended; and far in 
advance of all the others, its operations are too quick and too vast to be rectified by them. 
(140)  
   
Rousseau recognizes that, in contrast to vision, touch is limited in the span of the space it can 
embrace. But because it is limited, it is careful, precise, and thus reliable: “because they are most 
limited, tactile judgments are surer; for, extending only so far as our hands can reach, they rectify 
the giddiness of the other senses which leap far ahead to objects they hardly perceive, while 
everything that touch perceives, it perceives well” (138).   
Like Aristotle, Rousseau believes that critical thinking hinges on the discriminative 
powers of the senses, especially the sense of touch: “To learn to think … it is necessary to 
exercise our limbs, our senses, our organs, which are the instruments of our intelligence” (125). 
In this regard, he sees a particular danger in not developing the sense of touch. If the sense of 
touch is not refined, man can fall under the spell of deceptive illusions and fears—especially at 
night, when he cannot rely on his vision. Rousseau compares a sighted man whose sense of touch 
is dull to someone who is blind for half of his life: at night, he is prone to deception by illusion (a 
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distant tree may look like a bush, and a fly, a few inches away from his eyes, may look like a 
distant bird) (133–34). A man, Rousseau contends, should develop his sense of touch in order to 
have “eyes in the tips of his fingers [instead of] in a candle maker’s shop” (133) in order to 
dispel illusions and obtain true knowledge about the world. 
Consequently, Rousseau sees the development of the discriminative power of the senses 
as the foundation of man’s morality. Rousseau explains that man possesses sensory perception 
from birth, but until he has learned to understand the nuances of his sensations, to compare, 
contrast, and derive conclusions from them, he has not learned to sense. To sense, for Rousseau, 
is not only to experience sensations, but also to make judgments about the phenomena 
perceived—to measure, to weigh, and to compare—to develop critical thinking, to make sense 
out of perceptions (132–33). The development of the five bodily senses, then, encourages the 
development of the “sixth sense”: the “common sense,” the intellect: “Thus what I would call 
sensual or childish reason consists in forming simple ideas by the conjunction of several 
sensations, and what I call intellectual or human reason consists in forming complex ideas by the 
conjunction of several simple ideas” (158). From critical thinking about physical phenomena, a 
person then learns to make more complex, moral judgments. Rousseau insists that a child should 
not be instructed in moral convictions, but that his judiciousness evolves naturally from his 
critical judgment, which in turn develops from his ability to judge his sensory impressions:  
To be wise one must discern what is not wise. How will your child know men if he does 
not know how to judge their judgments or detect their errors? It is bad to know what they 
think when one does not know whether what they think is true or false. Teach him, 
therefore, in the first place what things are in themselves, and you can teach him 
afterward what they are in our eyes. It is thus that he will know how to compare the 
opinion to the truth and to raise himself above the vulgar; for one does not know 
prejudices when one adopts them, and one does not lead the people when one resembles 
them. (187) 
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Having learned to analyze his sensory impressions, man learns to make critical and then even 
moral judgments.        
 Yet, Rousseau, just as Aristotle, does not necessarily believe that the senses are always 
good. The senses can be either a “bane or boon” (Smith, J. 103), so they should be controlled in 
order to prevent desires from extending beyond one’s natural needs. Man’s moral conduct is 
strongly contingent on the ways in which he uses his body. For example, hard labor restrains 
man’s passions, whereas a leisurely and idle lifestyle encourages them: 
Reading, solitude, idleness, the soft and sedentary life, and the society of women and 
young people are dangerous trails to blaze at his [a young man’s] age, and they keep him 
constantly close to the peril. It is by means of other objects of sense that I put his senses 
off the track; it is by setting another course for his energies that I turn them away from 
the one they were beginning to take. It is by exercising his body with hard labor that I 
restrain the activity of imagination that is carrying him away. When the arms work hard, 
the imagination rests. When the body is tired out, the heart does not become inflamed. 
(320) 
 
To sum up, Rousseau appreciates the senses greatly, and considers the senses to be central to the 
development of man’s intellectual abilities and moral judgment. Although touch is the most basic 
of the senses and is limited in the space it can reach, it is the most accurate of the senses because 
it alone can verify the accuracy of the measurements estimated by the unreliable sense of sight. 
Touch is certainly no less, and perhaps even more, reliable than vision—especially in the dark, 
when man’s fingers become his eyes, allowing him to see and dispel illusions and fears. Yet, like 
Aristotle, Rousseau believes that the senses should be always checked, so as not to allow desires 
to take control over man.  
 Rousseau’s contemporary and fellow Enlightenment thinker Denis Diderot (1713–1784) 
made observations on touch that deserve special attention. In his essay “Letter on the Blind for 
the Use of Those Who See” (1749), Diderot, like Rousseau, praises touch for its discriminative 
abilities, which make it a reliable conductor of knowledge about the world: “If ever a 
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philosopher, blind and deaf from his birth, were to construct a man after the fashion of Descartes 
… he would put the seat of the soul at the fingers’ ends, for thence the greater part of the 
sensations and all his knowledge are derived” (104). However, Diderot’s essay is notable not 
only for its appreciation of touch’s epistemic value.  Diderot vindicates touch from its 
widespread accusations of promoting immorality. The blind’s reliance on touch had long been 
deemed an expression of their excessive sensuality and thus corruption. The cultural scholar 
Constance Classen comments on the phenomenon, prevalent especially in the Middle Ages:  
[t]he blind were often depicted as being enclosed in their bodies, unable to raise their 
thoughts above base desires and therefore concerned only with physical gratification. 
Furthermore, premodern medical lore held that blindness itself could result from an 
overindulgence in sexual activity … the blind, it seems, having no sight, must be all 
desiring touch. (52) 
 
Arguing against this view, Diderot insists that blindness promotes a person’s morality. For 
instance, he argues that a blind man abhors theft, since his lack of sight makes him vulnerable to 
both those who want to steal from him and those from whom he wants to steal (81). A blind man 
is also modest, since he is not sensible to certain exposed body parts that can seduce a sighted 
person (81). Likewise, he is less likely to be vain, since he would be attracted to another person 
for his/her intellect rather than for his/her looks (150). Therefore, Diderot conceives of sight 
rather than touch as the sense prone to seduction and corruption, radically departing from the 
Platonic and Cartesian elevation of sight and denigration of touch. In addition, Diderot reframes 
the discussion of touch, considering it not only from an epistemological and ethical perspective 
but also from a psychological one, discussing the role of the senses in a person’s mundane life 
and thus anticipating twentieth-century conceptions.  
Nineteenth-century European philosophy primarily shifted its interest towards the 
discussion of history and socio-economic problems and had little concern for sensory perception. 
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When discussing the senses in nineteenth-century European culture, the scholar Robert Jütte, for 
example, draws his conclusions not so much from philosophical discourse as from various social 
phenomena, including medicine, theories of art, and contemporary reactions to technological 
inventions.  
Jütte concludes that nineteenth-century industrialization, urbanization, and technological 
invention led to man’s alienation and isolation. On the one hand, the nineteenth century sought to 
enhance sensory perception: the stethoscope and the stereoscope were invented to enhance 
vision, the telegraph to enhance vociferation/hearing, and the railroad system to increase the 
mobility of the body—all introducing man to a “new consciousness of space and distance” (Jütte 
181). In Capital (1867), Marx argues that machine labor should liberate man’s muscles and 
relieve his nervous system’s exhaustion of (Jütte 185). However, these technological inventions 
not only enhanced sensory perception, but also disturbed man’s sensory organs and, 
consequently, his wellbeing. Jütte refers to an article published in 1899 in the Bern periodical 
Der Neue Hausfreund (The New Friend of the Family), which draws attention to the unhealthy 
consequences of urbanization and the harm it inflicted on the senses: city-dwellers “could feel 
tension all around them” and complained that “[t]he tortured brain is occupied day and night; day 
and night it is an overheated machine operating under maximum stream pressure” (qtd. in Jütte 
183). The doctor and psychiatrist Theodor Ziehen in his article on neurasthenia, published in 
1898, also points to the “modern” syndrome, which included such health issues as deterioration 
of vision, acute hearing impairment, and diminished or increased skin sensitivity (185).  
Although industrialization affected all of the senses, Jütte argues that sight was 
challenged the most. On the one hand, a variety of optical devices (primarily the camera, but also 
such popular gadgets as the Thaumatorope introduced in 1825, and the Phenakistoscope and 
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Zootrope invented in the 1830s) made the nineteenth century heir to the Cartesian hierarchy of 
the senses, with sight dominating (187). On the other hand, these optical devices, Jütte 
concludes, undermined the supremacy of physical sight, disrupted man’s perception of reality, 
and thus alienated man from the material world around him. Jütte cites the French cultural 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who noted just a few years after the invention of photography that it 
“dissolve[es] the solid and compact reality of everyday perception into an infinity of fleeting 
profiles” (qtd. in Jütte 196). Similarly, another witness of nineteenth-century visual hegemony, 
American writer Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote that “matter as a visible object is of not great use 
any longer […]. Give us a few negatives of a thing worth seeing, taken from different points of 
view, and that is all we want of it. Pull it down or burn it up, if you please” (qtd. in Jütte 196). In 
other words, as Jay summarizes the nineteenth-century attitude towards vision, “the initially 
euphoric exploration of new visual practices ultimately led to a certain disillusionment,” which 
fed subsequent antiocular discourse (150) and prepared the rise of discourse on the significance 
of touch in twentieth-century Western thought. 
While the above-discussed philosophers, from antiquity to the eighteenth century 
(Aristotle, Rousseau, and Diderot), appreciated touch as a source of knowledge about the world 
and a means of intellectual and even moral development, twentieth-century thinkers often focus 
on its role in the sphere of psychology rather than epistemology. Twentieth-century discourse on 
touch emphasizes its significance for human interpersonal and intrapersonal experiences, 
considering the role that touch plays in shaping a person’s identity and the way in which touch—
or the lack thereof—affects a person’s realm of emotions.  
Struggling to find a cure for men disrupted and alienated from one another by the 
tribulations of the World War I, Filippo Marinetti’s (1876–1944) manifestoes “Tactilism: A 
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Futurist Manifesto” (1921) and “Tactilism: Toward the Discovery of New Senses” (1924) claim 
that touch is a desired means of fostering human empathy and facilitating a more profound 
connection among people. Marinetti believes that tactile sensations of textures and temperatures 
convey various emotional experiences (touch can be cold, persuasive, reasoning, irritating, or 
willful; soft, warm, sensual, witty, or affectionate), and calls for refining the skin’s sensitivity. 
He explains that tactile sensitivity can help to re-habituate people to perceive and express 
emotions, and thus reconnect them with one another. If, when touching one another (bumping, 
holding, or stroking), people fail to decode the message that the touch conveys, their 
communication remains obfuscated by the imperfection of their tactile communication, insincere 
and superficial:    
I have realized that human beings speak to one another with their mouths and their eyes, 
but they never quite manage to be totally sincere, because of the insensibility of skin, 
which is ever a poor conductor of thoughts. While two individuals can communicate their 
most intimate selves by means of eyes and voices, the sense of touch conveys almost 
nothing when they bump into each other, wrap themselves around, or stroke one another. 
(372) 
 
Learning to translate these tactile sensations into emotions, a person learns to communicate on a 
deeper emotional level, if not a spiritual one, with another person.  
On the intrapersonal level, sensory impressions constitute a person’s identity and connect 
his past with his present, ensuring the continuity of a person’s “I.” Sensory perceptions form 
memories engraved in one’s body, so that a person’s past persists through his bodily sensations, 
gestures, and movements. In his influential treatise Matter and Memory (1896), Henri Bergson 
(1859–1941) argues that a person is never free from his past: he re-lives his past in his present 
every time he performs a gesture or a bodily movement that he once performed before. “Habits 
formed by repeated action are amassed in the body: they do not merely represent the past but act 
it” (37). In Marcel Proust’s (1871–1922) novel In Search of Lost Time (1913–27), sensory 
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impressions become the protagonist’s gateway into his past. The taste (and, one can add, the 
touch) of cake unexpectedly triggers the protagonist-narrator’s long-lost memory of his aunt, 
who once gave him a madeleine cake dipped into her tea on a Sunday morning back home in 
Combray. This sudden, involuntary recollection proves key to other distant memories and gives 
him a creative impulse, allowing him to rescue his vanished past from oblivion. In addition, and 
perhaps even more importantly for our understanding of touch, in recapturing his past, the 
protagonist regains his sense of the continuity of his “I.” This, in its turn, gives him the key to his 
future, in which he becomes the narrator capturing his rediscovery of his past. One touch, which 
takes place in a transient present instant, then extends into both his past and his future, giving 
him the sense of immortality (“I ceased now to feel mediocre, accidental, mortal” (Proust 50–
54)). Through the taste-touch of the cake, Proust’s protagonist is reintegrated with his past, 
recovers the wholeness of his personality, becomes immersed in the texture of life, and even 
transcends its boundaries—overcoming his sense of personal transience.  
Touch is at the center of the ontological structure, something that not only unites people 
with one another but stitches all things together into a single indivisible whole, as the 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) argues in his essay, “The Intertwining—
The Chiasm” (The Visible and the Invisible) (1964). Merleau-Ponty models his ontology on the 
sense of touch, since touch represents the idea of direct contact between two bodies more vividly 
than any other sense. For Merleau-Ponty, all other senses serve the same purpose as touch—to 
facilitate contact between bodies—so he considers the other senses to be only modifications. He 
views the universe as an interlinked whole, whose constituent elements are open to and 
interconnected with one another through acts of perception—whether visual, aural, or tactile.  
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Depicting the hiatus between all things, Merleau-Ponty introduces the “element” of 
“flesh” (139), giving this element a distinctly corporeal name although it is not, strictly speaking, 
a material element. “Flesh,” he argues, is born from the act of perception/touch between things, 
and coils over things, blurring their boundaries and making things open to one another. In other 
words, “flesh” binds all things together:  
Once again, the flesh we are speaking of is not matter. It is the coiling over of the visible 
upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in 
particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such 
that, simultaneously, as tangible it descends among them, as touching it dominates them 
all … The flesh … is not contingency chaos, but a texture that returns to itself and 
conforms to itself. (146)   
 
“Flesh” is the space where active acts of perception (seeing and touching) and passive acts of 
perception (being seen and touched) meet, making interaction possible. Every body is “sensible 
sentient” (136), both the object and the subject of perception, simultaneously participating in acts 
of seeing and being seen, touching and being touched. Therefore, every act of perception is 
reversible, simultaneously active and passive: one who sees is also seen, and one who touches is 
also touched, which facilitates interconnectedness of all things. Therefore, “flesh” is not an 
obstacle between things but “a means of communication” (135), where things’ boundaries blur 
and interpenetrate.   
Through the act of perception, two—the perceiver and the perceived—are melded into 
one indivisible whole, becoming one universal body: “the seer and the visible reciprocate one 
another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen” (139). Merleau-Ponty compares 
such “synergy” to a human body, whose two hands are separated but still interconnected through 
the body’s intercorporeality: “When one of my hands touches the other, the world of each opens 
upon that of the other because the operation is reversible at will, because they both belong (as we 
say) to one sole space of consciousness … because they are the hands of one same body” (141).    
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It follows from Merleau-Ponty’s body- and touch-centered ontology that man is never 
isolated. As both the subject and the object of perception, he naturally partakes in the universal 
interconnectedness of all things and shares all others’ worlds. However, if the senses are natural 
gateways that open people to one another, melding them into one whole, one can speculate that 
an individual is alienated if they use their senses to perceive their own rather than another’s 
body, become insensitive to another’s touch, or hurt another without feeling the pain that they 
cause.4  
Going back to Marinetti’s, Bergson’s, and Proust’s understanding of touch as a 
profoundly personal sense, deeply woven into one’s emotions, the anthropologist Ashley 
Montagu (1905–1999) considers touch within a person’s emotional sphere. In his book 
Touching: The Human Significance of Skin (1986), he argues that touch is a powerful expression 
of empathy and love: “[w]here touching begins, there love and humanity also begin—within the 
first minutes following birth” (xiv). He argues that physical touch and the emotional sphere are 
linked anatomically through the ectoderm, one of the three embryonic cell layers, which gives 
rise to both the skin and the nervous system: “The nervous system is … a buried part of the skin” 
and the skin is an “external nervous system” (5). Therefore, by touching a person’s skin, one 
penetrates a person’s inner sphere of emotions: stroking children, caressing lovers, and touching 
the ill to alleviate their pain and suffering, we exchange affection and empathy.  Montagu argues 
that “the communications we transmit through touch constitute the most powerful means of 
establishing human relationships, the foundation of experience” (xv). Depriving themselves of 
tactile interaction, people loosen their connections with one another. Lacking profound 
                                                 
4 Merleau-Ponty’s ontology does not allow for isolation, yet it is important for my research to speculate what kinds 
of perception can lead to the isolation of one person from another in order to reveal instances when Tolstoi’s 
characters are united with or alienated from one another.  
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interaction, man fails to know another person and thus is diminished to a “faceless figure” 
stripped of individuality (xiv). Montagu argues that one can truly know another person only 
through touch, and thus he considers touch as a powerful means of communication and 
communion between people. However, the lack of tactile interaction between people leads to 
their emotional alienation from one another.   
The philosopher Richard Kearney (b. 1954) stresses the dramatic “excarnation” (4) 
affecting those who substitute real, physical touch with digitalized and therefore distant and 
detached forms of communication. In his article “Losing our Touch” (2014), he argues that 
tactile privation, or indirect touch communicated through a proxy, is a symptom of emotional 
detachment, reflecting a person’s estrangement, loss of empathy, and stunted capacity for 
intimate emotional connection. Kearney’s particular preoccupation is with the proxy of modern 
digital technology. Having invaded even love and sex, the most intimate and tactile spheres of 
human life, digital technology deprives man not only of physical touch but also, subsequently, of 
natural human empathy, rendering him unsympathetic and emotionally distant: “touched by 
nothing” (4). The absence of physical touch, in this case direct contact with another’s body, 
deprives man of his capacity to reveal his inner, intimate world, and limits his ability to 
sympathize and experience true emotional reciprocity.   
To conclude, the sense of touch has engendered a variety of contradictory interpretations 
in the Western philosophical tradition, revealing thinkers’ many anxieties. On the one hand, 
touch was denigraded as the most corporeal and imperfect of the senses. While vision was 
understood as a metaphor for intellectual insight (in Plato), and was deemed to expand and 
promote a person’s imagination and knowledge about the world (in Descartes), touch was 
considered to be proximate, limiting a person’s concerns to the reality within his reach: the realm 
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of base, carnal interests (in both Plato and Aristotle). On the other hand, touch was also praised 
for its discerning capacity and the precision of knowledge that it grants, particularly in 
connection with the dexterity of hand, which elevates human beings above other animals (in 
Aristotle) and gives a person knowledge more accurate than vision (in Rousseau and Diderot).  
Touch facilitates the universal intertwinement of all things—whether it be actual physical 
contact or contact mediated through other senses (in Merleau-Ponty). Such a universal unity 
implies that, in touching the other, one is simultaneously touched. If this unity were to be 
realized in practical terms, no party would be able to harm another without simultaneously 
feeling the pain that they inflict. On the level of human relations, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
suggests that, if a person is not hurt by the harm he inflicts on the other, it indicates his isolation 
from the whole. Similarly, psychology and anthropology deem touch to be the most powerful 
mediator of interpersonal relations. Being the most intimate of the senses, touch conveys love, 
affection, and empathy, and facilitates profound emotional unity among people. When one 
reaches out and touches the body of the other, one overrides the distance—both physical and 
emotional—that separates them. Yet, when touch is avoided, denied, or is indirect 
(communicated through a proxy, as Kearney suggests), it indicates a person’s alienation from all 
others.  
Analyzing the haptic perceptions of Tolstoi’s characters in Anna Karenina, I will focus in 
particular on whether their touch is direct or indirect, indulged or avoided, on whether it refines 
or distorts their knowledge about the world, encourages or undermines their morality, and 
facilitates or undermines their unity.    
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2. The Body and the Senses in Orthodox Christianity  
Since Tolstoi grew up and lived in a manifestly Orthodox Christian milieu, one may ask 
whether an Orthodox conception of the body and the senses had any influence on Tolstoi, 
especially as pertaining to Anna Karenina.  
Orthodox Christianity, in some ways, shares Western philosophy’s epistemological and 
ethical preoccupations. It strives to define when the body and the senses bring a person closer to 
a union with the divine and, consequently, with other people, and when, on the contrary, they 
impede his spiritual progress. Although Christianity shaped Tolstoi’s moral views, especially his 
conception of the body (as I demonstrate in Chapter 2 in which I focus on Tolstoi’s moral 
vision), Christian attitudes regarding the senses seem to have had little effect on Tolstoi’s 
representation of touch in Anna Karenina.  
The Orthodox Christian tradition advocates a more positive conception of the body as 
compared to that of the Western Church. Orthodox Christianity draws strongly on the Apostle 
Paul’s conception of the body. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul emphasizes that the 
body is not something evil and opposed to the spirit, but rather is the Holy Spirit’s temple, and 
thus must be cared for and kept in purity: “Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy 
Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a 
price, therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God’s” (1 Cor 6:19–20). 
A person’s “body” belongs to “God,” just as a person’s soul.  
In Orthodox theology, Christ’s body represents the unity of all people with one another 
and with God through the flesh that Christ accepted in his earthly life. When God descended into 
humanity, he shared in its now-corrupted nature, allowing him to redeem human nature from this 
corrupted state by sacrificing his own body. The Apostle Paul envisages the Church through the 
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analogy of the human body in order to emphasize its members’ unity in Christ: “[f]or as the body 
is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one 
body: so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews 
or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit” (1 Cor 
12:12–13). The fact that God descended into a corrupt human body and suffered in order to 
restore its unfallen state proves, in the Orthodox imagination, that the human body was worth 
saving and thus emphasizes its initial goodness. More importantly, this line of logic also 
emphasizes that human beings share their corporeal nature with Christ, participating in unity 
with God corporeally as well as spiritually.  
Even though God’s incarnation rescued human beings from the corruption and mortality 
inherent in all living matter and gave them the hope for resurrection after death, it did not cleanse 
their physical bodies from crude physical longings and needs—presenting a challenge to their 
spiritual life. In order to resolve the conflict between the body’s inherent goodness and man’s 
unholy desires, which seem to originate in his body or at least engage it, the Orthodox tradition 
makes an important distinction between the “body” and the “flesh.” Paul calls these bodily needs 
and desires “flesh,” distinct from “body,” which he sees as a “temple of the Holy Ghost.” As 
Bishop Kallistos Ware comments, while “Paul’s view of the flesh is sombre, his estimate of the 
body is highly affirmative” (94). The goal of ascetic practices, including self-mortification, is to 
cleanse the “body” (the “temple of the Holy Ghost”) from all that is “flesh.” In Unfading Light, 
the Russian religious philosopher Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944) summarizes the nature of the 
Orthodox ascetic discipline, bearing in mind the Pauline difference between the “body” and the 
“flesh,” as the following: because “[Orthodox] Christianity sees in the body not the fetter but the 
temple of God,” ascetic practice is, then, “the struggle not against the body but for the body” 
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(254–55). By this, Bulgakov means that, by mortifying his body, an ascetic strives to purify his 
body of its “fleshly” desires and needs and restore the “body’s” inherent uncorrupted state, 
making it—as much as is possible in earthly life—a vessel worthy of God’s grace.   
Orthodox Christianity sees human nature as “twofold—both the material and the 
spiritual,” both because man was initially created from matter but in the image of God, and 
because God descended into human flesh but deified it with his presence, intertwining the 
corporeal and the incorporeal planes of human being (Louth 97). Because human beings are 
“twofold,” their religious life encompasses both spiritual and corporeal aspects, engaging not 
only their minds but also their bodies. The fundamental principle of Orthodox Christianity is that 
“God uses materiality as the medium of his salvific power” (McGuckin 358), so Orthodox 
tradition insists on the importance of a believer’s daily bodily and sensory participation in 
worshiping God. Orthodox worship appeals not only to a person’s vision, through icons, but also 
to his other senses, immersing a person in spiritual life through corporeal participation. By 
looking at icons, a person looks not only at a physical image, but also appeals to the divine that 
the image portrays. Icons communicate the presence of an invisible spiritual plane in the visible 
corporeal world, “remind[ing] us that the boundary between the heaven and earth is indeed thin” 
(117), as Louth explicates. As Ware comments on the participation of the other senses in 
worship, “[a]ll five senses have a part to play in worship: not only sight and hearing, but taste (at 
the Eucharist), touch (through anointing, through the laying-on of hands, through kissing the 
dead body, and also through kissing the holy icons in church and at home), and even smell 
(through the aromatic substances in the chrism, and through the burning of incense both in 
church and in the home)” (Ware 104). The purpose of sensory participation in worshipping God 
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is that the spiritual reaches out to a person, entering his body (and thus also his soul, which is 
linked) through his senses as he participates in a spiritual act.  
Aligning with the Orthodox Christian tradition, Tolstoi does not view the body as 
something inherently corrupt that must be done away with. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 
2 on Tolstoi’s moral vision, he increasingly insists on the necessity of controlling vicious 
“fleshly” desires (sex, gluttony, idleness, and vanity). However, up until the late 1870s, he 
considers human sexual activity to be morally acceptable (but only within the boundaries of 
marriage, and then only if sex yields a child). While he censures the body for the “fleshly” 
desires which undermine a person’s spiritual resolve, he praises the body when it is used for 
other moral and proper activities, such as serving other people (this idea begins to dominate his 
thought in the 1880s).  
Christian Orthodoxy’s influence on Tolstoi’s conception of the senses is not especially 
evident in the works written before his radical turn to asceticism in the 1880s. Although Tolstoi’s 
other fictional writings are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth pointing out that one 
can find echoes of the Christian Orthodox conception of the senses in his later works, 
particularly his short story “Father Sergius” (1898). It is unlikely that Tolstoi adopted this 
deliberately, but his representation of the senses in “Father Sergius” strikingly resembles the way 
in which the senses are presented in the Hesychast tradition, particularly in John Climacus’s 
(579–649) Ladder of Divine Ascent and Gregory Palamas’ (1296–1359) The Triads.  
Both of these theologians portray the senses as doors between a person’s spirit and the 
outward, corrupted world, and thus both consider the senses potentially dangerous for a person’s 
spiritual resolve. The goal of ascetic practices for each of these theologians is to achieve a state 
of inner stillness (or, hesychia) in which, by God’s grace, he can acquire the presence and 
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knowledge of God: he “liv[es] outwardly with men but inwardly with God” (Climacus 52), and 
his “mind[,] purified by prayer, acquires and sees in himself the grace promised to those whose 
hearts have been purified” (Palamas 42). In order to achieve this state of inner stillness, or 
hesychia, an ascetic should mute his senses. Climacus represents the world as a place swarming 
with demons who incite a person’s sensuality, pride, and other vices. He suggests that a 
momentary external sensory impression can stir up a person’s desires: “with an eye alone, with a 
mere glance, by the touch of a hand, through a song overheard, the soul is led to commit a 
definite sin of unchastity without any notion or evil thought” (183). He reiterates the danger of 
sensory impressions in the next paragraph, writing that “a pleasing sight, a touch of the hand, the 
scent of perfume, or the sound of sweet voices can be enough to generate evil thoughts” (183). 
So, a person is attacked by the seductive impulses of the world through all of his senses.5 Yet, 
since Climacus is particularly preoccupied with human sexuality, which he sees as an especially 
grave sin, he concludes that touch, directly engaged in consummation of sexual desire, is the 
most dangerous: “[t]he body can be defiled by the merest touch, for of all the senses this is the 
most dangerous” (178). Climacus concludes that, in order for one to preserve his purity, he 
should render himself insensitive to all worldly impressions, especially ones appealing to his 
touch: “Let your hand be dead to everything natural or otherwise, to your own body or to that of 
another” (178). In other words, a person should mute his senses, rendering them insusceptible to 
all worldly disturbance.  
Palamas suggests that an ascetic should collect his thoughts in the inner space of his 
body, in his heart (which hesychasts see as a locus of human spirituality), and alienate himself 
                                                 
5 Climacus includes vision, hearing, touch, and smell. He omits taste, probably not because he excludes it from the 
dangerous senses but rather because it is a less ‘momentary’ sense—one can witness or overhear something or be 
touched in passing, but one cannot taste in passing. So, taste is simply an unfitting example in this particular context. 
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from all external impulses reaching him through the senses: “gather together our mind, which 
has been dissipated abroad by the senses, and lead it back again into the interior, to the selfsame 
heart which is the seat of the thoughts” (Palamas 43). While Climacus censures touch because of 
its inherent carnality, Palamas’ attitude towards touch is more ambiguous. On the one hand, 
touch is susceptible to passion and, even once these passions are defeated, touch challenges an 
ascetic’s most basic need for physical comfort: since touch is always active, it is the hardest 
sense to disregard and mute. On the other hand, because touch is associated with pain, Palamas 
considers touch to be particularly useful for a person battling his passions: “For as all who have 
experienced ascetical combat, sensation painful to the touch is of greatest benefit to those who 
practice inner prayer” (48). Touch, therefore, is not only the most carnal but also the most 
spiritual of the senses, since it helps a person to subdue his passions and purify his body from all 
vicious impulses and desires. Finally, when a person becomes insensitive to the tactile impulses 
of his body, it indicates that he has won his combat over the corrupted, carnal, aspects of his 
personality.   
In “Father Sergius,” Tolstoi, too, portrays the senses as a liminal space between the 
corrupted world and the protagonist’ inner, spiritual realm. Throughout the story, the protagonist, 
Kasatskii (aka Father Sergius), struggles to ward off the irritating and seductive impressions of 
the external world that prevent him from finding inner peace. When he tries to escape from 
worldly vanity into a monastery, he can see and hear people chatting during the service, 
triggering his judgment. He can also smell the tobacco and wine on the general whom he used to 
serve, who now comes to the church to mock him, challenging his vow of humility. Tolstoi 
conveys Kasatskii’s stirred sensuality via tactile sensations. When the lascivious woman, 
Makovkina, appears at the door of his secluded cellar, he becomes aware of the textures of the 
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things around him: Tolstoi describes the floor as cold and moist when Kasatskii bows and 
touches it with his forehead as he prays, trying to suppress his surfacing attraction. In order to 
seduce him, Makovkina also confuses his senses. While he hides from her in an adjacent room, 
so that she cannot touch him directly to show off her bare skin, she is sure to make suggestive 
noises that incite his imagination: she steps on the floor with her bare feet, taking off her dress 
and stockings with a sound loud enough for Kasatskii to hear through the wall, thus compelling 
him to picture these sexually charged activities against his will. 
In keeping with the Christian ascetic tradition, Kasatskii uses physical pain to subdue his 
sexual desire: he tries to burn his hand in a candle flame, and when he can no longer endure it, 
takes the more radical step of cutting off his finger. Neither Climacus nor Palamas offers self-
mutilation as a way of dealing with temptation. Tolstoi clearly relies on other ascetic sources (he 
actually mentions the life of a saint whose example Kasatskii tries to follow by burning his hand 
on the candle). However, Palamas does mention pain as a means of taming carnal desires, so 
Kasatskii’s attempts to subdue his desire recall Palamas’ views on pain’s spiritual benefits, and 
thus the benefits of the sense of touch.  
While Tolstoi problematizes the senses in “Father Sergius” in a manner similar to the 
Orthodox theologians, he does not do so in Anna Karenina. The novel was written before 
Tolstoi’s views on human corporeality turned to radical asceticism, which exacerbated his fear of 
the body, compelling him to believe that the body should be protected and thus rendered 
insensitive to any external influences that could trigger unwanted desires. In Anna Karenina, 
both the indulgence in bodily/sensory delights and the lack of bodily/sensory engagement point 
to the characters’ shortcomings. For instance, Stiva’s overindulgence in physical sensations is 
one of the signs of his moral corruption (as I discuss in the chapter on Oblonskii), whereas 
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Vronskii’s, Karenin’s, Koznyshev’s and Varen’ka’s alienation from the physical is associated 
with their inability to connect with others on a deep emotional level (albeit for different reasons, 
as I show in the respective chapters). While writing Anna Karenina, Tolstoi viewed both of these 
extremes to be wrong modes of living. 
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II. TOLSTOI’S MORAL VISION: BETWEEN THE CARNAL AND THE SPIRITUAL 
Throughout his life, Tolstoi’s attitude towards human physicality became increasingly 
negative. Tolstoi underwent several crises that made him particularly anxious about the 
possibility of reconciling carnal impulses with spiritual aspirations. Anna Karenina, written at 
one of the turning points in Tolstoi’s meditation on morality, encompasses both Tolstoi’s moral 
views prior to writing the novel and those that evolved while he wrote it. Therefore, this chapter 
focuses on Tolstoi’s moral vision from the early 1850s to the late 1880s in order to trace the 
development of Tolstoi’s conception of human physicality and pave the way for an analysis of 
the haptic in Anna Karenina.  
1. Sexuality: Between Sex and Abstinence   
Tolstoi’s conflict between the sexual and the spiritual is evident from his earliest writings 
of the 1850s. In his diary of 1851, young Tolstoi ponders the mysterious link between the body 
and the soul, which incites man’s contradictory impulses: “В таинственной связи души и тела 
заключается разгадка противоречащих стремлений” (46:140). A student of the 
Enlightenment (Eikhenbaum, Molodoi Tolstoi 23, 44), he advocates self-perfection as his life’s 
goal: “Счастье есть добродетель. Юность чувствует это бессознательно, но различные 
страсти останавливают ее в стремлении к этой цели” (46:213–14).  
Young Tolstoi considers sexual desire itself to be natural and permissible, and finds its 
satisfaction immoral only outside of marital bonds: “[Э]то влечение естественное и которому 
удовлетворять я нахожу дурным только по тому неестественному положению, в котором 
нахожусь (холостым в 23 года)” (46:91). If marriage is not an option, Tolstoi suggests 
42 
channeling (wicked) sexual desires into (virtuous) activities, or, in other words, sublimating the 
desires of the body and relieving those desires through activities that do not contradict his 
spiritual values: “Cредство против как той, так и другой причины [body and imagination that 
incite his desires] есть труд и занятия, как физические — гимнастика, так и моральные — 
сочинения. … [Н]ичто не поможет, исключая силы воли и молитвы к Богу — избавить от 
искушения” (46:91). Tolstoi even believes that human flesh could be entirely transformed 
through self-perfection: “необходимо усовершенствование, при котором удовлетворение 
плотских потребностей не противоречит или даже совпадает с удовлетворением духовных 
потребностей” (1854; 47:38). Tolstoi does not explain how exactly this self-perfection might be 
achieved, but given the Enlightenment rhetoric in the passage, he most likely envisioned it in the 
vein suggested by Rousseau—that is, through the aforementioned “physical” and “spiritual” 
activities of gymnastics, writing, and prayer.  
Although Tolstoi seems to consider marital satisfaction of sexual urges to be moral in the 
early 1850s, he finds this justification somewhat problematic even by the mid-1850s. In letters to 
his beloved Valeriia Arsen’eva, he expresses his views on love and marriage using the imaginary 
family of the “Khrapovitskiis,” once again betraying his anxiety over sexuality. He hopes that, in  
marriage, the spiritual will eventually surpass the carnal. Tolstoi sees marriage as a primarily 
spiritual union, wherein the spouses should help each other avoid immoral “faux pas”: coquetry, 
jealousy, distrust, futility, vanity, impulsiveness, and disorganization in daily life (60:119). Since 
marriage is a spiritual sphere, Tolstoi finds it necessary to rid it of carnal corruption. Tolstoi, 
thus, divides love into two stages: an imperfect, sensual stage of infatuation and a perfect, 
spiritual stage of marriage. Contrasted with marriage, Tolstoi sees infatuation as something that 
impedes man’s self-perfection: it makes man particularly vain, unsatisfied with himself, and 
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unhappy. Once brought together by infatuation, the spouses, then, should help each other to 
overcome these wicked qualities, the “faux pas.” Tolstoi accepts infatuation and its sensual 
impulses as only a temporary, unstable state, naturally morphing into the “spiritual” state of 
family life (Eikhenbaum, Lev Tolstoi: piatidesiatye gody, 348–49).  
In the 1860s, procreation becomes particularly important to Tolstoi’s thought. Tolstoi 
believes that as long as sexuality leads to childbirth, it is not only natural and moral, but even 
desirable. Tolstoi celebrates sexuality yielding a child as a manifestation of the “force of life.” In 
War and Peace, those characters who procreate embody the “force of life,” whereas those who 
derive sexual pleasure without procreation are those who presumably alienate themselves from 
this “force” and thus act against it. Hélène Kuragina dies prematurely during an abortion, which 
she undergoes to eliminate an “inconvenient” outcome resulting from her having “two 
husbands.” Hélène’s unwanted pregnancy and the decision to abort her child are a consequence 
of her lascivious lifestyle. Her abortion and death are news in wider society, but no one feels 
sorry for her. Tolstoi suggests that Hélène’s death is a result of her lewd conduct. On the 
contrary, Natasha Rostova’s “порывы,” or outbursts of sensuality (her childish kissing of her 
friend Boris or her sensual infatuation with the lascivious Anatol’ Kuragin), embody the “force 
of life” since they lead her through a series of infatuations and disillusionments to the happy self-
realization of marriage and motherhood: “Все, знавшие Наташу до замужества, удивлялись 
происшедшей в ней перемене, как чему-то необыкновенному. Одна старая графиня, 
материнским чутьем понявшая, что все порывы Наташи имели началом только 
потребность иметь семью, … она всегда знала, что Наташа будет примерною женой и 
матерью” (12:265). This novel illustrates Tolstoi’s ideal union between the carnal and the 
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spiritual in the 1860s: Natasha’s sensual impulses do not make her licentious or immoral, but 
only reflect the intensity of the “force of life” driving her toward marriage and childbirth.  
A parallel, less-optimistic tendency develops in Tolstoi’s thought of the 1860s. Having 
faced the deaths of his brothers in 1856 and 1860, Tolstoi begins to question the world’s design, 
universal justice, the meaning of life, and ultimately the existence of God: “К чему все, когда 
завтра начнутся муки смерти со всею мерзостью подлости, лжи, самообманыванья, и 
кончатся ничтожеством, нулем для себя. … [П]оложение, в которое нас поставил кто-то, 
есть самый ужасный обман и злодеяние” (letter to A.A. Fet on October 17/29, 1860; 60:358).  
Tolstoi’s spiritual doubts recur consistently throughout the 1860s, ending in a grave 
spiritual crisis at Arzamas in 1868, after which Tolstoi’s views shift towards asceticism in all 
spheres. He describes his experience in fictional form in the story “Memoirs of Madman” 
(“Записки сумасшедшего”) (1883–86) and meditates on the causes and outcomes of his crisis 
in the essay “Confession” (“Исповедь”) (1878). In the story, the protagonist travels to Arzamas 
in order to buy an estate. Spending the night in a hotel, he is suddenly overcome with the terror 
of death:  
… но вдруг представилось мне, что я умру тут в чужом месте. И мне стало жутко. 
[…] «Да что это за глупость, — сказал я себе. — Чего я тоскую, чего боюсь». — 
Меня, — неслышно отвечал голос смерти. — Я тут. Мороз подрал меня по коже. 
Да, смерти. Она придет, она вот она, а ее не должно быть. […] Все существо мое 
чувствовало потребность, право на жизнь и вместе с тем совершавшуюся смерть. И 
это внутреннее раздирание было ужасно. (26:468–70) 
 
He tries to pray to silence his fears, but prayer brings only temporary relief. He questions the 
meaning of life in the face of inevitable death. Finding none, he ponders suicide, but hesitant to 
commit the act, he is caught up in a vicious cycle: “Я живу, жил, и должен жить, и вдруг 
смерть, уничтожение всего. Зачем же жить? Умереть? Убить себя сейчас же? Боюсь. 
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Дожидаться смерти, когда придет? Боюсь еще хуже. Жить, стало быть? Зачем? Чтоб 
умереть. Я не выходил из этого круга” (26:472).6  
Tolstoi, then, describes the protagonist’s rediscovery of faith as a nearly miraculous 
episode, a revelation from God. Tolstoi compares the protagonist’s (and his own) spiritual loss 
with being lost in the winter woods, anticipating inevitable death. The terror of imminent death 
causes the protagonist to appeal to God more vigorously than ever. As he prays, he realizes that 
God does not reject him, but that he himself has turned away from God because of his own moral 
corruption: “Я хотел по-прежнему допрашивать, упрекать Бога, но тут я вдруг 
почувствовал, что я не смею, не должен, что считаться с ним нельзя, что он сказал, что 
нужно, и что я один виноват” (26:473). Tolstoi suggests that the protagonist does receive 
God’s help, since he turns out to be near the forest’s edge and thus not lost in the “wilderness” at 
all. In realizing his moral corruption, the protagonist finds God; he is disgusted by his own 
corruption and recognizes that his past values and beliefs were wrong. The outcome of the 
protagonist’s crisis, however, seems to tell more about Tolstoi’s personal views in the 1880s than 
about the facts of his immediate post-Arzamas experience. Consistent with Tolstoi’s social-moral 
views of the 1880s, the protagonist realizes the falsehood of social inequality and finds himself 
to be a member of the human community in God:  
Она рассказала о своей нужде. Я приехал домой и, когда стал рассказывать жене о 
выгодах именья, вдруг устыдился. Мне мерзко стало. Я сказал, что не могу купить 
этого именья, потому что выгода наша будет основана на нищете и горе людей.  … 
Главное, истина того, что мужики так же хотят жить, как мы, что они люди — 
братья, сыны Отца, как сказано в Евангелии. (26:474) 
 
                                                 
6 In Anna Karenina, Anna, Levin, and Vronskii experience similar crises, although each of them experiences them 
differently. Unable to see the meaning of life, Anna commits suicide, while Levin overcomes his spiritual crisis and 
finds God, like the protagonist of this story. (Although, Levin’s conception of God is different from the 
protagonist’s, given the five-year gap between the works during which Tolstoi’s moral views turned to asceticism). 
In contrast to Anna and Levin, Vronskii’s “spiritual” crisis and subsequent suicide attempt, portrayed as the 
realization of a romantic cliché, appear vain—like Vronskii himself.     
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Similarly to the story’s protagonist, Levin immerses himself in the world of the peasantry, which 
proves a spiritual epiphany for him and resolves his spiritual agony by appealing to popular 
wisdom and faith. However, unlike the protagonist, Levin does not believe that he oppresses the 
peasants and does not renounce his social origins, as Tolstoi insists upon in his post-Anna 
Karenina writings, both fictional and non-fictional.7   
Tolstoi’s spiritual crisis and subsequent conversion made him more austere and critical of 
the carnal, especially of sexuality. As Spence observes, Tolstoi’s “desire to devote himself to 
God is the result of the need to overcome death, and overcoming death means willingly 
sacrificing the life that death will destroy” (Spence 14). The “force of life” with which Tolstoi 
associates sexuality in War and Peace, of the 1860s, is not only physical but also spiritual. 
Tolstoi continues to associate sexuality with the “force of life” in the 1870s, as is evident from 
his depiction of Levin and Kitty’s love in Anna Karenina, which encompasses both sensual and 
spiritual aspects. But he also begins to view sexuality as something vicious, which endangers a 
person’s morality, disrupts family union, and undermines human relations. (For instance, Stiva’s 
promiscuous nature casts his family into havoc and indirectly contributes to the ruin of Anna’s, 
as she first encounters Vronskii in Moscow when restoring Stiva’s marriage; Anna’s flirtation 
with Vronskii then hurts Kitty, who is in love with him.) Tolstoi’s views on family are 
reactionary to the “woman question” broadly discussed in Russia and Europe at that time. Tolstoi 
sees family as the “holy nucleus of social life” (Medzhibovskaya 143), insisting that the role of 
woman is procreation and that her place is among the family. Tolstoi believes that childbearing is 
not only commanded by God but is also naturally desired by woman herself, so that the “joys of 
love” are joyful not because of the pleasure they bring but because of the pregnancy they yield. 
                                                 
7 I discuss Tolstoi’s understanding of human community in God and his social views resulting from this belief later 
in this chapter, where I elucidate Tolstoi’s attitudes towards dogmatic Christianity.  
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As he writes in the essay “Так что же нам делать?” (“What is to be done?”) (1883–84): “Вы … 
знаете тот истинный, Богом положенный людям труд и знаете истинные награды за него, 
то блаженство, которое он дает. Вы знаете это, когда после радостей любви вы с 
волнением, страхом и надеждой ждете того мучительного состояния беременности” 
(25:408).  
Tolstoi sees family as a supreme value and sees woman’s major role in consolidating the 
institution of the family. He strongly objects to the emancipation of women. Tolstoi insists that 
all women, whether of childbearing age, still unmarried, or physiologically unable to have more 
children (“genderless,” as he quite scornfully calls them) must stay within the family circle. The 
“genderless” woman should help her childbearing peers cope with their toil by working as a 
midwife, nanny, housekeeper, or (uncharacteristically for Tolstoi’s philosophy, but not for his 
younger personal life) prostitute. Women should protect the institution of the family namely by 
procreating and nurturing, helping to raise children, and even prostituting themselves to protect 
virginal and childbearing women from the pursuits of unmarried men:      
Призвание женщины все-таки главное — рождение, воспитание, кормление детей. 
… [Н]икакой надобности нет придумывать исход для отражавших и не нашедших 
мужа женщин: на этих женщин без контор, кафедр и телеграфов всегда есть и было 
требование, превышающее предложение. — Повивальные бабки, няньки, 
экономки, распутные женщины … В этом-то периоде представьте себе женщину, 
подлежащую искушениям всей толпы неженатых кобелей, у к[оторых] нет 
магдалин, и главное — представьте себе женщину без помощи других несемейных 
женщин — сестер, матерей, теток, нянек. И где есть женщина, управившаяся одна в 
этом периоде? (1870; 61:233)  
 
In addition, the family union provides a safe outlet for men’s and women’s sexual urges, 
protecting them from falling into the sin of lechery. Thus, Tolstoi objects to the possibility of 
divorce since it ruins the sacred union of the family, which is commanded by God, and thus 
promotes dissolute behavior: “Допустить свободную перемену жен и мужей (как этого хотят 
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пустобрехи либералы) – это тоже не входило в цели провидения по причинам ясным для 
нас – это разрушало семью” (61:233). Tolstoi considers marriage to be a union based not only 
on love (or, not necessarily on love at all), but also on the spouses’ duty towards one another. 
The duties include not only the spouses’ faithfulness to one another, but also their readiness to 
stay in the family in case one of them is unfaithful. So a man, he believes, should not be allowed 
to divorce his wife simply because he does not want to live with her any longer—regardless, it 
seems, of which party was unfaithful: “Divorce cannot be admitted because it cannot be left to 
the will of every man to decide when he not more can live with his wife and shall repudiate her 
[sic]” (written in English, 1888; 64:194).  
Anna Karenina tackles many of the questions that preoccupied Tolstoi in the 1870s in 
fictional form. Family integrity, the danger of sexual desire, women’s roles in family and society, 
and divorce are themes central to both Tolstoi’s thought of the 1870s and to the novel as a whole. 
However, Tolstoi’s opinions on these matters are less equivocal in his letters and essays than in 
his novel, where his solution to the questions is more ambiguous. Anna is married off without 
love to a man much older and “colder” than she, which of course cannot justify, in Tolstoi’s 
view, her passionate infatuation with another. This leads to the desertion of her family and son, 
but at least evokes the readers’ compassion as she struggles to choose between her motherly and 
sensual loves.  
Both the sensual and the moral are present in Anna and Kitty, albeit in different 
proportions. Although Anna is Stiva’s sister and presumably shares his carnal, passionate nature, 
Anna has had no affair before meeting Vronskii. Unlike Stiva, Anna cannot simply hide and 
enjoy her passion either: she can never erase the shame, guilt, and awareness of her own moral 
fall. Kitty (for all of her “spirituality”) is not devoid of sensual stirrings, either. Although Tolstoi, 
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for the most part, merely hints at manifestations of Kitty’s and Levin’s sexuality, he does refer to 
their honeymoon, the details of which are omitted, as the most shameful time in their marriage 
when they were hardly themselves—suggesting their passionate sex life.  
Finally, because of Karenin’s complex personality and Anna’s tragic fate, divorce 
appears to be a more complicated matter in the novel than it does in Tolstoi’s letters and essays. 
In the story, Karenin takes revenge on Anna for her infidelity by refusing to grant her a divorce, 
but justifies this revenge by referencing the amorality of divorce and the husbandly duty to 
protect his wife from improper conduct.    
By the end of the 1880s, Tolstoi limits sexuality solely to the biological function of 
procreation, considering, it seems, the “joys of love” to be unnecessary (if not immoral). He 
insists that coitus is only acceptable when it serves procreation, and is a sign of moral corruption 
if it serves to satisfy sexual desire without conceiving a child. Tolstoi contrasts the natural, 
procreative sexuality of animals with the corrupted, pleasure-driven sexuality of men, and 
contends that men should return to the primeval, innocent state of animals that abstain from 
sexual activity if it cannot lead to procreation: “животные отдаются половому общению 
только тогда, когда может родиться плод. Человек непросвещенный, каковы мы все, готов 
на это всегда и даже выдумал, что это потребность. … Да, во всем животном человеку 
надо сознательно дойти до животного” (64:277).  
Since Tolstoi censures sexuality that does not lead to procreation, he also condemns 
marriage without procreation. Marriage is no longer defined as a legitimate space to contain 
sexuality—only childbearing is. Tolstoi contends that marriage without procreation is sinful and 
even worse than prostitution and onanism, as he argues when responding to the American writer 
Alice Stockham about her book “Tokology” (1888; 64:202). Although Tolstoi still justifies 
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sexuality with procreation as he did earlier, his views become more rigid. Tolstoi tries to “stifle 
the voice of flesh, and to enable the voice of the spirit to be heard in its stead” (Connolly 268). 
Tolstoi draws an increasingly clear line between the spiritual and the carnal, and strives to 
cleanse the body of the carnal. Sexuality is no longer an embodiment of the divine force of life as 
in War and Peace, a joyous precursor to pregnancy as in the essay “What is to be done?”, or a 
duty ordained by God as in Tolstoi’s letters, but as something organic whose only goal is 
procreation, a function of sustaining biological life.    
By the very end of the 1880s, Tolstoi’s quest to resolve the conflict between the carnal 
and the spiritual ends in his rejection of the body in favor of the spirit. Tolstoi concludes that 
even procreation cannot justify sexual relations, and even within marriage. Tolstoi argues that 
marriage should be a union of kindred spirits who are ready to provide each other with moral 
guidance rather than a union of infatuated lovers. In contrast to the 1850s, Tolstoi excludes love-
infatuation from his ideal of marriage, even as a preliminary stage. Tolstoi insists that man 
should be guided not by love, by which he apparently means infatuation, but by calculation (“по 
расчету”)—the expectation that his future wife will encourage her husband’s morality (1887; 
64:50). In 1889, in response to a young woman who has written to him for guidance, Tolstoi 
contrasts spirituality with marriage and advises celibacy as a moral way of living. Tolstoi now 
sees marriage as a frivolous occupation, rejects procreation as a woman’s major role, and 
considers the routine of marriage and childbearing to be inferior to the celibate’s life filled with 
good deeds:  
[К]ак человеку, в котором начинается внутренняя духовная работа, советую вам, 
как можно больше удаляться от всего, что в нашем обществе поддерживает в 
девушке мысль о необходимости и желательности брака и располагает к нему: 
романы, музыка, праздная болтовня, танцы, игры, карты, даже наряды. Право, 
приятнее выстирать себе рубаху (а уж для души насколько полезнее), чем 
проиграть вечер в secrétaire даже с самыми остроумными людьми. … Безбрачная 
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жизнь, наполненная делами добра, безбрачная потому, что дела, наполняющие эту 
жизнь, все выше брака. (1889; 64:289)  
 
In his essay “Царство божие внутри вас” (“The Kingdom of God is within You”) 
(1891–93), he contends that man should strive in his behavior for perfect chastity, as commanded 
by Christ: “Идеал — полное целомудрие даже в мыслях; заповедь, указывающая степень 
достижения, ниже которой вполне возможно не спускаться в достижении этого идеала, — 
чистота брачной жизни, воздержание от блуда. И это составляет вторую заповедь” (28:80). 
Tolstoi fails to reconcile the conflict between the carnal and the spiritual, and the only solution 
he finds is to idealize the innocent child-like state that precedes the awakening of sexuality. The 
innocent, chaste love completely devoid of sensual stirrings should preclude the transition to 
sensuality and thus would preclude the conflict that torments him throughout his life. Tolstoi 
writes in his diary that he wants to write a story “о любви целомудренной, влюбленной, как к 
Соничке Калошиной [Tolstoi’s childhood friend], такой, для которой невозможен переход в 
чувственность, которая служит лучшим защитником от чувственности. Да не это ли 
единственное спасение от чувственности? Да, да, оно и есть” (1890; 51:53)). In the end, 
Tolstoi rejects sexuality and accepts love only if it is innocent, chaste, and devoid of sensuality.  
Tolstoi views a child-like, chaste love as his ideal, since he considers sexuality to be 
something that potentially undermines man’s spiritual perseverance. But, since the ideal is hardly 
attainable, Tolstoi is conflicted about sexuality: on the one hand, it is entangled in love and 
marriage, and is inevitable as the means of procreation. On the other hand, it incites demanding, 
uncontrollable urges that challenge man’s virtue. Tolstoi never accepts sexuality in itself but 
tolerates it with concessions. He maintains that sexuality should be suppressed by proper 
physical and spiritual activities such as writing, exercising, enforcing self-control, and prayer, or 
  
52 
that it should be bounded by marriage, limited to procreation, or ideally eliminated (which is a 
hardly achievable goal, as he finally admits).  
2. The Society: Between Nature and Civilization   
In his correspondence with his friend, the philosopher Nikolai Strakhov in 1870, Tolstoi 
expresses his typical conflict between the carnal and the spiritual: “[В] нас две природы — 
духовная и плотская. … [Е]сть такие несчастные как мы с вами, у которых центр тяжести 
в середине и они разучились ходить и стоять. … Все в том мире, в котором мы жили, так 
перепутано – все плотское так одето в духовный наряд, все духовное так и облеплено 
плотским, что трудно разобрать” (1870; 62:502). Trying to uncover the sources of his personal 
inner conflict, Tolstoi concludes that it is, in many ways, informed by the loose morals of the 
society in which he was raised.  
Tolstoi’s criticism of society derives from his larger meditation on nature and 
civilization, with which he was preoccupied from the early years of his career. In his 
understanding of the conflict between nature and civilization, Tolstoi is a student of Rousseau 
(Eikhenbaum, Lev Tolstoi: semidesiatye gody, 217). Similarly to Rousseau, Tolstoi sees nature, 
and everything associated with it (plants, animals, children and peasants—both of whom are not 
yet corrupted by civilization), as innocent, whereas he views civilization as both corrupted and 
corrupting.  
For young Tolstoi, nature is devoid of vice and corruption: it is the realm of the spiritual. 
In 1857, affected by the beauty of the night, Tolstoi ponders the meaning of life in general and 
his life in particular, appealing to God for an answer: 
Ночь чудо. Чего хочется, страстно желается? не знаю, только не благ мира сего. — 
И не верить в бессмертие души! — когда чувствуешь в душе такое неизмеримое 
величие. Взглянул в окно. Черно, разорванно и светло. Хоть умереть.  
Боже мой! Боже мой! Что я? и куда? и где я? (47:141) 
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Similarly, in a letter to A.A.Tolstaia in 1859, he directly associates nature with religious 
experience: “Вы смеетесь над природой и соловьями. Она для меня проводник религии” 
(60:294). He portrays nature as a spiritual force also in the novel Казаки (The Cossacks) (1858–
62): Olenin, in recognizing his love for Maryanka, embraces a kind of nature-mysticism. He 
believes that nature itself encourages his love for her, and, in loving her, he feels that he becomes 
an integral part of all of God’s joyous world.  
Following Rousseau, Tolstoi also believes that man is born innocent. He idealizes 
children, viewing them as the natural bearers of spiritual truth, beauty, and goodness—virtues 
that they still hold before becoming exposed to the corrupting influences of civilized society. In 
his essay “Who Should Learn Writing from Whom; Peasant Children from Us, or We from 
Peasant Children?” (“Кому у кого учиться писать, крестьянским ребятам у нас или нам у 
крестьянских ребят?”) (1862), Tolstoi insists that the state of child-like innocence is an ideal 
for which grown men, corrupted by society and alienated from nature, should strive:  
Здоровый ребенок родится на свет, вполне удовлетворяя тем требованиям 
безусловной гармонии в отношении правды, красоты и добра, которые мы носим в 
себе; он близок к неодушевленным существам – к растению, к животному, к 
природе, которая постоянно представляет для нас ту правду, красоту и добро, 
которых мы ищем и желаем. … Человек родится совершенным, – есть великое 
слово, сказанное Руссо, и слово это, как камень, остается твердым и истинным.  
Ребенка развивают все дальше и дальше, и все дальше и дальше удаляются от 
бывшего и уничтоженного первообраза, и все невозможнее и невозможнее делается 
достижение воображаемого первообраза совершенства взрослого человека. Идеал 
наш сзади, а не впереди. (italics are in the original; 8:323) 
 
Consistent with his belief in the innate innocence of children, Tolstoi often portrays children and 
the age of childhood as a moral ideal in his fiction. Nikolen’ka, in the novel Childhood 
(Детство) (1852), is Rousseau’s “natural man,” and he “embod[ies] natural human vitality, the 
‘innocent merriment’” (Orwin, Consequences 150, 154). He exists in a flux of feelings and 
sensations, but he is “naturally moderate and naturally good” (Orwin, Tolstoy’s Art and Thought 
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63). Although he is not free from sexual stirrings, he is unaware of them and thus remains in a 
state of innocence (Salaman, The Great Confession 74). In Anna Karenina, Anna’s son, Serёzha, 
too, is a “compass” revealing to Anna and Vronskii their deviation from the moral way of living: 
“Ребенок этот с своим наивным взглядом на жизнь был компас, который показывал им 
степень их отклонения от того, что они знали, но не хотели знать” (18:196). Anna’s own 
childhood and the memories of her youth, surfacing shortly before her suicide, reveal her past 
innocence and present deviation from this innately innocent state.     
Since peasants are immersed in the world of nature through their life and work, 
untouched by the corrupting forces of civilization, Tolstoi considers them innocent as well. 
Being at one with the world of nature, peasants possess a kind of spiritual knowledge that allows 
them to face death in peace—a knowledge that is inaccessible to the gentry because of their 
deep-rooted moral corruption. In the story “Three Deaths” (“Три смерти”) (1859), Tolstoi 
contrasts the death of a peasant and the death of a tree, both of which belong to the world of 
nature, to the death of a noblewoman, a member of the gentry. He portrays the deaths of both the 
peasant and the tree as peaceful and beautiful: they live and die in harmony with nature, and it is 
understood that their own deaths are a part of a natural circle. The peasant does not revolt against 
death because he knows that it is inherent in all. On the contrary, the noblewoman, who is 
alienated from nature, dies in emotional and spiritual agony, unable to find comfort in her 
confused moral values. Unlike the peasant’s faith (which is not even necessarily Christian, but 
rather originates from his close contact with nature), the gentry woman’s Christianity is 
spiritually vacuous and thus cannot safeguard her from the terror of dying.8 As Tolstoi comments 
on the story in his letter to his aunt Aleksandra Tolstaia on May 1, 1858:   
                                                 
8 I discuss Tolstoi’s attitudes towards dogmatic Christianity in more detail later in this chapter.  
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Моя мысль была: три существа умерли – барыня, мужик и дерево. – Барыня жалка 
и гадка, потому что лгала всю жизнь и лжет перед смертью. Христианство, как она 
его понимает, не решает для нее вопроса жизни и смерти. Зачем умирать, когда 
хочется жить? В обещания будущие христианства она верит воображением и умом, 
а все существо ее становится на дыбы, и другого успокоенья (кроме ложно-
христианского) у нее нету, – а место занято. … Мужик умирает спокойно именно 
потому, что он не христианин. Его религия другая, хотя он по обычаю и исполнял 
христианские обряды; его религия – природа, с которой он жил. Un brute есть 
счастье и красота, гармония со всем миром, а не такой разлад, как у барыни. 
(60:265–66) 
 
Tolstoi blames the gentry’s alienation from natural innocence and goodness on the ills of 
social progress, as he argues in his essay “Progress and the Definition of Education” (“Прогресс 
и определение образования”) (1862). He believes that technological and social achievements 
encourage the gentry’s idleness, self-indulgence, and exploitation of others, causing their moral 
corruption (23:40–41). On the one hand, as Tolstoi explicates in “Who Should Learn Writing 
from Whom,” progress brought man the luxuries and comforts of the civilized world, including 
railroads, electricity, steam, and printing (which Tolstoi, when advocating the ruinous effects of 
education, includes in the list of technical achievements corrupting man’s morals) (8:334). On 
the other hand, progress at the same time has spoiled him, drawing him away from the primeval 
simplicity and moderation which Tolstoi sees as the ideal: “раз развращенное население 
удобствами комфорта, никогда уже не может быть возвращено к первобытной простоте и 
умеренности” (8:335–36).  
As previously mentioned, Tolstoi underwent a grave spiritual crisis in Arzamas in 1869, 
which reverberated throughout the 1870s. Tolstoi examines the causes of his crisis and concludes 
that the moral (or, rather, immoral) atmosphere of the elite social circle in which he was raised 
nurtured his alienation from faith. He recalls that, at school, one of his schoolmates suddenly 
announced that God did not exist, and that his older brothers were fascinated by the idea, 
encouraging young Lev’s agitation as well: “Мы все, помню, оживились и приняли это 
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известие как что-то очень занимательное и весьма возможное” (23:1). When his older 
brother Dmitrii became religious and decided to lead a pure and virtuous life, adults, including 
his school mentor, and youthful peers, including his brothers, laughed at him. From this 
experience, Lev learns that religion is not a serious matter, that one should observe its rituals but 
need not follow its instruction: “учить катехизис надо, ходить в церковь надо, но слишком 
серьезно всего этого принимать не следует” (23:2).  
His pursuit of self-perfection under the influence of Enlightenment values soon 
transformed into the pursuit of self-perfection in general (“совершенствование вообще”). It 
thus encouraged him to seek the “virtues” praised in society—to be stronger, better, more 
important, and richer than others: “[и] очень скоро это стремление быть лучше перед 
людьми подменилось желанием быть сильнее других людей, т. е. славнее, важнее, богаче 
других” (23:4). This corrupted social environment encouraged his youthful passions, hampering 
his spiritual aspirations. His efforts to be “good” (“[я] всею душой желал быть хорошим”) 
were scorned, whereas his deeds of moral corruption were cheered:  
Без ужаса, омерзения и боли сердечной не могу вспомнить об этих годах. Я убивал 
людей на войне, вызывал на дуэли, чтоб убить, проигрывал в карты, проедал труды 
мужиков, казнил их, блудил, обманывал. Ложь, воровство, любодеяния всех родов, 
пьянство, насилие, убийство... Не было преступления, которого бы я не совершал, и 
за всё это меня хвалили, считали и считают мои сверстники сравнительно 
нравственным человеком. (23:5) 
 
Tolstoi also condemns the role of writer and teacher, which, he seems to suggest, society 
has imposed on him: “от чина, данного мне этими людьми, — от чина художника, поэта, 
учителя, — я не отрекся” (23:6). Literary circles, a layer of elite society, have encouraged his 
other vices, such as pride and the arrogant belief that he knows “the truth” and can teach it to 
others: “[и]з сближения с этими людьми [писателями] я вынес новый порок — до 
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болезненности развившуюся гордость и сумасшедшую уверенность в том, что я призван 
учить людей, сам не зная чему” (23:6).    
Tolstoi examines various spheres of knowledge (social sciences, natural sciences, and 
philosophy) only to conclude that no rational knowledge could answer a person’s inmost queries 
about the meaning of life or console him in the face of death. As Tolstoi writes about his 
brother’s death: “Умный, добрый, серьезный человек, он заболел молодым, страдал более 
года и мучительно умер, не понимая, зачем он жил, и еще менее понимая, зачем он 
умирает. Никакие теории ничего не могли ответить на эти вопросы ни мне, ни ему во 
время его медленного и мучительного умирания” (23:8). Tolstoi’s dissatisfaction with 
rational knowledge grows as he realizes, for instance, that the proponents of social progress, a 
popular idea in Europe that presumably sought to ameliorate the life of humankind, approved of 
execution, which was both immoral and inhumane:  
… я понял — не умом, а всем существом, — что никакие теории разумности 
существующего и прогресса не могут оправдать этого поступка и что если бы все 
люди в мире, по каким бы то ни было теориям, с сотворения мира, находили, что 
это нужно, — я знаю, что это не нужно, что это дурно и что поэтому судья тому, 
что хорошо и нужно, не то, что говорят и делают люди, и не прогресс, а я с своим 
сердцем. (23:8) 
 
In addition, Tolstoi considers social science to be wrong because it ignores the value of the 
individual, suggesting that a person can only understand who he is by understanding the 
collective. This, Tolstoi insists, is impossible, since the collective consists of similarly confused 
individuals: “… глупость, этого воззрения состоит в том, что … [д]ля того чтобы понять, 
что он такое, человек должен прежде понять, что такое всё это таинственное 
человечество, состоящее из таких же людей, как и он сам, не понимающих самих себя” 
(23:19).     
  
58 
Natural science can only describe various aspects of a person’s life in physical terms. But 
for all of its detailed scrutiny, natural science never seeks to answer the question of the meaning 
of an individual’s life, and thus is useless for Tolstoi’s inquiry, which is spiritual in nature: “При 
таком ответе оказывается, что ответ отвечает не на вопрос. Мне нужно знать смысл моей 
жизни, а то, что она есть частица бесконечного, не только не придает ей смысла, но 
уничтожает всякий возможный смысл” (23:21).  
Various philosophical thinkers (Solomon, Socrates, Buddha, and Schopenhauer, whose 
theories had fascinated Tolstoi) devalue life and lead a person away from understanding its 
meaning. Tolstoi concludes that these philosophers have propagated alienation, teaching him that 
life is evil and even welcoming death as either a desirable liberation or an inevitable end with 
which one must reconcile: 
«Жизнь тела есть зло и ложь. И потому уничтожение этой жизни тела есть 
благо, и мы должны желать его», говорит Сократ. 
«Жизнь есть то, чего не должно бы быть, — зло, и переход в ничто есть 
единственное благо жизни», говорит Шопенгауэр. 
«Всё в мире — и глупость и мудрость, и богатство и нищета, и веселье и горе — 
всё суета и пустяки. Человек умрет, и ничего не останется. И это глупо», говорит 
Соломон. 
«Жить с сознанием неизбежности страданий, ослабления, старости и смерти 
нельзя — надо освободить себя от жизни, от всякой возможности жизни», говорит 
Будда. (23:26) 
    
Neither could Tolstoi find a way to overcome his crisis among the members of his social 
circle. Some people, he observes, simply do not ask the questions that torment him (“подход 
неведения” 23:27). Other people delight in life’s pleasures, seizing the moment and blindfolding 
themselves with earthly enjoyments in order to avoid recognizing that their lives have no 
meaning (“подход эпикурейства” 23:27). Tolstoi notices that this approach is most typical of 
those in his social circle. Members of a third group choose suicide as a way to deal with the fact 
that their lives have no meaning (“выход силы и энергии”). Tolstoi confesses that he 
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considered this approach, regarding it as the noblest, and wanted at some point to end his life (“Я 
видел, что это самый достойный выход, и хотел поступить так” 23:28). The fourth solution 
is to continue living, even while realizing that life is evil and meaningless (“выход слабости”). 
This, Tolstoi admits, is what he actually chose, but it nonetheless only prolonged his spiritual 
agony.   
 The path that Tolstoi eventually discovers, and which leads him out of the crisis, lies 
within the irrational knowledge given only by true faith: 
Я вспомнил, что я жил только тогда, когда верил в Бога. Как было прежде, так и 
теперь, сказал я себе: стоит мне знать о Боге, и я живу; стоит забыть, не верить в 
него, и я умираю. […]  
«Живи, отыскивая Бога, и тогда не будет жизни без Бога». И сильнее чем когда-
нибудь всё осветилось во мне и вокруг меня, и свет этот уже не покидал меня” 
(23:45).    
 
The awareness of God’s presence in the world gives Tolstoi a sense of life’s meaningfulness.9 
Emblematically, Tolstoi finds true faith and rediscovers the meaning of life among the common 
people. Tolstoi realizes that the common folk are not tormented by the spiritual crises typical of 
his social circle, because they have not been corrupted by rational knowledge, art, philosophy, 
and the lifestyles and actions of the gentry:   
[В]се одинаково и совершенно противуположно моему неведению знали смысл 
жизни и смерти, спокойно трудились, переносили лишения и страдания, жили и 
умирали, видя в этом не суету, а добро. … Со мной случилось то, что жизнь нашего 
круга – богатых, ученых – не только опротивела мне, но потеряла всякий смысл. 
Все наши действия, рассуждения, наука, искусства – всё это предстало мне как 
баловство. Я понял, что искать смысла в этом нельзя. Действия же трудящегося 
народа, творящего жизнь, представились мне единым настоящим делом. И я понял, 
что смысл, придаваемый этой жизни, есть истина, и я принял его. (“A Confession”; 
23:39–40)  
 
Since Tolstoi views peasant life as the ideal, he also idealizes manual work, which he 
considers to be a spiritual activity preventing a person from falling into a variety of vices (such 
                                                 
9 Levin’s discovery of faith in Anna Karenina repeats Tolstoi’s nearly verbatim.  
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as idleness, despondency, and exploitation of others). Through manual work, Tolstoi believes, 
the peasants are immersed in the world of nature not only as passive observers, but as co-creators 
of life (“[д]ействия же трудящегося народа, творящего жизнь”). By doing manual work, 
Tolstoi seems to suggest, a person can become at one with the world of nature and be cleansed 
from their corruption through its purity. 
Tolstoi himself seeks close contact with nature: he even temporarily abandons his literary 
career in 1861 to devote a year to managing his estate, educating the peasants, and doing 
physical work in the field. Tolstoi finds working in the field with the peasants to be physically 
and emotionally rewarding and renewing, as his letters of the 1870s suggest: “возвращаюсь 
потный с топором и заступом, следовательно, за 1000 верст от всего искусственного, и в 
особенности от нашего дела … [Я], благодаря Бога, нынешнее лето глуп, как лошадь. 
Работаю, рублю, копаю, кошу и о противной лит-т-тературе и лит-т-тераторах [sic], слава 
Богу, не думаю” (letter to A.A. Fet; 61:235), “я с утра до вечера работаю — руками — и 
ничего не думаю и не помню. […] Я теперь уже вот 6-й день кошу траву с мужиками по 
целым дням и не могу вам описать не удовольствие, но счастье, кот[орое] я при этом 
испытываю” (letter to S.S. Urusov; 61:237). In Anna Karenina, Tolstoi describes Levin’s time 
managing his estate and working in the field as devoted to spiritual activities, juxtaposing these 
pursuits with both the gentry’s corrupted lifestyle and the intellectual “hedonism” of Levin’s 
half-brother, Koznyshev.   
Tolstoi’s appreciation of manual work as a moral and spiritually healing activity persists 
throughout the 1880s, when he particularly comes to emphasize the moral aspects of manual 
work (which I consider in the following section of this chapter). 
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3. The Spiritual: Between the Metaphysical and the Moral  
Tolstoi’s meditations on Christianity and his understanding of the spiritual realm within 
the Christian tradition contribute to the way in which he sees the role of the body in this body-
spirit conflict, especially beginning in the 1880s.  
Young Tolstoi imagines the spiritual realm as something above or beyond the material 
world. He believes that it is possible to attain this realm through faith and prayer, and imagines it 
as a supernatural, fleshless state. In his diary, he records his spiritual experience when he prays, 
feeling exalted and connected with the divine:  
Мне хотелось слиться с существом всеобъемлющим. Я просил простить 
преступления мои; но нет, я не просил этого, ибо я чувствовал, что ежели оно дало 
мне эту блаженную минуту, то оно простило меня. … Нет, вот оно чувство, 
которое я испытал вчера – это любовь к Богу. Любовь высокую, соединяющую в 
себе все хорошее, отрицающую все дурное. … Я не чувствовал плоти, я был – один 
дух. (1851; 46:62) 
 
The spiritual experience described here is “most purely Rousseauistic” in its optimism and is 
generally uncharacteristic of Tolstoi, who was tormented by spiritual doubt (McLean, 
“Rousseau’s God,” In Quest of Tolstoy 158). But it is typical of young Tolstoi, and it is important 
for tracing the evolution of Tolstoi’s spiritual views. Here, Tolstoi captures the spiritual as a 
mystical experience in which he transcends the material world to connect with a spiritual realm. 
He sees the spiritual as fleshless (“не чувствовал плоти”). Furthermore, this metaphysical 
vision of the spiritual implies divine intervention into the affairs of the material world, and 
suggests man’s ability to achieve the spiritual realm through faith and prayer alone without 
requiring practical moral deeds.  
However, already by 1854, Tolstoi suggests establishing a “rational religion” (Spence 14) 
cleansed of its metaphysical component, which will not promise rewards in the afterlife but will 
serve the more practical, “earthly” goal of uniting people: “Мысль эта — основание религии, 
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соответствующей развитию человечества, религии Христа, но очищенной от веры и 
таинственности, религии практической, не обещающей будущее блаженство на земле. … 
Действовать сознательно к соединению людей религией — вот основание мысли, которая, 
надеюсь, увлечет меня” (47:37). Here, Tolstoi rejects the “fleshless” spiritual state in favor of 
an earthly organization of people; in other words, he rejects the metaphysical in favor of the 
physical, the mysterious in favor of the moral.  
As previously mentioned, Tolstoi was profoundly affected by the deaths of his two 
brothers, leading to the Arzamas crisis and episodes of spiritual doubt in the 1860s and 1870s. 
The death of his second brother, Nikolai, in 1860, was particularly traumatizing. Consumed by 
grief, Tolstoi suffers great distress and thinks of death as life’s ultimate end, meaning that there 
is no spiritual, metaphysical realm of afterlife. Tolstoi realizes that the body is mortal and thus 
temporary, and is terrified to think that one’s “I” ends with the destruction of one’s body. As he 
writes to Afanasii Fet in his letter of October 17/29, 1860:  
Правду он говаривал, что хуже смерти ничего нет. А как хорошенько подумать, что 
она все-таки конец всего, так и хуже жизни ничего нет. Для чего хлопотать, 
стараться, коли от того, что было H. Н. Толстой, для него ничего не осталось. […] 
К чему всё, когда завтра начнутся муки смерти со всею мерзостью подлости, лжи, 
самообманыванья и кончатся ничтожеством, нулем для себя. (60:357–58).  
 
During Nikolai’s funeral, Tolstoi thinks of writing a “materialistic Gospel” (“Скоро 
месяц как Николенька умер. … Во время похорон пришла мне мысль написать 
материалистическое Евангелие, жизнь Христа-материалиста” (48:30)). The idea of writing a 
materialistic Gospel echoes his idea to establish a “rational religion” in 1854, but the underlying 
causes of the two events are significantly different. If the first incident in 1854 only reflects 
Tolstoi’s ruminations on the practical purposes of religion, the second of 1860 is an acute 
emotional and spiritual response to the death of a loved one, revealing his despair and spiritual 
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agony. The tension between Tolstoi’s rational religion, rejecting the metaphysical for practical 
purposes, and his materialistic religion, turning away from the metaphysical in spiritual agony, 
will eventually give way to a singular moral teaching formulated by Tolstoi in the 1880s— one 
that preached practicality and eschewed the unseen.    
Rediscovering his faith after recovering from the Arzamas crisis, Tolstoi comes to 
recognize the value of life (though it be finite), which also changes his attitude towards the 
material world. As Irina Paperno explains, Tolstoi rejects the temporal understanding of life that 
used to terrify him: now, for him, “[t]he true life is life in the present” (75). In a letter to 
Strakhov in 1885, Tolstoi argues that Buddhism and Schopenhauer were wrong to consider the 
created world as merely evil phantasmagoria. He insists that the physical world provides both the 
material and the tools that man can use to improve its condition: “Материальный мир не есть 
ни призрак, ни пустяки, ни зло, а это тот материал и те орудия, над которыми и которыми 
мы призваны работать” (63:314). The body, a part of the material world, acquires the same 
purpose in Tolstoi’s thought, assuming its role as a tool of the spirit: “body and matter [are] the 
instrument[s] and material for the work of true life” (Spence 93).  
Tolstoi’s rediscovery of faith and reevaluation of the material world lead him to develop 
social ideas based on Christian ideals, wherein the body—as a tool of the spiritual/moral self—
plays a crucial role. Tolstoi believes that all people should recognize themselves as children of 
God and, as such, they should be equal and connected to one another in a single community: 
“Сущность христианского сознания состоит в признании каждым человеком своей 
сыновности Богу и вытекающего из него единения людей с Богом и между собой, как и 
сказано в Евангелии (Иоан. XVII, 21)” (“What is Art?” (“Что такое искусство?”)) (1897; 
30:157). Tolstoi sees the community of men as an ideal because it corresponds to a harmonious 
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state of unity or “residency,” which Richard Gustafson describes as “belong[ing] to a world 
harmonized into accord, made perfect because all participate together in the song of life. The 
Resident belongs to the family of man and is a son of the Father who loves him” (12). Tolstoi 
insists that the laws of active love and nonresistance to evil in an individual’s moral conduct 
should be both a metaphysical principle of man’s unity with God and a practical guide to social 
action, which, Tolstoi believes, would bring about the Kingdom of God in modern society 
(Paperno 75–76).  
Tolstoi places spirituality not in any metaphysical realm, but in the material world, 
among the community of men. If, in 1851, Tolstoi associates the spiritual with “fleshlessness” 
and thus deprives the body of any spiritual value, and in the 1860s–70s denigrates it as 
something temporary and unstable, doomed to be destroyed, in the 1880s Tolstoi recognizes that 
the body is not evil, but rather the means that the spirit can use to do its work in the material 
world. Being a member of the human community, man should renounce his self-interest, love 
others more than himself, and serve the common good, as Tolstoi argues in his essay “On Life” 
(“О жизни”) (1887). That is why, when Tolstoi formulates his understanding of the Christian 
faith, he rejects its mystical (ritualistic and dogmatic) aspect but emphasizes the importance of 
practical good deeds: “допускаю и уважаю, и понимаю всякое другое толкование всех этих 
таинственных предметов; но выговариваю одно — только бы люди любили добро, т. е. 
Бога, и делали бы добро, т. е. Божеские дела. … [л]юбить Бога и ближнего и делать дела 
Божьи, т. е. добро ближнему, и делать его точно, по-настоящему, не на словах, а на деле” 
(63:177). In this sense, he understands spiritual work as incarnate—manifested in practical deeds 
through which people help one another. In the material world, one must use the body to do a 
good deed: to carry a heavy load, to work in the field, or to dress a wound. But these good deeds 
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are not only material but also spiritual, because they correspond to man’s spiritual intents: “Разве 
христианин дает что-нибудь материальное? … Дело это для искреннего человека всегда 
будет выражаться в форме материальных дел, но само оно не материально” (1888; 64:167). 
Tolstoi demands that faith be realized in practical good deeds, and, in this sense, it can be said 
that he understands faith to be incarnate.    
In the 1880s, Tolstoi sees manual work, and thus the body that performs it, as a crucial 
component of man’s moral conduct—both as a son of God among his peers and as a member of 
the social community. Tolstoi condemns the idleness of some, primarily the gentry, because it 
brings about the oppression of others. Exploitation and social inequality contradict Tolstoi’s 
vision of society as a group of people who recognize themselves as the children of God. Tolstoi 
concludes that physical work, done by all people equally without social distinction, is the cure 
for social injustice. This is moral because it eases the suffering of other people: 
Я увидел, что причина страданий и разврата людей та, что одни люди находятся в 
рабстве у других, и потому я сделал тот простой вывод, что если я хочу помогать 
людям, то мне прежде всего не нужно делать тех несчастий, которым я хочу 
помогать, т.е. не участвовать в порабощении людей.  … Я пришел к тому простому 
и естественному выводу, что если я жалею ту замученную лошадь, на которой я 
еду, то первое, что я должен сделать, если я точно жалею её, это – слезть с нее и 
идти своими ногами. … не иметь денег, т.е. не пользоваться трудами других людей. 
А чтобы не пользоваться трудами других людей – делать своими руками все, что 
можем делать. (“What is to be done?”; 25:297–98) 
 
Now, Tolstoi conceptualizes the spiritual/good not as “fleshless,” as he did in 1851, but 
as incarnate, residing in good deeds. The choice between the moral and the immoral lies not in 
accepting or rejecting the body, but in the way in which the body is used. To be moral, Tolstoi 
believes, a member of the community should not disdain to satisfy his basic (physical) needs and 
should contribute his (manual) work to the community. Simple, physical actions that Tolstoi 
mentions in the above quotation, “идти своими ногами” (to walk on your own legs) and 
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“делать своими руками все, что можем делать” (to do with your own hands everything that 
you can do), are crucial for man’s moral conduct: man must do everything that he can by 
himself, and this “everything,” in Tolstoi’s view, is precisely physical/manual activity.  
Tolstoi contrasts manual work to intellectual work. He contends that manual work is an 
imperative for a community member, whereas intellectual work—such as science and art—is 
secondary and cannot be a substitute. From a moral standpoint, to carry a heavy load, to work in 
the field, or to dress somebody’s wound is better than to write a symphony or a book, as he 
comments in his letter to Romain Rolland in 1887. Physical needs are universal to all people, and 
thus, if one does the manual work required to satisfy his needs without forcing others to do this 
work for him, he behaves morally. Tolstoi sees manual work as essential for a community based 
on moral principles, one that Tolstoi envisions as the ideal (letter to Romain Rolland; 1887; 
64:92–93).  
Tolstoi’s apparent focus on the body in his discussion of the ideal community is likely to 
have a Biblical source. In the New Testament, the community of Christians is described as one 
body:  
For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, 
being many, are one body: so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one 
body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all 
made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many. … Now ye are 
the body of Christ, and members in particular. (1 Cor. 12.12–14, 27).  
 
Tolstoi rejects many Christian dogmas and sacraments, including the Eucharist. In the Eucharist, 
bread and wine are supposedly transformed into the body and blood of Christ. By eating this 
bread and drinking this wine, the faithful are united with Christ and, through Him, are also united 
with each other as a single community. Although Tolstoi rejects the mystical part of the 
sacrament, he does seem to view the ideal community of men as a single unit/body whose 
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members/limbs/organs recognize themselves as children of God, or as parts of the whole. In 
Tolstoi, men are united with each other not through the sacrament of eating and drinking the 
body of God (which Tolstoi even mocks in the 1900s), but through their practical good deeds—
through their own bodies, which they use for the spiritual goal of helping other people as 
commanded by God. Tolstoi believes that, by using his body to satisfy his needs and the needs of 
the community, man alleviates exploitation and social inequality, corrects his own morals and 
the morals of the community, and finally brings society closer to the Christian ideal—a perfect 
union of people in the Kingdom of God here on earth.  
4. The Body between the Carnal and the Spiritual 
By the end of his life, Tolstoi does not resolve the conflict between the carnal and the 
spiritual but reasserts that, though the struggle cannot be won, it nonetheless should be battled. In 
1884, Tolstoi concludes that Christians cannot escape the wicked influences and impulses that 
incite their carnal desires, but that the goal of the true Christian is to keep resisting them. 
Although the battle cannot be won, each little victory over vice brings him closer to God, which 
consoles him: 
Вся жизнь наша есть труд освобождения себя и других из этого ложного 
положения. Не надо думать, что христианин может выйти из соблазнов мира и 
жить вне их. Жизнь христианина есть борьба с соблазнами, освобождение себя и 
других от них – это труд жизни христианина, и радостный, блаженный труд, если 
человек поймет, что это его задача жизни. Радостный труд потому, что каждый шаг 
на этом пути плодотворен, приближает к цели, к царству Божию и к Богу. … 
[Т]еперь, когда я вижу, что задача моей жизни в том, чтобы освобождаться от 
соблазнов, я по мире сил своих освобождаюсь от них и, хотя теперь продолжаю 
жить в соблазнах, я чувствую спокойствие, имею определенную цель в жизни и 
чувствую радость, оглядываясь назад на то зло, от которого я уже освободился. 
(63:175) 
 
The body plays a crucial role in Tolstoi’s conflict between the carnal and the spiritual. On the 
one hand, the body incites wicked desires such as lust, indulgence, and idleness, which corrupt 
  
68 
man’s morals. On the other hand, the body partakes in man’s spiritual life, the only tool of the 
spirit available in the material world. Early in his career, Tolstoi sees the spiritual as fleshless, 
but he soon reevaluates his understanding of the spiritual to conclude that it should be incarnate 
in good deeds, performed through the physical/manual work of the body. Tolstoi thus endows the 
body with spiritual value. Indeed, the body itself generates carnal desires and challenges man’s 
spiritual aspirations, but it can be made to serve a higher good. Tolstoi condemns that which he 
considers to be wicked/carnal (sexuality, idleness, exploitation, technological and social 
progress, the moral ambiguity of the gentry, Christian rituals and dogmas with their earthly 
metaphysics), but appreciates the spiritual work that man can accomplish in using the body 
(manual work, serving other people). Tolstoi’s solution to the conflict can be summarized thus: 
in order to be moral, one should battle the carnal and instead incarnate the spiritual into one’s 
moral conduct.   
Tolstoi’s spiritual quest (and that of some of his characters) is rooted in the conflict 
between the carnal and the spiritual and thus can be seen as embodied. In the following chapters, 
I will demonstrate how Tolstoi’s representation of haptic elements in Anna Karenina reflects his 
controversial views on the body as both a source of wicked desires and a means of spiritual 
work, and therefore embodies Tolstoi’s unresolved conflict between the carnal and the spiritual.
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III. THE HAPTIC IN ANNA KARENINA 
1. Stiva  
During the carriage journey leading to her suicide, Anna has a sudden insight into the 
nature of her relationship with Vronskii: “Мы именно шли навстречу до связи, а потом 
неудержимо расходимся в разные стороны” (19:343). Though they are united with one 
another physically, they have become emotionally and spiritually alienated. Anna’s insight is 
correct not only about her affair with Vronskii, but also about the nature of carnal love in general 
in Anna Karenina. This chapter considers the haptic experiences of the novel’s sensual 
characters, Stiva Oblonskii and Anna Karenina, in order to demonstrate how touch, when 
tarnished by sexual desire, cannot serve as a means of communion. Rather, it severs the 
characters’ interpersonal and intrapersonal unities: the characters’ emotional and spiritual 
relatedness to other people and the wholeness of their identities. Sensual touch fragments a 
person’s connectedness with other people and the wholeness of his own identity.   
Tolstoi emphasizes Stiva Oblonskii’s sensual nature by endowing him with a distinctly 
acute sensory susceptibility. Stiva’s sensory delights lead neither to receiving knowledge about 
the world nor to resolving philosophical or moral questions. Rather, he derives physical pleasure 
and emotional satisfaction from his sensory perceptions, which often override his moral sense. 
Stiva rejoices when he sees a beam of light from behind the curtains as he awakes in the 
beginning of the novel, despite his ongoing quarrel with his wife (“заметив полосу света, 
пробившуюся с боку одной из суконных стор, он весело скинул ноги с дивана” 18:4). His 
red face suggests his enhanced blood circulation and warmth of his body, and the smell of wine 
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and cigars betrays his indulgence in a carefree lifestyle (“с красным, веселым лицом и запахом 
вина и сигары” 18:104). During his conversation with Karenin about Anna’s divorce, Stiva 
aimlessly lingers to smell the leather of his new cigar case (“понюхав кожу, достал папироску” 
18:451).  “Кожа,” which is both “leather” and “skin” in Russian, reiterates Stiva’s susceptibility 
to both sensory and carnal pleasures. He even perceives simple mundane objects with sensory 
acuity uncharacteristic of any other character in the novel: Tolstoi describes Stiva’s 
handkerchief, with which he wipes his mouth, as having both smell (“fragrant”) and texture 
(“cambric”) to underscore Stiva’s sensuous engagement with reality (“обтирая душистым 
батистовым с каемками платком рот” 19:226).  
Perhaps the most pronounced manifestation of Stiva’s sensory hedonism is the depiction 
of his oyster feast at the restaurant where he dines with Levin, where visual and tactile details 
suggest his gustatory delight: he eats sloshy (“шлюпающие”) oysters from their pearly shells 
with a silver fork. Tolstoi almost never refers to gustatory sensations, so the indirect visual and 
tactile descriptions of Stiva’s exquisite dinner are as close as he comes to describing taste. 
However, visual and tactile details depicting Stiva’s food also serve another purpose. These 
references suggest the pleasure that Stiva derives not only from devouring his food, but also from 
the aesthetic qualities accompanying the eating process: seeing the food and probing its texture. 
Even Stiva’s moist and shiny eyes seem to resemble the oysters’ texture, conveying Stiva’s 
sensory enchantment with his food: “— А недурны, — говорил он, сдирая серебряною 
вилочкой с перламутровой раковины шлюпающих устриц и проглатывая их одну за 
другой. — Недурны, — повторял он, вскидывая влажные и блестящие глаза то на Левина, 
то на Татарина” (18:39). 
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Stiva’s delight in the sensuous qualities of his surroundings reflects his sensual nature, 
which, however indulgent, never becomes as ruinous as Anna’s. Stiva’s sensory impressions are 
usually pleasurable—unlike Anna’s, which are similarly heightened, but to such a degree that 
they cause her physical pain. For example, shortly before her suicide, when Anna pursues 
Vronskii at the train station, the noise of the trains and the voices of the people around her 
physically hurt her, making her want to close her ears. Neither can she stand the smell of food, 
which disgusts her and diverts her from eating. Anna’s heightened sensitivity to sensory 
impressions causes her to experience reality as something that assaults her, reflecting her 
increasing alienation. Although Anna’s perception is affected by opium, which she begins to take 
after giving birth to her daughter, there is the suggestion that her distorted perception is also a 
result of her evolved sexuality. Stiva’s sensory susceptibility suggests his immersion in reality, 
his indulgence in the quotidian of life, whereas Anna’s heightened sensory sensitivity reflects her 
alienation from reality and anticipates her suicide. 
Stiva’s sensory perception is indulgent and thus impulsive, reflecting his spontaneous, 
easily-carried-away nature (“способность всё, всё забыть … способность полного 
увлечения” 18:75), jeopardizing his moral sense. Tolstoi uses another sensory metaphor to 
exemplify Stiva’s impulsive nature. During this same oyster dinner, Stiva admits that if the smell 
of a sweet roll is so attractive that he cannot resist it, he is ready to steal the roll even though he 
already has one. Smell symbolizes Stiva’s attraction to and anticipation of pleasure, which Stiva, 
because of his indulgent nature, cannot resist. He responds readily to the stimuli that promise 
him physical pleasure, easily justifying his infidelities with the satisfaction they provide. The 
carnal overrides the moral in Stiva’s ethics; thus, he believes that one should at least enjoy 
sensual pleasures in spite of moral failings:  
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Глаза Степана Аркадьича блестели больше обыкновенного. 
— Отчего же? Калач иногда так пахнет, что не удержишься. 
Himmlisch ist’s, wenn ich bezwungen 
Meine irdische Begier; 
Aber noch wenn’s nicht gelungen, 
Hatt’ich auch recht hübsch Plaisir!10 (18:45) 
 
The Western philosophical tradition (Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes) associates vision 
with mind/reason and clarity of perception and judgment. Tolstoi shows that Stiva’s mind/reason 
and therefore moral judgment are compromised by his indulgent nature. Stiva’s sight lags behind 
his touch. Waking up in his office after a quarrel with his wife, who has exiled him from the 
bedroom, Stiva fails to recognize that he has woken up in the wrong room, or to recall the 
upsetting dispute, even after he opens his eyes. He notices the bright light from behind the 
curtains, and one can assume that he should have noticed the room’s furniture and understood 
that he is not in the bedroom but in the office. However, Stiva only realizes that the room is 
wrong, recalling his quarrel with Dolly, when he stretches out his arm to fetch his robe and does 
not find it in its usual place (once again, in relation not to the room but to his body):     
… вдруг вскочил, сел на диван и открыл глаза. … Глаза Степана Аркадьича весело 
заблестели, и он задумался улыбаясь. … И, заметив полосу света, пробившуюся с 
боку одной из суконных стор, он весело скинул ноги с дивана, отыскал ими шитые 
женой (подарок ко дню рождения в прошлом году), обделанные в золотистый 
сафьян туфли и по старой, девятилетней привычке, не вставая, потянулся рукой к 
тому месту, где в спальне у него висел халат. И тут он вспомнил вдруг, как и 
почему он спит не в спальне жены, а в кабинете; улыбка исчезла с его лица, он 
сморщил лоб. (18:4) 
 
Indeed, Stiva is driven by his body rather than by his mind/reason, which reflects his general 
insusceptibility to others’ feelings and thus testifies to his poor moral judgment. When his wife 
                                                 
10 Великолепно, если я поборол 
Свою земную страсть, 
Но если это и не удалось, 
Я всё же испытал блаженство! (18:45) 
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discovers his liaison, he does not recognize his guilt and feels no remorse, involuntarily smiling 
at her with his habitually kind and silly smile, causing Dolly even greater distress:   
Вместо того чтоб оскорбиться, отрекаться, оправдываться, просить прощения, 
оставаться даже равнодушным — все было бы лучше того, что он сделал! — его 
лицо совершенно невольно («рефлексы головного мозга», подумал Степан 
Аркадьич, который любил физиологию), совершенно невольно вдруг улыбнулось 
привычною, доброю и потому глупою улыбкой. … «Всему виной эта глупая 
улыбка», думал Степан Аркадьич (18:4–5). 
 
Tolstoi repeats “совершенно невольно” (absolutely involuntarily) twice in the same sentence to 
describe Stiva’s smile, emphasizing his lack of control over the nerves and muscles that shape 
his expression. Stiva’s poor moral sense does nothing to restrain his bodily impulses, revealing 
his indulgent and impulsive nature, and a lack of control over his own body. Likewise, his 
pleasant morning routine and good digestion easily erase the memory of his ongoing quarrel with 
his wife, causing him to smile happily (“радостно улыбнулся, не оттого, чтоб у него на душе 
было что-нибудь особенно приятное, — радостную улыбку вызвало хорошее 
пищеварение” 18:10). Stiva’s smile is a primitive, physiological reaction invoked by healthy 
bodily operations, easily overriding any nascent remorse.  
Stiva’s judgments about religion and spirituality also derive from his body rather than his 
mind/reason, and therefore are base. Because Stiva’s body is sensual and indulgent, spiritual 
aspirations requiring him to restrain his carnal desires are alien to him. Supernatural and moral 
questions, at least in the way that they are posed by religion, lie outside of Stiva’s interests. He is 
immersed in the earthly, carnal life, which he is not ready to give up. He rejects religion because 
religious services cause him physical discomfort—a pain in his legs: “Степан Аркадьич не мог 
вынести без боли в ногах даже короткого молебна и не мог понять, к чему все эти 
страшные и высокопарные слова о том свете, когда и на этом жить было бы очень весело” 
(18:9). Nonetheless, given Tolstoi’s reservations about the dogmatic and metaphysical aspects of 
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the Christian religion, Stiva’s ignorance of immaterial spiritual realities may reflect, in some 
ways, his virtue. Stiva has fathered seven children with Dolly over nine years, and at least one 
additional child with his mistress, the French governess. Stiva’s carnality reflects not only his 
sensuality but also his naturally procreative force, incompatible with strict Christian asceticism 
but consistent with Tolstoi’s relatively positive views on sex and procreation during the 1870s, 
when he considered procreation to be a duty commanded by God, as I discuss in Chapter 1. The 
ambiguity of Stiva’s carnality reflects the ambiguity of the character’s moral sense. Although his 
sense of responsibility is admittedly questionable, it is not entirely absent. During a conversation 
about carnal love with Levin over their oyster dinner, Stiva says that, once having seduced a 
woman, he will not leave his family for her, but will not leave her either: “Ты пойми, что 
женщина, милое, кроткое, любящее существо, бедная, одинокая и всем пожертвовала. 
Теперь, когда уже дело сделано, — ты пойми,— неужели бросить ее? Положим: 
расстаться, чтобы не разрушить семейную жизнь; но неужели не пожалеть ее, не устроить, 
не смягчить?” (18:45). Stiva’s morality is inherently corrupt, since the affair is the result of his 
inability to resist desire in the first place. Yet, his sense of responsibility for the seduced woman 
is, in a way, moral. Stiva’s indulgent, sensuous and thus self-forgiving nature also makes him 
more compassionate with respect to others’ moral failings. For instance, Levin, whose lifestyle 
included some dissolute instances in the past, condemns fallen women, calling them “vermin” 
and comparing them to “spiders” (18:45). On the other hand, Stiva’s ambiguous, self-forgiving 
morality makes him a more empathetic person, allowing him to sympathize with Anna and stand 
by her side after she yields to Vronskii’s courtship and becomes a fallen woman herself. The 
balance between the carnal and the moral is not perfected in Stiva’s nature, so his sensuality 
dominates his conduct and often overrides his moral sense. Nonetheless, this moral sense, albeit 
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rudimentary, is still present in his nature, even if it derives from moral weakness rather than from 
moral strength. It makes him more tolerant and kind, even if his tolerance for his own moral 
flaws harms other people (both family members and lovers).  
Stiva’s haptic perceptions physically manifest his ability to empathize and feel remorse 
(though rudimentary). Despite seeking pleasant sensations and avoiding unpleasant ones, Stiva is 
nevertheless capable of responding to unpleasant stimuli that cause him physical and emotional 
discomfort. When Stiva’s daughter Tania realizes that he is lying to her, by claiming that her 
mother is not upset, she blushes out of shame for him, and Stiva reciprocates with his own blush 
(18:10). Tania’s reproach for the lie makes him feel embarrassed, although he never fully 
recognizes his unfaithfulness as a moral flaw. Stiva’s blush is a physiological bodily reaction, 
just like his involuntary smile, or the good mood incited by a sunny day and good digestion. But 
in the case of Tania, he responds to an impulse that is neither pleasurable nor, strictly speaking, 
physiological in nature. Stiva responds to a moral rather than physiological stimulus, even 
though it is manifested through the body. Tania’s moral sense manifests itself in her blush, and 
thus appeals to Stiva’s moral sense, causing him to blush as well. Stiva’s and Tania’s shared 
sensations reflect their shared emotions, testifying to Stiva’s susceptibility to shame.  
Stiva also sympathizes with Dolly, though his compassion is but momentary. Seeing 
Dolly’s pained expression and hearing her desperate voice, he begins to suffer himself, not only 
emotionally but physically: he cannot breathe, as if Dolly’s tears are transported into his body 
and block his airways (“ему захватило дыхание, что-то подступило к горлу”). Dolly’s 
suffering, concentrated in her voice, seems to render him speechless (“он не мог продолжать, 
рыдание остановилось у него в горле”):  
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… когда он увидал ее измученное, страдальческое лицо, услыхал этот звук голоса, 
покорный судьбе и отчаянный, ему захватило дыхание, что-то подступило к горлу, 
и глаза его заблестели слезами. 
— Боже мой, что я сделал! Долли! Ради Бога!.. Ведь...— он не мог продолжать, 
рыдание остановилось у него в горле. (18:13) 
 
Stiva’s suffering, like all of his sensory experiences, is acute in this scene, but he once again 
behaves impulsively. He responds only to direct stimulus: he feels compassion for Dolly only 
when witnessing her suffering in the moment, and restores his good spirits as soon as Dolly 
leaves his sight. Stiva jokes inwardly about feeling like a guilty little boy only half an hour later, 
underscoring his impulsive and indulgent nature, which seeks pleasurable experiences and avoids 
unpleasant ones, and revealing his immature moral sense (“«Если б они знали … каким 
виноватым мальчиком полчаса тому назад был их председатель!» — И глаза его смеялись 
при чтении доклада” 18:18). However, in spite of Stiva’s generally questionable morality, he is 
not devoid of empathy. Stiva’s ability to feel ashamed and partake in others’ suffering (even that 
which he causes) underscores his nascent—though yet undeveloped—moral sense.  
Compared to the pangs of remorse derived from Stiva’s interactions with other people as 
he is affected by their reproach, his self- and body-centered conscience, flawed as it is, is 
paradoxically more durable and effective. Although Stiva is a fundamentally carnal person, 
acting impulsively on his “brain reflexes” and driven by his body’s needs and comforts, his body 
is the seat not only of carnal desire but also of moral sense (even if primitive and rooted in his 
personal comfort). The rudimentary moral sense embedded in his body prevents him from 
complete, carefree neglect, prompting him with physical and emotional discomfort (though not 
moral guilt) to seek his wife’s forgiveness.  
Being a man of habit and comfort, Stiva feels uneasy when his routine is disturbed. His 
body suddenly reminds him of his fight with Dolly, interrupting his sensory (haptic, visual, and 
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gustatory) enjoyment. Despite being indulgent, easily carried away, and forgetful, Stiva cannot 
entirely escape his marital dispute. Stiva’s involuntary smile, which he justifies as one of his 
“рефлексы головного мозга/brain reflexes,” but still blames for aggravating his conflict with 
Dolly, continues to cause him discomfort. Stiva’s pleasant morning routine (reading a 
newspaper, drinking coffee, and eating a roll) seems to have completely wiped his memory of 
the ongoing quarrel. However, precisely when Stiva smiles, delighting in his good digestion, the 
expression—again, involuntarily—brings back the recollection of the unpleasant incident and 
frustrates his cheerful mood (“радостную улыбку вызвало хорошее пищеварение. Но эта 
радостная улыбка сейчас же напомнила ему всё, и он задумался” (18:10)). Although Stiva 
tries to erase his sense of guilt, his smile keeps a record of the misdeed. Stiva’s involuntary grin, 
which particularly vexes him as a cause of his alienation from Dolly, haunts him through 
subsequent smiles, suggesting his moral sense. That Stiva’s smile triggers the recollection of his 
misdeed reveals the balance between the carnal and the spiritual within his personality: although 
his carnal nature dominates, his spiritual—and thus moral— nature is still present.  
Nonetheless, although morality is present in Stiva, his carnal, sensual nature typically 
dominates his conduct. As discussed above, Tolstoi suggests that Stiva’s sensuality, which 
makes him highly susceptible to sensory impressions of worldly phenomena, also makes him 
impulsive and indulgent, unable to control his feelings and desires, and as such, often renders 
him selfish and insensitive to others’ needs. Because of his impulsive and indulgent nature, Stiva 
fails to sustain the wholeness of his family, which is reflected not only in the famous disorder in 
the Oblonskii house in the beginning of the novel, caused by Stiva’s exposed infidelity, but also 
in Stiva’s haptic interactions with his family members: his children and Dolly.  
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Although Stiva tries to love each of his children equally, his love is selective, and he can 
neither control his feelings nor even correct his conduct. Stiva has tender, loving relations with 
his daughter Tania, whereas his relations with his son Grisha, whom he loves less, are more 
distant. Describing Stiva’s relations with Tania and Grisha, Tolstoi juxtaposes touch and vision 
as proximate and distant senses, respectively. Touch and vision are polyvalent phenomena in the 
novel, and their interpretation depends on the particular relationship that they describe. A parent 
and child are tied together through their bodies, and their love is profoundly corporeal, but also 
innocent. Therefore, in parental-filial relationships, touch, as the most earthbound and intimate of 
the senses, communicates a physical and emotional bond between parent and child, whereas 
vision, the most incorporeal and detached sense, suggests their alienation. Tolstoi chooses touch 
to emphasize the emotional connection between Stiva and his daughter, and vision to 
communicate the emotional alienation between Stiva and his son. Stiva caresses Tania’s smooth, 
tender neck, yet only smiles at Grisha from a distance, without touching him. Stiva’s children 
reciprocate in the same manner: Tania greets her father with a touch, hanging on his neck, 
whereas his son ignores his smile because it is cold and unaffectionate, maintaining the distance 
between them:  
Девочка, любимица отца, вбежала смело, обняла его и смеясь повисла у него на 
шее, как всегда, радуясь на знакомый запах духов, распространявшийся от его 
бакенбард. Поцеловав его наконец в покрасневшее от наклоненного положения и 
сияющее нежностью лицо, девочка разняла руки и хотела бежать назад; но отец 
удержал ее. — Что мама? — спросил он, водя рукой по гладкой, нежной шейке 
дочери. — Здравствуй, — сказал он, улыбаясь здоровавшемуся мальчику. Он 
сознавал, что меньше любил мальчика, и всегда старался быть ровен; но мальчик 
чувствовал это и не ответил улыбкой на холодную улыбку отца (18:11).  
 
Later in the scene, Stiva again strokes Tania’s “tender” hand and “tender” shoulder, kisses her 
hair and neck, but continues to ignore his son. The emotional reciprocity between Stiva and his 
daughter is reflected in the reciprocity not only of their gestures but also of their sensations. 
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When Tania embraces Stiva and hangs on his neck, she can smell the familiar perfume of his 
sideburns. Likewise, when Stiva caresses her neck, Tolstoi describes it as “smooth and tender,” 
suggesting Stiva’s sensory impression as he touches Tania’s skin. In keeping with Merleau-
Ponty’s vision of unity as simultaneously touching and being touched, Stiva’s and Tania’s 
sensory interactions—touching the other while simultaneously being touched by him/her—reveal 
their profound connection. Their tactile interaction conflates active and passive touches: reaching 
out to the other’s body, they are being simultaneously touched by it. The sensations produced by 
the contact or close proximity with the other’s body (tenderness of skin, smell of the sideburns) 
reveal Stiva and Tania’s mutual affection. In light of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of sensory 
reciprocity in his essay “The Intertwining—The Chiasm” (The Visible and the Invisible), Stiva 
and Tania achieve unity, because each of them not only touches the other but is also 
simultaneously touched—Stiva is touched through the sensation of Tania’s skin, and Tania is 
touched by Stiva’s smell.  
The thermal sensations suggested in the scene also contrast Stiva’s unequal loves for 
Tania and Grisha. As he bends over to let his daughter kiss him, his face becomes red as the 
blood rushes to his skin. His flush suggests the warmth of his skin/body, and reflects the tender 
and cordial love he feels for his daughter. On the other hand, Stiva’s insincere smile for his son is 
“cold.” Although in this case the “cold” does not denote a physical sensation, but rather an 
emotional state of alienation, it could be read as a haptic element as well. After all, Grisha does 
not touch his father and cannot feel the warmth of his body, as Tania most likely does when 
touching Stiva’s neck. Stiva’s love for his children is tender but not inclusive: his insufficient 
love for his son leaves Grisha feeling alienated.  
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Stiva lacks control over his loves (both sensual and parental) and needs a mediator who 
can maintain his family’s unity, such as Tania in this episode (and Anna later on). When Stiva 
gives Tania two of her favorite candies, Tania gives one to Grisha, whom Stiva continuously 
neglects. Tania mediates Stiva’s touch and love for Grisha, bridging the gap between father and 
son.       
— Ну, иди, Танчурочка моя. Ах да, постой, — сказал он, всё-таки удерживая ее 
и гладя ее нежную ручку. 
Он достал с камина, где вчера поставил, коробочку конфет и дал ей две, выбрав 
ее любимые, шоколадную и помадную. 
— Грише? — сказала девочка, указывая на шоколадную. 
— Да, да. — И еще раз погладив ее плечико, он поцеловал ее в корни волос и 
шею и отпустил ее. (18:11) 
 
Despite her enjoyment of touch, which could indicate her nascent sensuality (she is Stiva’s 
daughter, after all), little Tania serves as a bridge between her parents and Grisha, giving him 
candies in this scene, and a cake later in the novel, when Dolly punishes him for misbehavior. 
Tania’s still-dormant sensuality does not prevent her from connecting with other people or re-
connecting people with one another. Tania’s sensuality manifests itself as a tender, filial, and 
sisterly love, devoid of the ruinous erotic component developed in Stiva. Inherently innocent, 
Tania proves a successful peacemaker, able to re-unite. Even if the unity she facilitates does not 
prove stable, it is no fault of the peacemaker, but of the participants: Stiva’s indulgent nature and 
his flawed morality continue to threaten the family peace.         
Through their touch, Tolstoi also reveals Stiva and Dolly’s typical alienation, which only 
escalates after Dolly uncovers Stiva’s infidelity. Stiva’s love for his wife is flawed. He does not 
love Dolly with a romantic or spiritual love, which should have prevented him from cheating, but 
rather only respects her (“Жена стареется, а ты полн жизни. Ты не успеешь оглянуться, как 
ты уже чувствуешь, что ты не можешь любить любовью жену, как бы ты ни уважал ее” 
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18:45). Even this respect for Dolly is questionable. Stiva seems to respect his wife as a friend 
rather than a spouse, since he does not find his infidelity offensive. Although Stiva’s respect for 
Dolly (however questionable) and Dolly’s love for Stiva tie them together, their union is 
imperfect and verges on separation. On the fateful evening when Dolly discovers Stiva’s 
unfaithfulness, Stiva returns from a party with a pear for Dolly in his hand, only to find Dolly 
holding a note revealing his love affair:  
Неприятнее всего была та первая минута, когда он, вернувшись из театра, веселый 
и довольный, с огромною грушей для жены в руке, не нашел жены в гостиной; к 
удивлению, не нашел ее и в кабинете и наконец увидал ее в спальне с несчастною, 
открывшею всё, запиской в руке. Она, эта вечно озабоченная, и хлопотливая, и 
недалекая, какою он считал ее, Долли, неподвижно сидела с запиской в руке и с 
выражением ужаса, отчаяния и гнева смотрела на него. (18:3)     
  
Tolstoi communicates Stiva and Dolly’s relationship non-verbally by drawing the reader’s 
attention to their hands. Tolstoi repeats “в руке” twice in the episode: when Stiva brings the pear 
to Dolly “in his hand,” she holds the note revealing his infidelity “in her hand.” Their hands 
cannot touch one another because of the objects they are holding. The pear, which Stiva brings 
from a party to his home, bridges the gap between his lascivious lifestyle and his family life. 
Despite multiple romances and even his current lover’s pregnancy (suggested in the text), Stiva 
does not want to leave his family. Stiva’s gift of a pear for his wife emblematizes their 
connection. Even though Stiva is not attracted to his wife anymore, he brings her a pear as a 
present. Presumably, Dolly would have accepted the pear from Stiva’s hands if she had not 
found the fateful note. Stiva’s offering suggests that they do not share a profound emotional or 
spiritual connection (they do not touch each other directly, but through a gift, in this case the 
pear), but that they are nonetheless linked. Both love their children (even though Stiva’s parental 
love is selective and unequal) and want to preserve their family. When his unfaithfulness is 
revealed, Stiva strives to make peace with Dolly and hopes for her forgiveness, although he 
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never recognizes his guilt and does not stop cheating. Stiva will not change his lifestyle, but he 
wants to restore his and his family’s habitual routines, which include their family unity (albeit 
generally unstable, because of his infidelities). 
Stiva’s discovered unfaithfulness severs the connection, however faint, between himself 
and Dolly, dividing his family just as the love note divides Stiva and Dolly’s hands and hampers 
their touch. By counterposing the “pear” in Stiva’s hand with the “note” in Dolly’s, Tolstoi 
contrasts Stiva’s and Dolly’s attitudes toward infidelity, suggesting the opposing moral beliefs 
which alienate them. Dolly, who married Stiva believing in his innocence, and who did not know 
about his romances after their marriage, is shocked, aggrieved and enraged by his infidelity. On 
the other hand, Stiva takes his romances lightheartedly. His moral judgment is driven by his 
body’s desires, and he finds it easy to justify his infidelity with his sensual drive, which he 
cannot satisfy within family bounds. He displaces his responsibility by saying—and believing—
that he is to be blamed, but that he is not guilty (“виной я, а не виноват” 18:4). Stiva recognizes 
that he is at the center of his family’s discord, but not that he is the cause. He considers his 
unfaithfulness to be natural (and therefore permissive) because, still a young man at the age of 
thirty-two, he finds his wife, who has given birth to their five living and two dead children, 
unattractive. He considers himself a victim rather than an offender, failing to recognize his 
responsibility for the conflict. Stiva’s lighthearted attitude and Dolly’s condemnation alienate 
them, like the pear in Stiva’s hand and the note in Dolly’s. Stiva’s infidelity, and Dolly’s pain 
and condemnation, divide them, severing the connections between all other family members and 
throwing the entire household into disorder. 
Tolstoi shows that Stiva’s touch, tarnished with sensuality, cannot be a means of 
communion, so Stiva cannot bridge the rift he has created by himself. As his daughter Tania 
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reconnects Stiva and Grisha, Stiva’s sister Anna comes to bridge the gap between Stiva and 
Dolly, reconnecting them and restoring the unity of their family. In reuniting Stiva’s family, 
Anna also interlinks its members through her touch, consecutively touching Stiva, then Dolly, 
and then their children, “stitching” them back together.  
Arriving at Stiva’s house, Anna finds Dolly stricken by grief and seized with hatred. 
Dolly is hurt by Stiva’s infidelity, feeling alienated and estranged (“чужие”) from him: “мы 
чужие. Навсегда чужие! — повторила она опять с особенным значением это страшное для 
нее слово” (18:16). Her suffering transforms her love into hatred, alienating her also from her 
children. She refers to her and Stiva’s children as only “his,” separating herself from them, 
blaming them for stealing her youthful beauty and questioning if she should have had children at 
all:  
Ты понимаешь ли, Анна, что у меня моя молодость, красота взяты кем? Им и его 
детьми. Я отслужила ему, и на этой службе ушло всё мое, и ему теперь, разумеется, 
свежее пошлое существо приятнее. Они, верно, говорили между собою обо мне 
или, еще хуже, умалчивали, — ты понимаешь? — Опять ненавистью зажглись ее 
глаза. — И после этого он будет говорить мне... Что ж, я буду верить ему? Никогда. 
Нет, уж кончено всё, всё, что составляло утешенье, награду труда, мук... Ты 
поверишь ли? я сейчас учила Гришу: прежде это бывало радость, теперь мученье. 
Зачем я стараюсь, тружусь? Зачем дети? (18:74–75).  
 
Dolly’s hatred and alienation distort her judgment (she sees the situation “in a wrong way” 
(“видишь не так”), as Anna says), giving her the desire to kill Stiva and perhaps herself as well:  
Ужасно то, что вдруг душа моя перевернулась, и вместо любви, нежности у 
меня к нему одна злоба, да, злоба. Я бы убила его и... 
— Душенька, Долли, я понимаю, но не мучь себя. Ты так оскорблена, так 
возбуждена, что ты многое видишь не так. (18:74–75) 
 
Dolly’s initial impulse is to reject Anna along with the others. Dolly is humiliated, afraid that 
Anna, Stiva’s sister and emissary, will naturally take his side and will be unable to empathize: 
“Говорить о своем горе она не хотела, а с этим горем на душе говорить о постороннем она 
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не могла. Она знала, что, так или иначе, она Анне выскажет всё, и то ее радовала мысль о 
том, как она выскажет, то злила необходимость говорить о своем унижении с ней, его 
сестрой, и слышать от нее готовые фразы увещания и утешения” (18:72). Because Dolly 
does not trust Anna, she hugs and kisses (touches) Anna insincerely, only as a social ritual of 
greeting. When Anna comes in, Dolly is trying to decide whether to share her feelings with Anna 
or to reject her, and she looks puzzled rather than joyful when they meet. Dolly’s puzzlement 
(“удивление”) reflects not only the surprise of seeing Anna so early, but also the uncertainty of 
how Anna should be perceived. So, Dolly’s touch and kiss reveal her emotional detachment: 
“Услыхав шум платья и легких шагов уже в дверях, она оглянулась, и на измученном лице 
ее невольно выразилось не радость, а удивление. Она встала и обняла золовку. — Как, уж 
приехала? — сказала она, целуя ее” (18:72).  
Anna begins her peacemaking mission by touching Dolly indirectly, using her children as 
intermediaries. Anna and Dolly are both mothers and thus have grounds for bonding, so Anna 
begins to earn Dolly’s trust through her children. Anna kisses Grisha, and then holds and kisses 
Tania, and finally asks Dolly to show her all of the other children:  
— Это Гриша? Боже мой, как он вырос! — сказала Анна и, поцеловав его, не 
спуская глаз с Долли, остановилась и покраснела. — Нет, позволь никуда не 
ходить. […] 
— Боже мой, Таня! Ровесница Сереже моему, — прибавила она, обращаясь ко 
вбежавшей девочке. Она взяла ее на руки и поцеловала. — Прелестная девочка, 
прелесть! Покажи же мне всех. (18:72) 
 
Anna’s first step in helping Dolly overcome her alienation and bridge the gap between her and 
Stiva proves successful. When Anna sits closer to Dolly, taking her hand and trying to console 
her, Dolly accepts her touch: she does not yet respond to the touch, or loosen her reserved 
expression, but neither does she withdraw her hand and move away: “— Долли, милая! — 
сказала она, — я не хочу ни говорить тебе за него, ни утешать; это нельзя. Но, душенька, 
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мне просто жалко, жалко тебя всею душой! … Она пересела ближе к невестке и взяла ее 
руку своею энергическою маленькою рукой. Долли не отстранилась, но лицо ее не 
изменяло своего сухого выражения” (18:73). Dolly’s acceptance of Anna’s touch reveals that 
she is overcoming her alienation. Even though Dolly still feels withdrawn, thinking that she has 
lost everything and thus cannot be consoled, she begins to confess her grief. Anna’s compassion, 
expressed in her touch on Dolly’s hand, bridges the gap between them:  
— … Утешить меня нельзя. Всё потеряно после того, что было, всё пропало! 
И как только она сказала это, выражение лица ее вдруг смягчилось. (18:73) 
 
Dolly’s confession brings her relief, and her face suddenly softens. Dolly does not yet respond to 
Anna’s touch with her own, but her facial expression suggests that Dolly is ready to let Anna into 
her emotional world and re-connect.      
Throughout their conversation, Dolly tries to object to Anna’s reasoning, becoming more 
distant: she doubts that Anna can fully understand her situation and suffering, and feels that she 
cannot forgive Stiva despite her love for him. Dolly’s vicious cycle of recurring fits of suffering, 
frustration, and hostility perpetuate her alienation (“как будто нарочно, каждый раз, как она 
смягчалась, она начинала опять говорить о том, чтò раздражало ее” (18:74)). Anna’s touch 
breaks this cycle and helps Dolly overcome her sense of alienation. Whenever Dolly drifts away, 
seized by grief and anger, Anna touches (presses and kisses) Dolly’s hand, reaching out to Dolly 
and reasserting their bond:  
Продолжать быть моим мужем вместе с нею... это ужасно! Ты не можешь понять 
[...]   
— О, нет, я понимаю! Понимаю, милая Долли, понимаю, — говорила Анна, 
пожимая ее руку. (18:74) 
 … Но, Долли, душенька, я понимаю твои страдания вполне, только одного я не 
знаю: я не знаю... я не знаю, насколько в душе твоей есть еще любви к нему. Это ты 
знаешь, — настолько ли есть, чтобы можно было простить. Если есть, то прости! 
— Нет, — начала Долли; но Анна прервала ее, целуя еще раз ее руку. (18:75) 
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Finally, when Dolly decides to forgive Stiva, she begins to reciprocate Anna’s touch for the first 
time. Dolly hugs Anna sincerely, greeting her at last as if she had just arrived, and this time with 
genuine joy: “Если простить, то совсем, совсем. Ну, пойдем, я тебя проведу в твою 
комнату, — сказала она [Долли] вставая, и по дороге Долли обняла Анну. — Милая моя, 
как я рада, что ты приехала” (18:75). Dolly’s response to Anna’s touches, in the form of 
sincere and joyful embrace, reflects her reintegration.  
 Having helped Dolly overcome her resentment and alienation, Anna now finalizes her 
mission as a peacemaker by touching Stiva. Anna crosses Stiva shortly before Stiva and Dolly’s 
fateful reconciliation. The sign of crossing can involve a direct touch on the skin, or can be 
performed without, but in either case the touch is implied. Throughout the scene, Anna touches 
the Oblonskiis’ children, Dolly, and Stiva once more, as she works to reestablish peace between 
them, restoring their unity. She now closes up a different kind of circle: not the vicious circle of 
individual hostility and alienation, but a circle interlinking the family members into a single 
whole.  
The dynamics of Stiva and Dolly’s fight and reconciliation are reflected in their children, 
especially Grisha, who has been neglected or nearly neglected by both of his parents on different 
occasions. Before Anna’s arrival, the children run around the house as if lost, without proper 
guidance or order (“Дети бегали по всему дому, как потерянные” (18:3)). Stiva is always 
more affectionate with his daughter, Tania, than he is with Grisha. Dolly, too, seized with anger, 
feels alienated from her children, and singles out Grisha in particular (“я сейчас учила Гришу: 
прежде это бывало радость, теперь мученье. Зачем я стараюсь, тружусь? Зачем дети?” 
18:74). After Anna successfully accomplishes her mission as a peacemaker, all of the children 
gather together around Anna, playing a game which is stunningly tactile, and whose rules are to 
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sit as close to her as possible, touch her, hold her hand, kiss her, play with a ring on her finger, or 
at least touch the flounce of her dress. By Anna’s side, Grisha finally gains the affection and 
touch that is lacking in his relationship with his father and (almost) with his mother. Grisha 
beams with pride and delight as he puts his head under Anna’s hand, pressing against her dress:  
Когда Степан Аркадьич ушел, она вернулась на диван, где сидела окруженная 
детьми. Оттого ли, что дети видели, что мама любила эту тетю, или оттого, что они 
сами чувствовали в ней особенную прелесть; но старшие два, а за ними и меньшие, 
как это часто бывает с детьми, еще до обеда прилипли к новой тете и не отходили 
от нее. И между ними составилось что-то в роде игры, состоящей в том, чтобы как 
можно ближе сидеть подле тети, дотрагиваться до нее, держать ее маленькую руку, 
целовать ее, играть с ее кольцом или хоть дотрагиваться до оборки ее платья.  
— Ну, ну, как мы прежде сидели, — сказала Анна Аркадьевна, садясь на свое 
место. 
И опять Гриша подсунул голову под ее руку и прислонился головой к ее платью 
и засиял гордостью и счастьем. […] 
— Нет, я прежде! нет, я! — кричали дети, окончив чай и выбегая к тете Анне. 
— Все вместе! — сказала Анна и смеясь побежала им на встречу и обняла и 
повалила всю эту кучу копошащихся и визжащих от восторга детей. (18:77–79) 
 
The scene ends with Anna’s exclamation “Все вместе! / All together!” as she embraces all of the 
children, stressing—as the exclamation point confirms—their unity. The image of the children 
united around Anna, seeking to touch and be touched, including the now-integrated Grisha, 
reflects Stiva and Dolly’s reconciliation taking place in the adjacent room.  
Through Anna’s touch, Stiva, Dolly, and their children all come together as one family. 
Touching Stiva, Dolly, and their children, Anna stitches their family back together. Even though 
Stiva and Dolly will never have a perfectly spiritual union, because of Stiva’s continuing 
infidelity, Stiva’s sense of guilt (albeit transient) and Dolly’s continuing forgiveness allow their 
family to recover a relative wholeness.  
 By depicting Stiva’s haptic interactions with his children and his wife, Tolstoi shows that 
Stiva’s carnal, indulgent, and impulsive nature weakens his ability to establish and sustain his 
family’s unity. Stiva’s touch fails to fulfill what should be its major purpose—to serve as a link 
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interconnecting his family members into a single whole. Stiva’s lack of parental love for his son 
Grisha, and his lack of either romantic attraction or spiritual love for his wife Dolly, renders his 
touch indirect, communicated only through an intermediary (object or person). This inability 
reveals his alienation. By introducing intermediaries into Stiva’s relationships, Tolstoi 
demonstrates that Stiva fails to bridge the gap between himself and others, pointing to the 
fragmenting rather than uniting nature of touch tarnished by his sensuality.  
2. Dolly 
Unlike other major characters, Dolly’s haptic experiences are few. Nevertheless, the 
limited haptic experiences that she does have indicate that she is one of the characters (along 
with Levin and Kitty) who embody Tolstoi’s moral ideal. Dolly’s haptic experiences manifest 
themselves in three episodes. The first instance is the above analyzed pear-note episode, in which 
Stiva and Dolly’s hands cannot not touch. The pear in Stiva’s hand is associated with his 
lascivious lifestyle. This, combined with the note revealing his unfaithfulness held in Dolly’s 
hand (telling of her moral condemnation of Stiva’s conduct), prevents their hands from touching. 
The second instance is an episode that I will analyze in the Chapter on Anna, when Anna arrives 
from Saint Petersburg to persuade Dolly to forgive Stiva. The episode is, however, telling of 
Anna’s rather than of Dolly’s haptic experiences. The third episode is the one that will be my 
focus in this chapter, since it reveals the way in which Tolstoi identifies Dolly as a moral ideal 
through her haptic perception.     
On her way to visit Anna, who now lives with Vronskii at his estate, Dolly compares her 
own troubled life devoted to her children to Anna’s—who, as Dolly imagines, enjoys freedom, 
physical beauty, and passion with Vronskii. Recalling the hardships of motherhood, Dolly thinks 
of the painful sensation in her cracked nipples when breastfeeding (“Дарья Александровна 
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вздрогнула от одного воспоминания о боли треснувших сосков, которую она испытывала 
почти с каждым ребенком” [19:181]). While Stiva’s awareness of his body is associated with 
sensuality (as Anna’s is associated with hers, as will be discussed later), Dolly’s awareness of 
her body is linked to motherhood. Since Dolly experiences no other bodily sensations in the 
novel, it is safe to suggest that the pain in her nipples reflects her identity—that is, the identity of 
a mother.     
It is true that Dolly temporarily feels conflicted about the way in which she has lived her 
life—devoting it solely to bearing and raising her children. She regrets her lost beauty and the 
nonchalant lifestyle she could have had without incessant concern for her children’s wellbeing. 
She even wonders if she was right to let Anna persuade her to stay with Stiva, and meditates on 
whether she should have left Stiva and enjoyed free love in the same way that Anna did: “Я 
тогда должна была бросить мужа и начать жизнь с начала. Я бы могла любить и быть 
любима по-настоящему. А теперь разве лучше? Я не уважаю его. Он мне нужен, — 
думала она про мужа, — и я терплю его. Разве это лучше? Я тогда еще могла нравиться, у 
меня оставалась моя красота” (19:182).  
Dolly temporarily associates the pain in her cracked nipples, and therefore her 
motherhood, solely with hardships. She also reflects on the unnecessary sacrifice—as she is 
tempted to admit—of her beauty and joy to her husband, who does not love her, and to her 
children, who misbehave and may, she is afraid, grow up to be poorly mannered despite her 
strenuous efforts (“Так что и вывести детей я не могу сама, а разве с помощью других, с 
унижением. Ну, да если предположим самое счастливое: дети не будут больше умирать, и 
я кое-как воспитаю их. В самом лучшем случае они только не будут негодяи. Вот всё, чего 
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я могу желать. Из-за всего этого сколько мучений, трудов... Загублена вся жизнь!” 
[19:182]).  
Tolstoi associates Dolly’s doubts in the value of motherhood and her envy for Anna’s 
free lifestyle with an autoerotic impulse. Dolly is tempted to look at herself in a little mirror that 
she keeps in her bag to check her looks (wondering if she still can be found attractive). Although 
she then decides not to, feeling ashamed of what the coachman and the clerk may think of her, 
she continues to daydream of possible romances:  
«… Я тогда еще могла нравиться, у меня оставалась моя красота», продолжала 
думать Дарья Александровна, и ей хотелось посмотреться в зеркало. У ней было 
дорожное зеркальце в мешочке, и ей хотелось достать его; но, посмотрев на спины 
кучера и покачивавшегося конторщика, она почувствовала, что ей будет совестно, 
если кто-нибудь из них оглянется, и не стала доставать зеркала.  
Но и не глядясь в зеркало, она думала, что и теперь еще не поздно, и она 
вспомнила Сергея Ивановича, который был особенно любезен к ней, приятеля 
Стивы, доброго Туровцына, который вместе с ней ухаживал за ее детьми во время 
скарлатины и был влюблен в нее. И еще был один совсем молодой человек, 
который, как ей шутя сказал муж, находил, что она красивее всех сестер. И самые 
страстные и невозможные романы представлялись Дарье Александровне. (19:183) 
 
Dolly’s urge to look at herself in the mirror reverberates with other instances in the novel 
when characters direct their attention to their own bodies. For instance, Vronskii strokes his leg, 
which hurts after his fall in the horse race, and enjoys the painful sensation, which Tolstoi 
associates with his self-centered and amoral personality. Kitty feels the marble coldness of her 
skin at the ball, which is associated with her surfacing sensuality and the self-admiration linked 
to her naïve—but still morally wrong—infatuation with Vronskii. Anna experiences the 
hallucinatory sensations of Vronskii’s kisses on her skin, testifying to the obsessive and self-
absorbed nature of her desire.11 Just as with the above characters’ physical sensations, Dolly’s 
wish to admire her physical beauty (or what is left of it) suggests an autoerotic impulse. Unlike 
                                                 
11 I analyze these instances in detail in the corresponding chapters.  
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the above characters, though, Dolly is unconsciously aware that her daydreams of being 
physically attractive are vain and immoral. She feels ashamed of her urge, and her shame 
prevents her from consummating the autoerotic impulse to look in the mirror.  
Tolstoi’s reference to vision in describing Dolly’s deviation from the moral ideal of 
motherhood does not seem accidental. As discussed earlier, Plato’s “cave” metaphor associates 
vision with morality. Tolstoi links Dolly’s impulse to look at herself in the mirror with her erotic 
fantasies, which temporary make her self-absorbed and alienate her from her children. Since 
Dolly’s autoerotic urges alienate her from her children, Tolstoi suggests that these urges are 
immoral, just as her self-absorbed gaze would have been had she looked in the mirror.12 Tolstoi 
directly associates gaze with moral authority when he writes that Dolly is afraid to look at herself 
in the mirror for fear of her shame if the coachman or the clerk saw her doing it (“она 
почувствовала, что ей будет совестно, если кто-нибудь из них оглянется” (emphasis added; 
19:183)). The coachman and the clerk are common people who, according to Tolstoi’s moral 
vision, have an innate moral sense. For instance, when Dolly has an unpleasant impression of 
Vronskii’s estate and Anna’s life there later in the scene, she double-checks this impression with 
the coachman—as if he were a figure of moral authority—and he confirms that life in the estate 
is fraught with falsehood. The coachman and the clerk’s vision embodies the moral authority that 
stops Dolly from consummating her autoerotic urge when it undermines her moral sense.  
Dolly’s fear of being seen and judged by the coachman and the clerk indicates not only 
that she considers them to be figures of moral authority but also points to her close connection 
with the world of the peasantry. Her fear of their morally judgmental gaze reveals that she does 
                                                 
12 Unlike Dolly’s, Anna’s vision does become self-directed in the episode in which it seems to her that she can see 
the shining of her own eyes in the darkness after she yields to Vronskii’s pursuit and professes her love for him. 
Anna’s self-directed gaze reflects her growing self-absorption regarding her passion for Vronskii, as she 
simultaneously grows alienated from others. I discuss Anna’s vision in detail in the chapter devoted to her.  
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not separate herself from the common people and views herself as a part of their community, 
regardless of their differing social statuses. Since Dolly is a part of their community, their 
communal moral sense restrains Dolly’s urge when her individual morality is about to fail.  Since 
the shame of committing an act that the common people (and she herself) consider to be illicit 
prevents her from consummating the autoerotic urge to look at herself in the mirror, her vision 
never becomes self-directed. Likewise, Dolly, unlike Anna, never becomes self-absorbed in 
passion. Rather, Dolly’s eyes remain open to the world, anticipating her emotional reconnection 
with her children and a regained appreciation of motherhood.  
Having visited Anna, Dolly realizes the artificiality and misery of Anna’s life with 
Vronskii and longs to return home to her children—the habitual domestic world which she now 
finds especially dear:   
Оставшись одна, Долли помолилась Богу и легла в постель. Ей всею душой было 
жалко Анну в то время, как она говорила с ней; но теперь она не могла себя 
заставить думать о ней. Воспоминания о доме и детях с особенною, новою для нее 
прелестью, в каком-то новом сиянии возникали в ее воображении. Этот ее мир 
показался ей теперь так дорог и мил, что она ни за что не хотела вне его провести 
лишний день и решила, что завтра непременно уедет. (19:217)  
 
Describing Dolly’s renewed affection for her home and children, Tolstoi uses the visual image of 
light—“radiance” (“в каком-то новом сиянии возникали в ее воображении”). The fact that 
Dolly does not look at herself in the mirror suggests that, unlike Anna, she has not become 
enclosed in her sexual urges. Since her vision remains untainted by erotic impulse, she begins to 
appreciate her domestic life even more than she did before her temporary disappointment, seeing 
it in a “new light/radiance.” In keeping with Plato, Tolstoi’s association between Dolly’s 
renewed, tender love for her family and the light imagery—“radiance” (“сияние”)—indicates 
that love for family is the ideal to which one should strive, regardless of the hardships. While 
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Anna becomes seduced by carnal pleasure, Dolly does not, which allows her to regain her 
tenderness for and a new, greater appreciation of her family.   
As previously mentioned, Tolstoi reveals Dolly’s identity as a mother through her sole 
haptic sensation—that is, the pain in her cracked nipples from breastfeeding. The context in 
which Dolly recollects this sensation does not seem accidental. Dolly recalls the pain only when 
she undergoes an inner conflict between carnal pleasure and motherhood, when her erotic 
impulse challenges her identity as a parent. Since breastfeeding implies physical contact between 
a mother and a child, one can interpret the pain in Dolly’s nipples not only as a testimony to the 
hardships of motherhood, but also as the pain of separation when her erotic impulses threaten her 
emotional (and, it would seem, physical) connection to her children. In this regard, Tolstoi may 
be contrasting carnal love to motherly love through the choice of Dolly’s haptic memory. On the 
one hand, as Tolstoi’s non-fictional writings testify, he views breastfeeding as a manifestation of 
a woman’s morality, since he believes that breastfeeding is one of the duties prescribed to her by 
God. On the other hand, breastfeeding is evocative of intercourse, in the sense that both imply a 
kind of penetration (in the case of breastfeeding, a mother’s breast “penetrates” a child’s mouth). 
In choosing breastfeeding as Dolly’s haptic experience while describing Anna’s intercourse with 
Vronskii, Tolstoi highlights the contrast between motherhood and sexual desire—emphasizing 
Dolly’s identity as a mother rather than as a sexual being.   
Because motherhood rather than sexuality dominates Dolly’s identity, she can overcome 
erotic temptation to gain a deeper appreciation of her domestic life—something that Anna cannot 
do. Contrasting carnal and parental loves, Tolstoi suggests that carnal love limits the parental. 
Unlike Stiva, whose love for his children is unequal, Dolly’s love for her family is not only equal 
but also increases as she overcomes temptation.   
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In terms of Dolly’s sensory perception, since both the haptic (pain in the nipples) and the 
visual (“radiant” motherly love) are associated with Dolly’s motherhood, the haptic does not 
override the visual in Dolly’s sensorium as it does in Stiva’s (and in Anna’s and Vronskii’s, as 
will be discussed later). Since Dolly’s haptic and visual experiences belong to the same source—
her identity as a mother—her inherent physical connection to her children, reflected in the pain 
in her nipples, engenders the “radiance” of her renewed and strengthened motherly love. The fact 
that the physical/haptic does not limit but rather generates the visual suggests that Dolly has 
achieved the correct balance between body and soul (corporeal and spiritual, haptic and visual) 
through her role as a mother.  
Tolstoi associates Dolly’s haptic experience of the pain in her nipples with the pivotal 
moment of her moral near-fall, which, however, results in strengthened motherly love, 
reconfirming her identity as a mother. The fact that Dolly does not experience any other haptic 
sensations and hardly participates in haptic interactions may testify to the inner balance that she 
has achieved in motherhood. Unlike other characters, who deviate from or aspire to Tolstoi’s 
moral ideal in the course of their lives—Dolly occupies a static space, resigning herself to and 
rejoicing in her family life, despite the hardships and frustrations that she endures. One could 
speculate that the characters’ sensory (and particularly haptic) experiences testify to the fact that 
their lives are unbalanced, whether they aspire towards the spiritual or undergo moral failure. 
Therefore, the lack of Dolly’s haptic experiences in comparison with the other major characters 
is as informative and significant for revealing Dolly’s identity as are her haptic experiences 
themselves (however few). Her lack of haptic sensation indicates that she has achieved inner 
balance through motherhood, compromising with her husband’s unfaithfulness and devoting 
herself to her children, whom she genuinely loves. Though her domestic situation is perhaps far 
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from ideal, she fulfills and is content with her role as a woman, as Tolstoi’s views it, serving her 
family and working to preserve its unity despite her husband’s escapades. In this sense, Dolly 
can be viewed as a static, unifying center for her family, desiring nothing more than she already 
has. She is therefore excluded from the failures and ascents that other characters undergo, and 
that Tolstoi communicates through their haptic (and other sensory) experiences. 
3. Anna 
In her discussion of Plato’s influence on Tolstoi’s representation of love in Anna 
Karenina, Irina Gutkin maintains that, according to Plato, “love of the body … strives only to 
achieve an end,” and “once satisfied, this sole driving force is withdrawn, leaving the love dead” 
(92–93). Gutkin suggests that Tolstoi draws on Plato’s understanding of carnal love in Anna 
Karenina when he portrays it as a means to its own end, incapable of facilitating unity between 
Anna and Vronskii. This chapter argues that the haptic analysis of Anna’s sense of touch 
(alongside her other sensory experiences) reveals that her sensuality interferes not only with her 
relationship with Vronskii, as Gutkin’s argument suggests, but also hampers her immersion with 
the world on a broader scale. The investigation of Anna’s touch demonstrates that her sensuality 
severs her relationships with other people, leads to the fragmentation of her identity’s 
intrapersonal whole, and distorts her physical perception as well as her intellectual and moral 
judgment.13  
While Tolstoi emphasizes Stiva’s sensual nature from the first page of the novel, 
describing the character’s acute awareness of his body and physical reality, he hardly describes 
Anna’s sensory perceptions until the blizzard sequence during her return journey from Moscow 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the sections of this chapter discussing Anna’s haptic interactions with Karenin and 
Vronskii focus solely on those episodes that highlight Anna’s role in undermining their touch. The subsequent 
chapters on Karenin and Vronskii contribute to the overall analysis of Anna’s haptic interactions with both men by 
highlighting the ways in which Karenin and Vronskii cause their haptic alienation from Anna.        
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to Saint Petersburg. Likewise, while Stiva’s enhanced sensuality undermines his physical contact 
with Dolly, revealing their emotional estrangement, Anna’s touch is able to reconnect Stiva’s 
family (as discussed in the previous chapter). Anna’s ordinary sensory perception early in the 
novel—and her ability to reconnect Stiva’s family members—suggests that her powerful, sensual 
nature is still dormant, not yet explicitly manifested.   
Although Anna herself may be unaware of her powerful sensuality, Tolstoi intimates that 
Anna is a sensual person early on in the novel, in the scene portraying her “tactile” game with 
Dolly’s children. The game itself is unquestionably innocent and, on the surface, testifies to 
Anna being a tender and likable aunt. However, the fact that Tolstoi portrays Anna as immersed 
in touch (Anna shares bodily contact with the children as they seek to give and receive touches 
and strokes) implicitly alludes to her sensuality. Tolstoi includes a parallel scene depicting Levin 
playing with Dolly’s children later in the novel, in order to show that the two characters use 
manifestly different modes of haptic perception. While Anna’s game with the children is 
“tactile,” Levin’s game is “kinesthetic” (dynamic and muscular): he runs with the children and 
teaches them gymnastics, thus developing their dexterity.  
На приглашение его [Левина] два старшие [дети] тотчас же соскочили к нему и 
побежали с ним так же просто, как бы они побежали с няней, с мисс Гуль или с 
матерью. Лили тоже стала проситься к нему, и мать передала ее ему; он посадил ее 
на плечо и побежал с ней. 
— Не бойтесь, не бойтесь, Дарья Александровна! — говорил он, весело 
улыбаясь матери, — невозможно, чтоб я ушиб или уронил. 
И, глядя на его ловкие, сильные, осторожно-заботливые и слишком 
напряженные движения, мать успокоилась и весело и одобрительно улыбалась, 
глядя на него.              
… Левин пришел в то, часто находившее на него, детски веселое расположение 
духа, которое Дарья Александровна особенно любила в нем. Бегая с детьми, он 
учил их гимнастике, смешил мисс Гуль своим дурным английским языком и 
рассказывал Дарье Александровне свои занятия в деревне. (18:282) 
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Tolstoi’s juxtaposition between “tactile” and “kinesthetic” perceptions in depicting Anna’s and 
Levin’s play is consistent with Aristotle’s division of potentially sensual “touch” (i.e., physical 
contact, stroke, and caress of the skin) from touch that involves the “dexterity” of the human 
hand (and, one can suggest, the human body). Aristotle argues that touch is sensual and therefore 
base, whereas the dexterous human hand is, on the contrary, both a sign and a facilitator of 
human intellect. In keeping with Aristotle, the juxtaposition between Anna’s tactile and Levin’s 
kinesthetic games with the children points to Anna’s implicitly sensual makeup.  
Although Anna manages to reconnect Stiva’s family, her sensuality begins to interfere 
with both her feelings and her body immediately after she encounters Vronskii on the train when 
arriving in Moscow. Although Vronskii only touches Anna formally, greeting her with a 
handshake, Tolstoi’s references to Anna’s subsequent physical sensations suggest that Vronskii 
had “touched” her much more intimately—stirring up both her feelings and her body. When 
Anna gets into a carriage with Stiva afterwards, she asks him about Vronskii and is perplexed to 
learn that he is Kitty’s suitor, betraying her nascent affection. Anna seems to find her feelings for 
Vronskii alarming at first. Abruptly switching the conversation to Stiva’s family troubles, Anna 
shakes her head as if trying to shake off something “superfluous” and “disturbing” (“что-то 
лишнее и мешавшее”)—one can assume, the agitation caused by her attraction to Vronskii:  
— А ты давно знаешь Вронского? — спросила она. 
— Да. Ты знаешь, мы надеемся, что он женится на Кити. 
— Да? — тихо сказала Анна. — Ну, теперь давай говорить о тебе, — прибавила 
она, встряхивая головой, как будто хотела физически отогнать что-то лишнее и 
мешавшее ей. (18:70) 
 
Similarly, during Anna’s conversation with Kitty a bit later, she decides not to mention 
Vronskii’s generous two-hundred-ruble donation to a watchman’s widow at the train station. 
Anna feels that Vronskii’s gesture concerned—or in the original Russian, “touched”—not only 
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the widow, but also herself (“что-то касающееся до нее” 18:79). Anna recognizes Vronskii’s 
more-than-formal attention to her and thinks of their apparent mutual attraction as something 
unpleasant, something that “should not be”: “Но она не рассказала про эти двести рублей. 
Почему-то ей неприятно было вспоминать об этом. Она чувствовала, что в этом было что-
то касающееся до нее и такое, чего не должно было быть” 18:79). Describing Anna’s 
attraction to Vronskii as something that causes her distress, Tolstoi suggests not only the novelty 
of Anna’s feelings for him, but also the fact that her attraction is, in fact, something extraneous 
that will meddle with her life and that should have been avoided. The way in which Anna shakes 
her head to rid herself of something “extraneous” and “disturbing”, and the way in which she 
keeps Vronskii’s generosity a secret from Kitty, reveals that Anna’s affection for Vronskii begins 
to interfere with both her body and her relationships.     
Anna’s romantic interest in Vronskii affects her relationships with others in a more 
explicit, haptic way once she succumbs to her affection. When Vronskii unexpectedly stops by 
the Oblonskii house on the evening of Anna’s arrival, she catches a glimpse of him from the 
staircase and suddenly finds herself overcome with pleasure admixed with the fear of 
anticipation: “Анна, взглянув вниз, узнала тотчас же Вронского, и странное чувство 
удовольствия и вместе страха чего-то вдруг шевельнулось у нее в сердце” (18:81). Anna no 
longer finds her attraction for Vronskii “extraneous” and “disturbing”, a thing that “should not 
be.” Her growing emotional bond with Vronskii undermines her haptic interaction with Kitty at 
the ball, which takes place shortly thereafter. During the ball, Kitty does not fail to notice Anna 
and Vronskii’s mutual attraction—Vronskii willingly courts Anna, who is intoxicated by his 
attention. Kitty is deeply hurt to discover that the woman that she admires and the man that she 
loves have deceived her. During the mazurka, Anna takes Kitty’s hand with a carefree smile, 
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with no indication of guilt for flirting with her suitor. Kitty, however, takes Anna’s hand but does 
not return the smile. Although Anna notices Kitty’s frustration, she deliberately ignores Kitty’s 
distress, turning to another woman and chatting cheerfully:   
В середине мазурки, повторяя сложную фигуру, вновь выдуманную Корсунским, 
Анна вышла на середину круга, взяла двух кавалеров и подозвала к себе одну даму 
и Кити. Кити испуганно смотрела на нее, подходя. Анна прищурившись смотрела 
на нее и улыбнулась, пожав ей руку. Но заметив, что лицо Кити только 
выражением отчаяния и удивления ответило на ее улыбку, она отвернулась от нее и 
весело заговорила с другою дамой. (18:89) 
 
Anna’s intentional refusal to reach out to Kitty reveals her growing absorption with her passion 
for Vronskii, which renders her both emotionally and morally ignorant of Kitty’s suffering. 
According to Montagu, since the primary embryonic matter of “ectoderm” gives rise to both the 
nervous system (the site of emotions) and the outer layer of skin, physical contact between two 
bodies expresses the individuals’ emotional connection. It is true that Anna’s ignoring Kitty’s 
distress does not interrupt their physical contact, but it does sever their emotional ties. Anna and 
Kitty’s physical (external) contact does not reflect their emotional (internal) bond, and thus 
highlights their alienation.   
Anna’s evolving infatuation with Vronskii undermines her relationship not only with 
Kitty but also with Dolly’s children. Since Anna considers Kitty to be a rival for Vronskii’s 
heart, her spoiled relationship with Kitty is psychologically motivated. However, her spoiled 
relationship with the children does not seem to have a clear psychological cause, but rather 
seems to be driven by the change in her moral state. Tolstoi believes children to be naturally 
perspicacious because of their virginity and moral purity. When he writes that Dolly’s children 
can sense that Anna has changed after the ball, he suggests that Anna’s passion has begun to 
corrupt her, alienating the naturally innocent children. Anna no longer takes interest in playing 
with the children, and they are no longer interested in playing with her: “Потому ли, что дети 
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непостоянны или очень чутки и почувствовали, что Анна в этот день совсем не такая, как 
в тот, когда они так полюбили ее, что она уже не занята ими, — но только они вдруг 
прекратили свою игру с тетей и любовь к ней, и их совершенно не занимало то, что она 
уезжает” (18:103). On a haptic level, while Anna and the children willingly touch one another 
during their “tactile” game before the ball, they ignore each other afterwards. Anna’s evolving 
carnal love for Vronskii severs her innocent love for the children, leaving a gap of emotional 
indifference and physical alienation between them. 
While Anna perceives her attraction to Vronskii as something that is only emotionally 
pleasurable, as in the scene where she catches a glimpse of him from the staircase in the 
Oblonskiis’ house, she becomes acutely aware of its bodily effects during the train ride from 
Moscow to Saint Petersburg. Anna’s acute awareness of her body suggests that she has also 
become aware of her sexual desire for Vronskii and yielded to it. When Anna gets on the train, 
she tries to convince herself that she has no feelings for Vronskii, but the more she thinks of him, 
the more she becomes susceptible to the feelings that she is trying to deny. Anna’s body reflects 
these feelings. When she aloofly touches a cold window with an ivory paper knife, then passing 
its smooth, cold blade over her cheek, the sharp sensation excites her, and she plunges into a 
dream-delirium suggesting her sexual arousal: 
Она провела разрезным ножом по стеклу, потом приложила его гладкую и 
холодную поверхность к щеке и чуть вслух не засмеялась от радости, вдруг 
беспричинно овладевшей ею. Она чувствовала, что нервы ее, как струны, 
натягиваются всё туже и туже на какие-то завинчивающиеся колышки. Она 
чувствовала, что глаза ее раскрываются больше и больше, что пальцы на руках и 
ногах нервно движутся, что внутри что-то давит дыханье […].  (18:107)  
 
Depicting Anna’s physical excitement, Tolstoi compares it with the accelerated forces 
operating in a steam train. Her physical tension resembles the pressure of an engine; her nervous 
finger and toe movements evoke the rapid motions of pistons; her intensified sensory perception 
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reverberates with the accelerated forces (for instance, pressure and speed) that a train produces. 
As was discussed in the chapter on Tolstoi’s moral vision, Tolstoi was suspicious of 
technological progress, believing that it alienated man from the world of nature and physical 
labor, perpetuating the idle inequality of the elite and thus leading to their moral corruption. 
Associating Anna’s passion with the machine’s “unnatural” forces, Tolstoi suggests that Anna’s 
passion for Vronskii is similarly “unnatural” and therefore destructive.  
Anna’s sexual excitement makes her acutely aware not only of her own body but also of 
her impressions of external reality, indicating that her evolving sensuality makes her senses more 
perceptive. Anna notices that she observes reality with extraordinary vivacity (“все образы и 
звуки … с необычайною яркостью поражают ее” 18:107). According to Merleau-Ponty, a 
person is immersed in the world through his senses. However, Anna’s sensory susceptibility to 
external impressions reveals that her senses, excited by desire, do not immerse her in the world 
but rather alienate her from it. Anna’s passion distorts rather than clarifies her perception. When 
Anna gets on the train to Saint Petersburg, her perception is generally unremarkable, although 
detailed and precise. She perceives reality visually, tactually, and aurally, just as it is. She notices 
the bustle and noise of the car, the snow beating against the window and sticking to the glass, a 
conductor passing by (bundled up, coated with snow on one side), and random conversations 
about the terrible blizzard outside (18:106). Anna’s perception shifts into distortion after she 
descends into the passionate dream-delirium. Reality appears nearly surreal. For instance, instead 
of checking the temperature, the stoker seems to gnaw at something in the wall. The legs of a 
woman travelling in the same car become unnaturally elongated to fill the car’s entire length, 
clouding it in darkness. As the train pulls into the station, its screeching and banging are 
perceived by Anna as the terrifying cry of a human being torn apart (an association apparently 
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triggered by her unconscious recollection of the watchman killed when she arrived in Moscow): 
“Мужик этот с длинною талией принялся грызть что-то в стене, старушка стала 
протягивать ноги во всю длину вагона и наполнила его черным облаком; потом что-то 
страшно заскрипело и застучало, как будто раздирали кого-то” (18:108). Anna’s senses, 
compromised by her passion for Vronskii, alter rather than reflect her reality. Anna’s surreal, or 
one can say “unnatural,” perceptions of reality result from her “unnatural” (according to 
Tolstoi’s moral vision) passion for Vronskii.  
Anna’s distorted perception during her delirium suggests not only her physical confusion 
but also her intellectual and moral disorientation. As the chapter on haptic perception 
demonstrates, Rousseau and Diderot highlight the importance of the senses in a person’s 
interactions with the external world. Rousseau’s program of cultivation for the senses proclaims 
that a person learns both logic and morality from observing and comparing/contrasting his basic 
perceptual acts. Both Rousseau and Diderot argue that a person receives the most accurate 
information about the world by verifying one sensory act with another. In other words, a 
person’s knowledge about the world (including his intellectual and moral judgments, for 
Rousseau) depends on the clarity and accuracy of his sensory perceptions. Describing the way in 
which Anna considers her experiences, the narrator states that Anna thinks of the images in her 
delirium as being only vivid, whereas a further account of her delirium reveals that her 
perception of reality is not only intensified but also distorted. In keeping with Rousseau and 
Diderot, Anna’s failure to recognize the distortion of her sensory perceptions indicates that her 
sensuality jeopardizes not only her physical senses but also her intellectual and moral faculties. 
  
103 
This anticipates the confusion in the scenes leading to her suicide, wherein Anna reads physical 
and moral corruption in all things and people that she observes.14  
Although Anna’s wakeful perception is accurate, especially compared to that of her 
surreal dream, her vision suggests that her body has begun to dominate her mind/soul. Plato’s 
“cave” metaphor associates sight with mind and considers sight to be the most intellectual and 
spiritual of the senses. In a cave illuminated only by fire, one cannot see the true images of things 
(the “ideas”), but only their shadows. In order to see the “ideas,” one must leave the cave and 
ascend to the earth’s surface, gazing directly at the sun. This ascension requires moral 
development, by which Plato implies taming one’s carnal desires and needs. Although Anna’s 
wakeful vision is not distorted, but rather is perceptive of minute details, as was mentioned 
above, it is restricted. Anna’s visual impressions are limited to the inside of the car: the nighttime 
blizzard, with snow sticking to the windows, makes it impossible for her to see outside. (She 
does see the snow on the windows, but nothing beyond.) Not only is Anna’s long-range vision 
obstructed, but her vision within the car is also suppressed. The light in the car is quite dim, 
which makes it impossible for Anna to read without a lamp, bright enough only to read a book. 
Tolstoi’s references to the “lamp” (fire) and the “twilight” (semi-shadow) of the car reverberate 
with Plato’s depiction of the “cave” and suggest Anna’s carnal rather than spiritual proclivities.  
Furthermore, Anna “sees” this surreal dream when her eyes are apparently open: she can 
physically see reality as it is, but it becomes altered in her mental retina. Anna’s open eyes, as 
she dreams, suggest that the dream suppresses her vision, rendering her unable to make accurate 
judgments of reality. Anna’s passion “blinds” her. Tolstoi’s representation of Anna’s vision in 
                                                 
14 For instance, the smell of good food disgusts her (19:342); she sees children on the street eating “dirty” ice cream; 
she hears a man whisper something “disgusting”; she sits on a “soiled” seat in the train car; she mentally undresses a 
woman sitting across from her and sees her as physically “ugly”; she hears a girl laughing “unnaturally,” and she 
concludes that all people “hate” one another (19:340; 345). 
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the dream reflects this notion even more explicitly. Her passionate dream-delirium ends in a 
flash of red fire, blinding her—she sees everything as if hidden by a wall, and she feels as if she 
is falling through something: “потом красный огонь ослепил глаза, и потом всё закрылось 
стеной. Анна почувствовала, что она провалилась” (18:108). The flash of red fire, which 
illuminates the dim space only for an instant but ultimately eliminates light, reflects the fact that 
Anna succumbs to rather than tames her carnal urges. Unlike Plato’s protagonist, who ascends 
towards the sun, Anna descends into the ultimate darkness of the “cave” (without even a dim 
light) and therefore away from true knowledge of reality and moral perfection.15   
Anna’s encounter with Vronskii at the railway station immediately after the delirium 
sequence reveals the way in which her passion “blinds” her judgment. Depicting Anna and 
Vronskii’s encounter, Tolstoi associates Vronskii with a “shadow,” which evokes Plato’s cave 
metaphor and associates Anna’s evolving passion for the man with untamed carnal desires, 
typical of those dwelling in the “cave.” When Anna notices Vronskii at the station, he stands 
between her and the streetlamp, thus creating a shadow that conceals his face and hampers her 
vision:  “… человек в военном пальто подле нее самой заслонил ей колеблющийся свет 
фонаря. […] Она довольно долго, ничего не отвечая, вглядывалась в него и, несмотря на 
тень, в которой он стоял, видела, или ей казалось, что видела, и выражение его лица и 
                                                 
15 Some other moments in the scene also point to Anna’s compromised moral state. In his lecture on the novel, 
Vladimir Nabokov comments on the details, which, according to Nabokov, are meant to suggest Anna’s moral 
“imbalance.” For instance, she notices the snow beating against the “left” window of the car, observes the stoker 
covered with snow only on “one” side, and discerns a missing button on the stoker’s nankeen coat (“снег, бивший в 
левое окно и налипавший на стекло” 18:105; “вид закутанного, мимо прошедшего кондуктора, занесенного 
снегом, с одной стороны” 18:105; “мужик, в длинном нанковом пальто, на котором не доставало пуговицы” 
18:108). For Nabokov, Tolstoi’s reference to the “left” window and the conductor covered in snow on “one” side 
reflects “Anna’s one-sided mood, a moral loss of balance” (155). This moral loss of balance suggests a deficiency, 
which Tolstoi seems to express through the button missing from the stoker’s coat. Although Anna’s ordinary, 
detailed, and accurate perceptions of reality in her wakeful state should suggest her undistorted judgment, Tolstoi’s 
references to “one-sidedness” (as described by Nabokov) and the deficiency suggested in the missing button 
indirectly point to a defect in Anna’s moral condition. 
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глаз. Это было опять то выражение почтительного восхищения, которое так 
подействовало на нее вчера” (18:109). Vronskii’s casting of a shadow, which obstructs Anna’s 
vision, points to his being the cause of Anna’s moral fall. Although Anna is perhaps correct to 
read admiration on Vronskii’s face, her growing desire for him makes her a poor judge of both 
his character and her own—like the shadow, which is cast by Vronskii and conceals his face. 
While Anna believes that Vronskii pursues her deliberately, out of love (“Ей не нужно было 
спрашивать, зачем он тут. Она знала это так же верно, как если б он сказал ей, что он тут 
для того, чтобы быть там, где она” 18:109), Vronskii steps out of the train to get some seltzer 
water (as a reader learns in the subsequent chapter), thus meeting Anna by accident and 
professing his passion for her in the spur of the moment.  Infatuated with Vronskii, Anna fails to 
see that his admiration is but the impulsive attraction of an ambitious and corrupted man: he only 
seeks to satisfy his carnal desires and is ignorant of the harm that his persistent pursuit may 
cause, just as she remains ignorant of the harm that her passion may bring her own family.      
Since Tolstoi portrays Anna’s passion for Vronskii as “blinding” in the delirium 
sequence, it is perhaps not accidental that he describes the way in which her passion alienates her 
from her husband through her eyes. At Princess Betsy’s party, Anna reciprocates Vronskii’s 
flirting and eventually casts a loving gaze in his direction, bringing him to understand that she is 
non-verbally professing her love:  
Она все силы ума своего напрягла на то, чтобы сказать то, что должно; но 
вместо того она остановила на нем свой взгляд, полный любви, и ничего не 
ответила. 
«Вот оно!—с восторгом думал он. —Тогда, когда я уже отчаивался и когда, 
казалось, не будет конца, — вот оно! Она любит меня. Она признается в этом». 
(18:147–48) 
 
After Anna reveals her love for Vronskii to Karenin, her husband notices that her eyes appear 
shielded, separating her from him. When Karenin tries to admonish Anna for her questionable 
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behavior at the party, she casually dismisses his admonitions with feigned ignorance. Looking 
into Anna’s eyes, Karenin sees that they have become “impenetrable,” and that the depth of her 
soul, which had been “open” to him, is now “closed”:  
Анна говорила, что приходило ей на язык, и сама удивлялась, слушая себя, своей 
способности лжи. […] Она чувствовала себя одетою в непроницаемую броню лжи. 
[…] Он говорил и смотрел на ее смеющиеся, страшные теперь для него своею 
непроницаемостью глаза и, говоря, чувствовал всю бесполезность и праздность 
своих слов. […] Он видел, что глубина ее души, всегда прежде открытая пред ним, 
была закрыта от него. (18:153–54)  
 
It is true that Anna’s passion is not the only cause of the spouses’ alienation from one 
another. Despite being married, sharing mutual respect and even sometimes tenderness, Anna 
and Karenin are not emotionally close. That they respect one another in place of genuine love 
makes their marriage a superficial union and reveals the inherent emotional gap between them. 
For instance, early in the novel, when Dolly recalls the Karenin household and the spouses’ 
relationship, she thinks of it as “false” (“Правда, сколько она могла запомнить свое 
впечатление в Петербурге у Карениных, ей не нравился самый дом их; что-то было 
фальшивое во всем складе их семейного быта” 18:71). However, although Anna and 
Karenin’s relationship had not been emotionally close or particularly genuine, as Dolly’s 
impression suggests, this seems to be the first secret that Anna has held from Karenin that would 
cause her to openly resent him. Anna’s growing attraction to Vronskii makes her feel as if she 
were dressed in an “impenetrable shield of lies” (“непроницаемая броня лжи” 18:153), making 
her resentful of Karenin’s admonitions and allowing her to lie with ease. Anna’s “impenetrable” 
eyes, like her words and conduct during her conversation with Karenin, conceal rather than 
reveal her true feelings.16  
                                                 
16 To compare, Tolstoi consistently emphasizes that Kitty has truthful eyes, reflecting her inner honesty and 
morality, which in turn attract Levin. Tolstoi also demonstrates that Levin and Kitty’s relationship is founded on 
their mutual honesty with one another and ability to forgive one another’s faults.   
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In addition, Anna’s “impenetrable” eyes indicate that her passion has not only made her 
vision a means of deceit, but also that it has severed her connection with Karenin—however 
faint. According to Merleau-Ponty, the senses facilitate the connection, or the “intertwinement,” 
between people. Blurring the boundaries of individual bodies, the senses interconnect humans 
into an “intercorporeal” whole.  In keeping with Merleau-Ponty, Anna’s eyes’ “impenetrability” 
and her feeling of protection behind an “impenetrable shield of lies” suggest that her passion for 
Vronskii has divided them with an “impenetrable” barrier. Associating Anna’s vision with lying 
and division, jeopardized by carnal love, Tolstoi demonstrates that this carnality is a source of 
emotional and physical discord among people.       
  In order to demonstrate Karenin’s fear of the emotional sphere, Tolstoi uses the metaphor 
of a “bridge” cast over the “bottomless deep of life”—wherein the “bridge” represents Karenin’s 
artificial existence, regulated by social and religious rules, and the “bottomless deep of life” 
represents the reality of genuine human relations, which Karenin finds troubling (“Теперь он 
испытывал чувство, подобное тому, какое испытал бы человек, спокойно прошедший над 
пропастью по мосту и вдруг увидавший, что этот мост разобран и что там пучина. Пучина 
эта была — сама жизнь, мост — та искусственная жизнь, которую прожил Алексей 
Александрович” 18:151). Like Anna’s “impenetrable shield,” Karenin’s “bridge” can be 
understood as a protective measure: just as Anna’s “shield of lies” protects her from Karenin’s 
reproach, Karenin’s “bridge” protects him from interacting on a personal level. His emotional 
restraint doubles Anna’s barrier, aggravating their alienation. His fear of feelings makes it hard 
for him to reach out to Anna and have a sincere conversation, whereas Anna’s passion fortifies 
her resentment. While seemingly protective measures, Karenin’s “bridge” and Anna’s “shield” 
isolate them from one another.  
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When Karenin briefly overcomes his fear of emotion (stepping off the bridge into the 
“bottomless deep,” to use Tolstoi’s metaphor), changing his moralistic tone and expressing 
genuine care, he seems to break through Anna’s “impenetrable shield” as well. Tolstoi shows 
that the expression of Anna’s “impenetrable” eyes changes. Anna stops looking at Karenin with 
derision, as her face acquires a softer expression: “На мгновение лицо ее опустилось, и 
потухла насмешливая искра во взгляде” (18:155). Anna’s softer look suggests that Karenin’s 
genuine care has reached her, temporarily penetrating her eyes’ “shield.” Nonetheless, even if 
Karenin has reached Anna for an instant, Anna’s passion for Vronskii remains an obstacle, 
preventing Karenin from permanently restoring even their typically-respectful relationship. Since 
Anna has experienced passion, apparently for the first time, Karenin’s restrained love-respect is 
ineffective and therefore unable to satisfy the emotional needs and physical desires awakened by 
Vronskii’s love. When Karenin assures Anna that he loves her, Anna resents the claim, 
apparently thinking that Karenin does not know what true love is and rejecting his dispassionate 
kind of “love”: “но слово «люблю» опять возмутило ее. Она подумала: «любит? Разве он 
может любить? Если б он не слыхал, что бывает любовь, он никогда и не употреблял бы 
этого слова. Он и не знает, что такое любовь»” (18:155–56). Dismissing Karenin’s 
supplications after her momentary doubt, Anna restores the “impenetrable wall of some cheerful 
perplexity/непроницаем[ая] стен[а] какого-то веселого недоумения” (18:156–57), making it 
impossible for Karenin to reach out to her again.  
Tolstoi concludes the scene by portraying Anna’s “reversed” vision. Having dismissed 
her husband’s reprimands, Anna lies in bed, her eyes open with ecstasy, and it seems to her that 
she can see her own eyes shining in the darkness: “— Поздно, поздно, уж поздно, — 
прошептала она с улыбкой. Она долго лежала неподвижно с открытыми глазами, блеск 
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которых, ей казалось, она сама в темноте видела” (18:156). Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
the senses as the means of “intertwinement” suggests that Anna’s vision does not connect her 
with another person, but rather self-encloses, rendering her an isolated entity absorbed in her 
passion for Vronskii and alienated from her husband.   
Anna’s passion seems to cover not only her eyes but also her body with the “shield of 
lies,” evident from an episode taking place before the steeplechase, at the Karenins’ dacha. Anna 
hides her passion from Karenin and pretends to be casual in her husband’s presence, just as she 
does in the above-analyzed scene after Princess Betsy’s party. When she leaves for the race 
before Karenin, he formally kisses her hand. Describing the kiss and Anna’s reaction, Tolstoi 
introduces a significant gap between the two aspects of touch. After Karenin kisses Anna’s hand, 
Tolstoi does not describe Anna’s sensations. Instead, he writes that Anna cheerfully responds to 
Karenin’s earlier phrase, as she apparently walks towards her carriage. Anna feels Karenin’s kiss 
only after she leaves his sight, thus with a delay: 
Алексей Александрович поцеловал ее руку. 
— Ну, так до свиданья. Ты заедешь чай пить, и прекрасно! — сказала она и 
вышла, сияющая и веселая. Но, как только она перестала видеть его, она 
почувствовала то место на руке, к которому прикоснулись его губы, и с 
отвращением вздрогнула. (18:217) 
 
The delay in Anna’s feeling of Karenin’s kiss can be dually interpreted. On the one hand, it can 
be read as a manifestation of Anna’s haptic memory—a phantom hallucinatory sensation that 
involuntarily surfaces on her skin and anticipates the haptic hallucination shortly before her 
suicide, when she feels that Vronskii’s kisses cover her body (“оглядывая себя всю, она 
почувствовала вдруг на себе его поцелуи и, содрогаясь, двинула плечами” 19:335). In both 
episodes, Tolstoi uses the verb “to feel” even though he describes a recollection in the form of 
physical sensation, not caused by an immediate act of touching. On the other hand, the way in 
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which Tolstoi describes Karenin’s touch before Anna feels his kiss may mean that Tolstoi 
implies an actual delay in Anna’s physical perception. (To compare, Vronskii’s kisses do not 
immediately precede the phantom sensations that Anna feels shortly before her suicide. Rather, 
she experiences a cumulative sensation, encompassing all of Vronskii’s kisses on her body in the 
past and thus representing a clear instance of memory.) According to Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of touch, the sense’s two simultaneous phases (the act of touching and feeling 
touched) make it a means of entwinement. In keeping with Merleau-Ponty, the delay in Anna’s 
physical response to Karenin’s touch (she is touched but does not feel the touch immediately, at 
least according to Tolstoi’s depiction of the scene) testifies to her internal alienation from 
Karenin. In addition, Tolstoi associates the delay in Anna’s perception with her deceit. While 
Anna conceals her true feelings about Karenin verbally, pretending to be happy and cheerful in 
his presence, her body seems to conceal these feelings physically as well, filtering her sensations 
to prevent an immediate honest reaction—of disgust—to Karenin’s kiss. Such a reading of the 
scene suggests that Anna’s delayed sensation reflects her altered, deceitful personality: her body, 
like her eyes, is covered by the “shield of lies” filtering her physical sensations and assisting in 
the deception of her husband. 
Anna’s passion for Vronskii not only severs her external connections with other people 
but also divides the internal whole of her identity. The first time that Anna experiences an 
instance of “split personality” occurs during her train ride from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. In 
her dream-delirium, Anna begins to doubt her own identity—whether she is “herself” (her 
ordinary, moral self) or “somebody else” (her newly-discovered, sensual self): “И что сама я 
тут? Я сама или другая?” (18:107). The conflict within Anna’s identity—between her ordinary 
“self” and her new sensual “other self”—is reflected in her touch. After she consummates her 
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passion with Vronskii, Anna begins to have a recurring nightmare in which she sees herself with 
two “husbands”—Karenin and Vronskii—both of whom caress her body:     
Ей снилось, что оба вместе были ее мужья, что оба расточали ей свои ласки. 
Алексей Александрович плакал, целуя ее руки, и говорил: как хорошо теперь! И 
Алексей Вронский был тут же, и он был также ее муж. И она, удивляясь тому, что 
прежде ей казалось это невозможным, объясняла им, смеясь, что это гораздо проще 
и что они оба теперь довольны и счастливы. Но это сновидение, как кошмар, 
давило ее, и она просыпалась с ужасом. (18:159) 
 
Karenin’s and Vronskii’s “doubled” caresses of Anna’s body demonstrate the duplicity of 
Anna’s feelings—her duty to her husband and her passion for Vronskii. Her attempt to reconcile 
the two fails. While Anna enjoys the “doubled” caresses at the beginning of the dream, the vision 
begins to disturb her, forcing her to wake in terror to her reality. She perceives her ambiguous 
role as a wife and a lover for what it is: not only an impossible but also a lewd and shameful 
arrangement.     
 In the scene after she confesses her secret love for Vronskii to Karenin, Anna’s own 
gestures reflect her inner conflict. Waiting for Karenin’s decision, unable to decide whether she 
wants to return to a habitual but stifling life with her husband or to pursue a life of passion with 
Vronskii, losing her social privileges, she unconsciously clasps the hair on both sides of her 
head: 
     «Ах, что я делаю!» сказала она себе, почувствовав вдруг боль в обеих сторонах 
головы. Когда она опомнилась, она увидала, что держит обеими руками свои 
волосы около висков и сжимает их. (18:305)    
 
Tolstoi repeats the pronoun “both” (“обеих сторонах головы,” “обеими руками”) twice within 
two adjacent sentences, emphasizing the gesture’s duality.  
Depicting Anna’s confusion in the scene, Tolstoi also compares Anna’s emotional state 
with “double vision”: “Она чувствовала, что в душе ее всё начинает двоиться, как двоятся 
иногда предметы в усталых глазах. Она не знала иногда, чего она боится, чего желает. 
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Боится ли она и желает ли она того, что было, или того, что будет, и чего именно она 
желает, она не знала” (18:305). In keeping with Plato’s notion of vision as a spiritual sense, 
Tolstoi’s comparison of Anna’s inner conflict with doubling vision confirms that Anna’s “split 
personality” is not only emotional but also moral in nature. Since “double” vision suggests two 
separate focal points, which fail to merge into a single image and thus blur a person’s vision, the 
comparison of Anna’s inner conflict with double vision suggests that her awakened sensuality 
has rendered her morally confused—divided between the moral values advocated by Christianity 
and her husband, and the immoral pursuits that align with her feelings. For instance, although 
Anna realizes that her passion for Vronskii is wrong from a Christian perspective, she refuses to 
suppress it:    
Она беспрестанно повторяла: «Боже мой! Боже мой!» Но ни «Боже», ни «мой» не 
имели для нее никакого смысла. Мысль искать своему положению помощи в 
религии была для нее, несмотря на то, что она никогда не сомневалась в религии, в 
которой была воспитана, так же чужда, как искать помощи у самого Алексея 
Александровича. Она знала вперед, что помощь религии возможна только под 
условием отречения от того, что составляло для нее весь смысл жизни. (18:305)  
 
Justifying her sensuality, Anna goes so far as to mentally assert that God created her to be 
sensual, and unfairly blames Karenin for deliberately denying her an outlet for her naturally 
passionate personality. She even misinterprets her genuine motherly love for her son, now 
thinking of it only as an outlet for unrealized sexual desires: 
Они не знают, как он восемь лет душил мою жизнь, душил всё, что было во мне 
живого, что он ни разу и не подумал о том, что я живая женщина, которой нужна 
любовь. Не знают, как на каждом шагу он оскорблял меня и оставался доволен 
собой. Я ли не старалась, всеми силами старалась, найти оправдание своей жизни? 
Я ли не пыталась любить его, любить сына, когда уже нельзя было любить мужа? 
Но пришло время, я поняла, что я не могу больше себя обманывать, что я живая, 
что я не виновата, что Бог меня сделал такою, что мне нужно любить и жить. 
(18:308–09) 
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Though Anna may be correct that her passionate nature is something inherent, her effort to 
justify her sensuality leads to her poor judgment about her husband, with whom she had shared a 
respectful if not passionate relationship, and about her son, whom she loves dearly. Although 
Anna’s distorted discernment is understandable psychologically, it indicates that her sensuality 
undermines her ability to judge truthfully, jeopardizing her moral sense.   
Anna tries to restore the wholeness of her personality in the scene after her childbirth, 
which was followed by complications that nearly caused her death. Burning up with fever and 
fearing that she will die after giving birth, Anna seeks her husband’s forgiveness. She tries to 
suppress her sensual self in favor of her “true” (“настоящая”) self. Begging Karenin to forgive 
her, Anna compares herself to a martyr who had been a sinner but then reformed: “Одно мне 
нужно: ты прости меня, прости совсем! Я ужасна, но мне няня говорила: святая мученица 
— как ее звали? — она хуже была” (18:434). Anna’s comparison suggests that she perceives 
herself as a sinner, thus realizing that her passion for Vronskii is illicit. She contrasts Vronskii to 
Karenin and her “other” (sensual) self to her “true” self. Anna describes her “other,” sensual self 
as something extraneous, implying that the kind of person she had been before her infatuation 
with Vronskii, her moral self, had been “true”: “Я всё та же... Но во мне есть другая, я ее 
боюсь — она полюбила того, и я хотела возненавидеть тебя и не могла забыть про ту, 
которая была прежде. Та не я. Теперь я настоящая, я вся” (18:434). Anna tries to persuade 
Karenin that she has rid her “true” self of her sensual self to regain her “wholeness” (“я вся”), 
but the positioning of her two hands is telling of a continuing inner struggle. While Anna holds 
Karenin with one hand, she pushes him away with the other: “Нет, ты не можешь простить! Я 
знаю, этого нельзя простить! Нет, нет, уйди, ты слишком хорош! — Она держала одною 
горячею рукой его руку, другою отталкивала его” (18:434). Anna’s attraction towards and 
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repulsion against Karenin reveals that her sensual self persists in both her body and her identity, 
pointing to her emotional and moral duplicity.17  
Anna’s failure to overcome her sensual self, causing her apparent inner resistance to 
reconciliation, is evident from tactile interactions with her husband in an episode during her 
recovery. In an earlier scene, wherein Anna has just returned from Moscow, she tries to forget 
Vronskii and acts as if their encounter did not stir up feelings. Her tactile interaction with 
Karenin in these scenes reveals their consideration and care: Karenin presses Anna’s hand when 
she comes home, betraying genuine joy at her arrival, and Anna takes him by the elbow to walk 
him to the study where he reads in the evening. Their considerate touch reflects a habitual and 
mutually respectful spousal relationship. However, Anna’s developing love for Vronskii 
negatively affects this relationship and, therefore, its touch. After Anna begs for Karenin’s 
forgiveness on her “deathbed”, he offers to maintain her social status and good name if she 
promises never to see her lover again. Anna tries to keep her promise, but does so reluctantly, 
with visible strain. No matter how hard Anna tries to force herself to appreciate Karenin’s 
kindness and regain her respect, she cannot help but feel revulsion towards her husband and long 
for Vronskii. Tolstoi shows Anna’s revulsion for Karenin in haptic terms: when Karenin tries to 
take Anna’s hand to express his appreciation for her good will, Anna instinctively pulls away, 
and takes his hand only after an instant of hesitation when she manages to take control over her 
aversion:     
Алексей Александрович подвинулся и хотел взять ее руку. 
Первым движением она отдернула свою руку от его влажной, с большими 
надутыми жилами руки, которая искала ее; но, видимо сделав над собой усилие, 
пожала его руку. (18:445) 
                                                 
17 While Anna’s passion for Vronskii causes her inner conflict (an inner emotional and moral “split”), Levin’s love 
for Kitty causes him no inner conflict but rather “doubles” his happiness (“они испытали новое удвоенное счастье 
любви” 19:51), immersing him in the world of human community (which I discuss in more detail in the chapter on 
Levin and Kitty).     
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Tolstoi divides the depiction of Karenin and Anna’s touch into two paragraphs, highlighting their 
emotional and physical alienation on a textual level. He describes Karenin’s hand as “moist,” 
“with large bulging veins” in the second paragraph, thus attributing the depiction to Anna’s point 
of view. The image of Karenin’s hand produces the impression of being unpleasant to the touch, 
revealing that Anna’s aversion towards her husband is physical as well as emotional. Tolstoi 
mentions her feelings more directly shortly thereafter: “Она тревожно играла кистями халата, 
взглядывая на него [Каренина] с тем мучительным чувством физического отвращения к 
нему, за которое она упрекала себя, но которого не могла преодолеть” (18:446). Once Anna 
recovers from her illness and is no longer afraid of dying, she is no longer able (nor genuinely 
willing) to eliminate her sensual nature and suppress her passion for Vronskii. Because of her 
enduring desire, she begins to loathe her husband’s body, now perceiving its leanness as 
particularly repulsive and avoiding any contact. Shortly thereafter, Anna sees Vronskii before his 
planned departure to Tashkent. She decides to leave her husband and depart for Italy with 
Vronskii and their newborn daughter. Instead of regaining her “real,” non-sensual self, which she 
had associated with the “wholeness” of her personality, Anna surrenders herself to passion, thus 
further enabling the fragmentation of her identity and perception evident in the scenes leading to 
her suicide.    
Anna’s passion for Vronskii compromises not only her relationship with her husband, but 
also her close bond with her son Serёzha. When Anna surprises Serëzha on his birthday, their 
sensory interactions reflect a deep emotional connection. During the secret visit, they hardly 
speak, but primarily interact through touch. The physical contact between their bodies in place of 
words—oral-aural interaction that would maintain their physical distance—highlights Anna and 
Serёzha’s profound emotional proximity. Serёzha moves under his mother’s hands to expose as 
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many different parts of his body to her as possible (“— Мама! — проговорил он, двигаясь под 
ее руками, чтобы разными местами тела касаться ее рук” 19:105). He embraces her 
shoulders, leans on her, and rubs against her neck (“он перехватился пухлыми ручонками от 
спинки кровати за ее плечи, привалился к ней, обдавая ее тем милым сонным запахом и 
теплотой, которые бывают только у детей, и стал тереться лицом об ее шею и плечи” 
19:105). Anna clasps Serёzha’s body in her arms (“— Сережа! Мальчик мой милый! — 
проговорила она, задыхаясь и обнимая руками его пухлое тело” 19:105). She then probes 
his changed, grown form, his now-longer legs, thinner cheeks, and shorter curls, and sits next to 
him on his bed, unable to let go of his hand:   
Она узнавала и не узнавала его голые, такие большие теперь ноги, выпроставшиеся 
из одеяла, узнавала эти похуделые щеки, эти обрезанные, короткие завитки волос 
на затылке, в который она так часто целовала его. Она ощупывала всё это и не 
могла ничего говорить; слезы душили ее. […] 
… не выпуская его руки, села у его кровати на стул, на котором было 
приготовлено платье. (19:105–06)  
 
Anna and Serёzha’s touches are not only mutual but also simultaneous. The first part of 
their meeting, which ends the chapter, concludes in an instant of perfect unity expressed in 
simultaneous touch: Serёzha touches Anna’s hand precisely at the moment when it is touching 
Serёzha. Serёzha grabs her hand, which is stroking his hair, and kisses it: “— Я знал, я знал! — 
повторял он свою любимую фразу и, схватив ее руку, которая ласкала его волосы, стал 
прижимать ее ладонью к своему рту и целовать ее” (19:106). In keeping with Merleau-Ponty, 
the simultaneity of their touches (touching while being touched) suggests that they are 
intertwined into an intercorporeal whole.  
Anna experiences this profound bond with her son not only emotionally, but also 
spiritually. When Anna meets Serёzha after returning home to Saint Petersburg in the beginning 
of the novel, she feels the nearly “physical pleasure” (emphasis added) of his closeness and 
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caress, which puts her at moral ease: “Анна испытывала почти физическое наслаждение в 
ощущении его близости и ласки и нравственное успокоение, когда встречала его 
простодушный, доверчивый и любящий взгляд и слышала его наивные вопросы” (18:114). 
According to Tolstoi, children are morally pure, because they have not yet attained sexual 
maturity and thus are uncorrupted. Anna’s son seems to be the only uncorrupted aspect of her 
life: her aunt married her off to Karenin, forcing her into a union without genuine love and into a 
society that propagates moral depravity. Serёzha’s simple, trusting, loving gaze and his naïve 
questions testify to his artlessness and innocence, a form of pure morality that Anna seeks as she 
tries to overcome her attraction to Vronskii at the beginning of their romance.     
Anna’s profound emotional connection with her son in the birthday scene informs her 
drastic change in feelings in subsequent scenes.  When Karenin forbids Anna to see her son after 
the surprise visit, she finds herself in an acute emotional isolation (“она навсегда не только 
физически, но духовно была разъединена с ним, и поправить этого нельзя было” 19:110). 
She is unconsoled even by her second child—her daughter Annie, who lives with her. When the 
nanny brings Anna her daughter, she can only think of Serёzha, realizing that she loves him more 
than her daughter—if she loves her daughter at all: “при виде этого ребенка [дочери Анны] ей 
еще яснее было, что то чувство, которое она испытывала к нему, было даже не любовь в 
сравнении с тем, что она чувствовала к Сереже” (19:110). Tolstoi suggests that Anna’s love 
for her son is so powerful partly because her son was the only outlet for love during her 
marriage, since she respected but never loved his father: “На первого ребенка, хотя и от 
нелюбимого человека, были положены все силы любви, не получавшие удовлетворения 
…” (19:110). By contrast, Anna’s passion for Vronskii seems to diminish her love for his 
daughter: “Всё в этой девочке было мило, но всё это почему-то не забирало за сердце” 
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(19:110). Anna’s unequal love for her children, by which she comes to resemble Stiva, shows the 
fragmented nature of her passion as it affects her natural motherly love, limiting her love for her 
daughter as compared to her son.  
Anna’s tactile exchange with her daughter reflects their alienation. It is true that Tolstoi 
describes their touch as reciprocal, which theoretically suggests their bond. (Anna offers her 
daughter a finger and she grasps it; Anna offers her lip and she sucks it into her mouth, as if in a 
kiss.) However, Tolstoi introduces negative rhetorical structures into the description of Anna’s 
touch (“нельзя было не”), revealing that Anna kisses her daughter and plays with her only out 
of duty—not of love:   
Нельзя было не улыбнуться, не поцеловать девочку, нельзя было не подставить ей 
палец, за который она ухватилась, взвизгивая и подпрыгивая всем телом; нельзя 
было не подставить ей губу, которую она, в виде поцелуя, забрала в ротик. И всё 
это сделала Анна, и взяла ее на руки, и заставила ее попрыгать, и поцеловала ее 
свежую щечку и оголенные локотки … (19:110) 
 
The negative structures in Tolstoi’s depiction of Anna’s touch undermine the initial impression 
of their bond. Anna’s physical touch proves to be vacuous, conveying no love, and thus reveals 
the underlying gap between Anna and her daughter beneath their physical contact.    
Emotionally isolated, Anna tries to extend her connection with her son, despite the 
physical distance dividing them. She takes Serёzha’s pictures out of an album and spreads them 
out on the table, recalling him at different ages. However, as she does so, one of Vronskii’s 
pictures takes over her attention and she seems to forget about her son completely, absorbed by 
thoughts of her lover. Anna uses Vronskii’s picture to unstick the last of Serёzha’s, which is 
lodged in the album. Anna’s attention shifts from Serёzha to Vronskii when she holds his photo 
in her hand:  
Разрезного ножика не было на столе, и она, вынув карточку, бывшую рядом (это 
была карточка Вронского, сделанная в Риме, в круглой шляпе и с длинными 
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волосами), ею вытолкнула карточку сына. «Да, вот он!» сказала она, взглянув на 
карточку Вронского, и вдруг вспомнила, кто был причиной ее теперешнего горя. 
[…] Но теперь вдруг, увидав это мужественное, благородное, столь знакомое и 
милое ей лицо, она почувствовала неожиданный прилив любви к нему. … Она 
послала к нему просить его прийти к ней сейчас же; с замиранием сердца, 
придумывая слова, которыми она скажет ему все, и те выражения его любви, 
которые утешат ее, она ждала его. (19:111) 
 
The reference to a paperknife evokes the train scene, in which the sexual arousal incited by 
Anna’s growing attraction to Vronskii is sparked by the cold, smooth blade of a paperknife 
against her cheek. Vronskii is here again associated with a paperknife, an object meant for 
dividing the whole, reflecting the way in which Anna’s passion undermines her relationships and 
her perceptions of reality. Vronskii’s photograph distracts Anna’s attention from her son—as if 
dividing them once again, now not only physically but mentally—and diverts her attention to her 
lover. When Anna exclaims: “Да, вот он!/Yes, here he is!” pushing Serёzha’s picture from the 
album, it seems as if she is still thinking about her son, whereas the entire sentence makes it 
evident that she is in fact already thinking of Vronskii. The mental transition from son to lover is 
almost seamless, suggesting that passion has begun to dominate Anna’s identity. Feeling a surge 
of passion as she looks at Vronskii’s photograph, she anticipates how he will console her grief 
with assurances of his love. Anna’s carnal love transforms the genuine suffering of losing her 
son into a pretext for eliciting her lover’s attention, thus overriding her motherly love and 
revealing her emotional estrangement from Serёzha.  
In keeping with Tolstoi’s condemnation of carnal love as a force that divides rather than 
unites, Anna’s passion for Vronskii undermines not only her connections with other people but 
also her emotional—and consequently physical—unity with Vronskii. Their attraction results in 
their alienation. Anna herself summarizes the two-stage development of a relationship based on 
carnal love in a scene shortly before her suicide: “Мы именно шли навстречу до связи, а 
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потом неудержимо расходимся в разные стороны” (19:343). Anna and Vronskii’s haptic 
interaction reflects the two stages of their relationship. The previously mentioned blizzard scene, 
wherein Anna returns from Moscow to Saint-Petersburg and encounters Vronskii at the transit 
station, reveals their attraction. When Vronskii appears out of the blizzard, Anna has one of her 
hands out of her muff, outstretched to take hold of the car handle: “Она вздохнула еще раз, 
чтобы надышаться, и уже вынула руку из муфты, чтобы взяться за столбик и войти в 
вагон, как еще человек в военном пальто подле нее самой заслонил ей колеблющийся свет 
фонаря” (18:109). Anna’s hand—already out of her muff and not yet holding the post—remains 
in midair throughout the conversation as Vronskii professes his passion for her. Although Anna 
outwardly hesitates, and even begs Vronskii to stop his pursuit, his confession inwardly delights 
her: “Он сказал то самое, чего желала ее душа, но чего она боялась рассудком” (18:109). 
Anna’s idle, empty hand reflects her inner receptiveness to his confession, producing the 
impression that the hand is not only vacant but available—for Vronskii, it seems. When Anna 
finally takes hold of the post and enters the car, she feels that the brief encounter has brought her 
significantly closer to Vronskii: “И, взявшись рукой зa холодный столбик, она поднялась на 
ступеньки и быстро вошла в сени вагона. … Не вспоминая ни своих, ни его слов, она 
чувством поняла, что этот минутный разговор страшно сблизил их” (emphasis added; 
18:110). Although they do not actually touch in the scene, their intimate conversation and 
Anna’s vacant hand in midair anticipate their future touch, in intimacy as their passion evolves.   
Portraying Anna and Vronskii’s touch, Tolstoi demonstrates that physical contact during 
their affair is constantly interrupted. The Russian word for an “affair” is “связь,” as in the quote 
above (“мы именно шли навстречу до связи”), which also means “connection” or “link.” 
Tolstoi is consistent in showing that Anna and Vronskii’s carnal love is unstable, severing their 
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emotional and consequently physical “connection.” Anna’s alienation from Vronskii begins as 
early in their romance as their first consummation of passion. Instead of deepening their 
emotional connection, their intimate touch results in their emotional alienation, which, in turn, is 
reflected in severed touch. Unlike Vronskii, Anna feels profoundly guilty after making love with 
him: “Она чувствовала себя столь преступною и виноватою, что ей оставалось только 
унижаться и просить прощения … Она, глядя на него [Вронского], физически чувствовала 
свое унижение и ничего больше не могла говорить. […] Стыд пред духовною наготою 
своей давил ее и сообщался ему” (18:158). When Anna anticipates their lovemaking, the act of 
sex itself incites contradictory feelings—her delight is admixed with shame (“в эту минуту не 
могла выразить словами того чувства стыда, радости и ужаса пред этим вступлением в 
новую жизнь” 18:158). Her physical “nakedness” makes her feel “naked” spiritually. Although 
Vronskii seems able to sense Anna’s shame (“стыд … сообщался ему”) and even to pity her 
(“Лицо ее было всё так же красиво, но тем более было оно жалко” 18:158), he himself feels 
neither shame nor guilt for her seduction. He is astonished by Anna’s distress, not understanding 
its cause. He refers to their relationship, now consummated, as his “life” and highest “happiness” 
(“— Я не могу не помнить того, что есть моя жизнь. За минуту этого счастья...” 18:158), 
whereas Anna does not share his excitement (“— Какое счастье! — с отвращением и ужасом 
сказала она […]” 18:158).  
Anna’s shame prevents her from lightheartedly enjoying sexual relations with Vronskii, 
alienating her not only on an emotional but also on a haptic level. Depicting Anna’s interactions 
with Vronskii after intercourse, Tolstoi repeats twice that Anna feels that she has no one but 
Vronskii in the world—first in the narrator’s voice, and then in Anna’s own a bit later in the 
scene: “а в жизни теперь, кроме его, у ней никого не было” (18:157),  “[у] меня ничего нет, 
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кроме тебя” (18:158). Tolstoi associates Anna’s gesture with each of these statements. Anna 
holds and kisses Vronskii’s hand in the first episode: “Она держала его руку и не шевелилась. 
Да, эти поцелуи — то, что куплено этим стыдом. Да, и эта одна рука, которая будет всегда 
моею, — рука моего сообщника. Она подняла эту руку и поцеловала ее” (18:157). Her kiss 
expresses the feeling that Vronskii is her only possession in the world. The second episode 
reveals Anna’s alienation, which is expressed not verbally but haptically. Anna pushes Vronskii 
away immediately before saying that she has no one but him: “как бы сделав усилие над 
собой, она поднялась и оттолкнула его” (18:158). Psychologically, Anna’s pushing Vronskii 
away reflects the despair and determination of accepting her new, despicable role as a fallen 
woman (as she apparently views it, given her shame). However, a haptic reading of the episode 
also suggests that, when Anna pushes Vronskii away while verbally reaffirming their bond, the 
gesture reflects her estrangement from her lover—which, according to Tolstoi, is inherent in the 
nature of carnal love.   
Associating Vronskii with his hand (“а в жизни теперь, кроме его, у ней никого не 
было […] эта одна рука, которая всегда будет моею” emphasis added; 18:158), Tolstoi 
underscores the carnal rather than spiritual nature of Anna and Vronskii’s love. Tolstoi uses a 
similar phrasing when describing Levin’s loved one, Kitty, also as “the only one” in the world, 
but he associates Kitty with her eyes (“Только одни на свете были эти глаза. Только одно 
было на свете существо, способное сосредоточивать для него весь свет и смысл жизни” 
(emphasis added; 18:292). By contrasting “hand” to “eyes”—the “lower” tactile and the “higher” 
visual senses according to Plato’s and Aristotle’s hierarchies—Tolstoi contrasts Anna’s carnal 
and Levin’s spiritual loves. While Levin and Kitty’s love eventually binds them together in a 
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happy marriage, even if instances of misunderstanding sometimes cause temporary upset, Anna 
and Vronskii’s passion fails to do so, alienating them ever further in the course of their affair.  
Unlike Levin and Kitty’s temporary disagreements, Anna and Vronskii’s arguments only 
generate further conflicts, even if they achieve a brief reconciliation. The failure to achieve 
harmony in their relationship is reflected in their interrupted touch. For instance, despite their 
shared wish to live as one family, Anna and Vronskii remain insensitive to one another’s needs 
and feelings, sometimes unable and other times unwilling to yield. Vronskii’s inability to 
empathize with Anna’s concerns about her status and her son’s fate in case of divorce 
undermines their physical contact, as in the scene where Vronskii visits Anna after she recovers 
from her post-partum fever. Anna and Vronskii’s reunion begins with an exchange of passionate 
caresses, expressing their shared joy to see one another. When Vronskii runs into Anna’s room, 
embraces her, and kisses her face, hands, and neck, she responds to his caresses by pressing his 
hand to her chest and embracing his head:  
И не думая и не замечая того, есть кто в комнате или нет, он обнял ее и стал 
покрывать поцелуями ее лицо, руки и шею. […] 
— Да, ты овладел мною, и я твоя, — выговорила она наконец, прижимая к 
своей груди его руку. […] 
— Это правда, — говорила она, бледнея всё более и более и обнимая его 
голову.  (18:457)  
 
Their touch even becomes simultaneous and reciprocal when Anna takes Vronskii’s hand and 
moves it to stroke her hair and cheeks: “И она не могла не ответить улыбкой — не словам, а 
влюбленным глазам его. Она взяла его руку и гладила ею себя по похолодевшим щекам и 
обстриженным волосам” (18:457). In keeping with Merleau-Ponty, Anna and Vronskii’s 
touching while being touched suggests an instance of corporeal “intertwinement,” reflecting their 
emotional unity as they seek to live together as a family: 
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— Неужели это возможно, чтобы мы были как муж с женою, одни, своею 
семьей с тобой? — сказала она, близко вглядываясь в его глаза.   
— Меня только удивляло, как это могло быть когда-нибудь иначе. (18:457) 
 
 However, Anna cannot completely yield to the dream of togetherness in the same, 
lighthearted way that Vronskii does. She cannot think solely of Vronskii and their love, because 
she is concerned with her husband’s decision about her and her son. Anna’s worry, which 
Vronskii does not share, results in emotional withdrawal. Tolstoi shows Anna’s retreat through 
her gaze and touch. Pondering her divorce and the fate of her son, Anna looks past Vronskii’s 
face while apparently holding his hand. Instead of showing empathy and support, Vronskii tries 
to divert Anna’s attention away from concerns about Karenin and Serёzha and redirect it to their 
union, asking Anna not to think about her husband and son while turning her hand in his. Anna 
remains unresponsive to his touch, continuing to look past him:       
— Стива говорит, что он на всё согласен, но я не могу принять его 
великодушие, — сказала она, задумчиво глядя мимо лица Вронского. — Я не хочу 
развода, мне теперь всё равно. Я не знаю только, что он решит об Сереже.  
Он не мог никак понять, как могла она в эту минуту свиданья думать и помнить 
о сыне, о разводе. Разве не всё равно было? 
— Не говори про это, не думай, — сказал он, поворачивая ее руку в своей и 
стараясь привлечь к себе ее внимание; но она всё не смотрела на него. (18:457–58)  
 
Both Anna’s burden of an uncertain fate and Vronskii’s insensitivity to her distress cause an 
emotional gap between them, interrupting their touch’s reciprocity. Just as in the case with Kitty, 
Anna’s touch with Vronskii does not reflect their emotional unity but rather highlights the 
absence thereof—expressed in Anna’s distracted gaze and unresponsive hand, insensitive to 
Vronskii’s touch.    
 Society’s unequal treatment of male and female infidelity complicates Anna and 
Vronskii’s relationship and aggravates the tension between them. While society rejects Anna for 
leaving her husband, publicly acknowledging her unfaithfulness and tainting her reputation, it 
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willingly accepts Vronskii. Tolstoi describes Anna and Vronskii’s opposing positions in society 
haptically, referring to hands: society’s hands are raised for Vronskii but are immediately 
lowered to Anna, indicating that society is willing to greet (shake hands with) Vronskii but not 
Anna. “[Х]отя свет был открыт для него лично, он был закрыт для Анны. Как в игре в 
кошку-мышку, руки, поднятые для него, тотчас же опускались пред Анной” (19:100). 
Society’s hands, “closed”, reveal the gap between Anna and her wider peer group. For instance, 
her appearance at the opera is such a scandal that a couple occupying the adjacent box decides to 
leave, finding it inappropriate even to sit close to Anna. Vronskii, in turn, is unwilling to give up 
his social freedom for her, as he thinks elsewhere in the novel: “«…Во всяком случае я всё 
могу отдать ей, но не свою мужскую независимость», думал он” (19:221). Vronskii’s 
unchanged position in society incites her irritation, her jealousy of his social freedom, and her 
fear of losing him.   
 Anna’s irritation and jealousy alienate her from Vronskii. Her nagging requests for 
reassurance of his love trigger his resentment and interrupt their physical contact, as, for 
instance, in the episode wherein Anna briefly meets with Vronskii at the hotel after visiting her 
son on his birthday. Having lost her son, Anna is gripped with the fear of losing Vronskii as well. 
When Vronskii is about to leave the hotel with his friend Yashvin for another social event, Anna 
tries to hold him back, at least to ask if he still loves her even though he cannot stay. Anna begins 
by showing tenderness to Vronskii, which is willingly reciprocated: when Anna takes Vronskii’s 
hand and presses it to her neck, he responds with a kiss on her hand. However, when Anna asks 
Vronskii if he still loves her, pressing his hand between both of hers in supplication, Vronskii 
responds to her kindly but pulls his hand away: 
Она взяла его за руку и, не спуская глаз, смотрела на него, отыскивая в мыслях, 
что бы сказать, чтоб удержать его. 
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— Постой, мне кое-что надо сказать, — и, взяв его короткую руку, она прижала 
ее к своей шее. — Да, ничего, что я позвала его [Яшвина; Yashvin is Vronskii’s 
friend who visits Anna with Vronskii] обедать? 
— Прекрасно сделала, — сказал он со спокойною улыбкой, открывая свои 
сплошные зубы и целуя ее руку.  
— Алексей, ты не изменился ко мне? — сказала она, обеими руками сжимая его 
руку. — Алексей, я измучалась здесь. Когда мы уедем? 
— Скоро, скоро. Ты не поверишь, как и мне тяжела наша жизнь здесь, — сказал 
он и потянул свою руку. (19:112–13) 
 
Anna’s pressing of Vronskii’s hand with both of her own demonstrates not only the power of her 
emotion but also the intensity of her desire to keep Vronskii by her side. Vronskii feels 
responsible for Anna’s misfortune and is faithful despite his social liberties, so her incessant 
doubt irritates and repulses him. That he pulls his hand away, interrupting their touch while 
gently responding to Anna’s words, reflects his inner alienation from Anna. He politely tolerates 
her jealousy but feels insulted and averted. Tolstoi shows that carnal love creates social and 
interpersonal dynamics encouraging Anna’s ungrounded jealousy, which fragments the couple’s 
emotional unity and divides the couple’s hands. Under similar circumstances, when Kitty finds 
herself attracted to the corrupted Vasen’ka Veslovskii, she is tormented by her attraction, 
begging Levin to forgive her and to make Veslovskii leave their home. Thus, she eliminates her 
attraction and the source of Levin’s jealousy, restoring their harmonious relationship.        
 Even when Anna and Vronskii manage to achieve a moment of unity, it inevitably proves 
to be fleeting. The haptic interactions during their last argument before Anna’s suicide reveal 
their inability to sustain a union. Although Vronskii undergoes a kind of inner transformation,18 
sacrificing his career for Anna and becoming more empathetic and compassionate with her, she 
again suspects his infidelity—as so often in this stage of their relationship. She both suffers 
herself and torments her lover. Anna particularly distrusts Vronskii’s relations with Princess 
                                                 
18 I discuss Vronskii’s inner transformation and the way in which Tolstoi communicates it through his haptic 
experiences in the chapter on Vronskii.  
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Sorokina, whom his mother intends for marriage to her son. When Vronskii tells Anna that he 
needs to see his mother in order to obtain money, delaying their departure from Moscow to his 
estate, Anna breaks into tears, humiliated, both blaming herself for burdening Vronskii and at the 
same time accusing him of loving another woman: “— Брось меня, брось! — выговаривала 
она между рыданьями. — Я уеду завтра... Я больше сделаю. Кто я? развратная женщина. 
Камень на твоей шее. Я не хочу мучать тебя, не хочу! Я освобожу тебя. Ты не любишь, ты 
любишь другую!” (19:324).  
 Though Anna tries to hurt Vronskii, he consoles her, reassuring her that the jealousy is 
unfounded and hurts her as much as it hurts him. Saying this, he kisses Anna’s hands: “— Анна, 
за что так мучать себя и меня? — говорил он, целуя ее руки” (19:324). Vronskii’s inclusive 
phrasing as he says that Anna’s jealousy torments both of them (“себя и меня”) suggests his 
genuine care for Anna as well as himself, thus revealing his efforts to bridge her alienation and 
consolidate their unity. His kiss (touch) on Anna’s hands corroborates his verbal efforts to 
connect. Tolstoi shows that, since Vronskii sincerely cares not only for himself but also for 
Anna, he manages to reach out to her. When he talks to her and kisses her hands, Anna reads the 
tenderness in his expression, seeming to both hear the tears in his voice and feel their moisture 
on her hand: “В лице его теперь выражалась нежность, и ей казалось, что она слышала 
ухом звук слез в его голосе и на руке своей чувствовала их влагу” (19:325). Whether or not 
Vronskii cries during this scene (which Tolstoi does not reveal), the fact that Anna feels the 
sensations left by his tears, whether real or illusory, suggests that she is responsive both 
emotionally and haptically. Thus, Vronskii has managed to reach out to her, thereby bridging the 
alienation between them.  
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Vronskii’s confirmation of his love for Anna reunites them, also conveyed through touch. 
Vronskii’s tenderness transforms Anna’s jealousy into passion, so she reciprocates his touch with 
amorous caresses. She embraces him, kissing his head, neck, and hands: “И мгновенно 
отчаянная ревность Анны перешла в отчаянную, страстную нежность; она обнимала его, 
покрывала поцелуями его голову, шею, руки” (19:325). Anna and Vronskii’s reciprocal touch 
suggests their reestablished bond, reflecting their temporary reconciliation. They stop fighting 
and willingly yield to one another’s wishes throughout the evening: 
Чувствуя, что примирение было полное, Анна с утра оживленно принялась за 
приготовление к отъезду. Хотя и не было решено, едут ли они в понедельник или 
во вторник, так как оба вчера уступали один другому, Анна деятельно 
приготавливалась к отъезду, чувствуя себя теперь совершенно равнодушной к 
тому, что они уедут днем раньше или позже. (19:325) 
 
Anna and Vronskii’s reconciliation ends the chapter, producing the impression that they 
have overcome their alienation definitively. However, the next chapter reveals that the 
reconciliation is only temporary. Thus, the break between the chapters anticipates the break in 
their reunion, and the break in their touch. When, the next morning, Vronskii mentions his 
departure to his mother’s, Anna feels “stung” (“кольнуло”): “Как ни хорошо она была 
настроена, упоминание о поездке на дачу к матери кольнуло ее” (19:325). On the one hand, 
Vronskii does not give up his intention to visit his mother, though he knows from their 
conversation the day before that it upsets Anna. On the other hand, Anna does not trust Vronskii 
even after their reconciliation. Vronskii’s visit to his mother re-awakens Anna’s insecurity and 
jealousy, leading her to feel hurt. Anna further misinterprets Vronskii’s words, accusing him of 
indifference. When he discusses Anna’s divorce, expressing care for Anna and for their future 
children, Anna mishears him, convinced that he only cares about the children and not about her. 
She provokes an argument, responding to Vronskii with spiteful reprimands and hurting him so 
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much that he winces  in pain: “— Ах, я сказал: для тебя. Более всего для тебя, — морщась, 
точно от боли, повторил он, — потому что я уверен, что большая доля твоего раздражения 
происходит от неопределенности положения” (19:327). Anna seeks to hurt Vronskii in order 
to avenge the pain that she believes he has caused.  
As was previously discussed, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ideal unity merged into an 
“intercorporeal” whole suggests that, by hurting one another, each being of the intercorporeal 
whole hurts itself as well. Though Tolstoi does not portray actual, physical touch in the scene, 
his references to Anna’s “sting” and Vronskii’s “wince” of “pain” can be read as haptic 
elements. While love and genuine care temporarily “intertwine” Anna and Vronskii, Vronskii’s 
unwillingness to forgo the visit to his mother and Anna’s jealousy, fueling resentment and 
misinterpretation, drive their entwinement apart. This separation hurts both parties at the instant 
of division, expressed through the haptic elements of pain.   
Anna’s resentment for Vronskii leads her to read repulsion in his attitude towards her 
body. When the two sit down to coffee, after their argument about Princess Sorokina but before 
Vronskii’s departure, Anna catches his gaze and reads what she perceives as disgust. It seems to 
her that her hand, her gestures, and the sound that she makes with her lips as she drinks repulse 
him: “Она подняла чашку, отставив мизинец, и поднесла ее ко рту. Отпив несколько 
глотков, она взглянула на него и по выражению его лица ясно поняла, что ему противны 
были рука, и жест, и звук, который она производила губами” (19:328). Since the scene is 
portrayed from Anna’s point of view, it is unclear whether Vronskii is truly averse to Anna’s 
body, or if his disgust is only a figment of her confused mind. While she believes her judgment 
of Vronskii to be accurate (“ясно поняла/understood clearly”; emphasis added), this already 
anticipates the distortion of Anna’s sensory perceptions and moral judgments in the scenes 
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preceding her suicide, when she is disoriented and sees corruption and hatred in all people. 
Whether Anna’s judgment is correct or not, her interpretation of Vronskii’s gaze aggravates their 
alienation. Anna retaliates against his presumed disgust for her body with loathing for his hands. 
She associates them (and thus his body as well) solely with his sensuality. She recalls his 
passionate caresses from the evening before, and imagines how those hands have caressed and 
(she believes) will caress other women besides her: “Пристально глядя на него, на его лицо, 
руки, она вспоминала со всеми подробностями сцену вчерашнего примирения и его 
страстные ласки. «Эти, точно такие же ласки он расточал и будет и хочет расточать 
другим женщинам!» думала она” (19:328). The sensual nature that had initially brought them 
together now repulses Anna, as do the hands. Anna’s jealousy undermines not only their 
emotional relationship but also her physical attraction, transforming it to disgust. Her lover’s 
body now repulses her, just as her husband’s body with “moist” hands and “big swollen veins” 
had repulsed her earlier. Anna’s disdain reveals the unbridgeable gap of repulsion, which, Tolstoi 
demonstrates, is inherent in carnal love. Anna’s passion repelled her from her husband’s body, 
and now repels her even from her lover’s.    
Since Tolstoi represents carnal love as a force of discord and alienation, he shows how 
Anna’s passion leads to the escalating anxiety and madness of her suicide. Anna’s haptic 
recollections in the scenes preceding her death recapitulate her inner struggle, revealing her 
passion’s destructive effects on her emotional, mental, moral, and physical states. Anna’s haptic 
memory manifests itself for the first time in a scene after an argument with Vronskii and before 
her carriage ride to the train station. Vronskii leaves the house, and Anna, afraid that he has 
abandoned her, sends a note and waits for his return. Addled by opium, Anna looks at herself in 
the mirror but cannot immediately recognize her form. When she does, she suddenly feels 
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Vronskii’s kisses covering her body: «Кто это?» — думала она, глядя в зеркало на 
воспаленное лицо со странно блестящими глазами, испуганно смотревшими на нее. «Да 
это я», — вдруг поняла она, и, оглядывая себя всю, она почувствовала вдруг на себе его 
поцелуи…” (19:335). The way in which the phantom sensation surfaces on Anna’s skin once 
she recognizes her reflection is consistent with Montagu’s notion of skin as the outer layer of a 
person’s ego.  Anna’s skin reflects her identity (as the mirror reflects her appearance)—now 
reduced to Vronskii’s kisses, i.e., to her passion. 
The hallucinatory kisses disturb Anna, so she tries to shake them off with a shrug of her 
shoulders. But, she involuntarily kisses her own hand instead, as if reiterating the very kiss she is 
trying to erase: “… и, содрогаясь, двинула плечами. Потом подняла руку к губам и 
поцеловала ее” (19:335). The way in which Anna tries to shake off Vronskii’s phantom kisses 
reverberates with a previously-discussed scene, wherein Anna talks to Stiva and shakes her head 
to escape disturbing thoughts of Vronskii. In both scenes, Anna fails to free herself. Instead, her 
passion escalates throughout the novel, developing from brief, troubling thoughts into physical 
sensation: first the sensation of Karenin’s kiss on her hand, and then sensations covering her 
entire body. Anna’s involuntary kiss on her own hand suggests the imposing nature of her 
passion, which seems to have taken control over both her body and her personality. Anna thinks 
of herself first and foremost as a lover, who only desires Vronskii’s caresses, who cannot and 
does not want to have any other identity: “Если б я могла быть чем-нибудь, кроме 
любовницы, страстно любящей одни его ласки; но я не могу и не хочу быть ничем 
другим” 19:343).  
Although Anna has come to identify herself only with her passion, other haptic 
recollections suggest that her ordinary (innocent and moral) self persists in her personality—
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although it eventually fails to restore Anna’s clear perception and judgment, distorted by passion 
for Vronskii. When Anna goes to see Dolly after the mirror episode, the passing shop signs and 
the very experience of travelling in a carriage trigger a chain of associations that recover the 
distant memory of travelling to Trinity Monastery when she was a virginal seventeen-year-old 
girl: 
Сидя в углу покойной коляски, чуть покачивавшейся своими упругими 
рессорами на быстром ходу серых, Анна, при несмолкаемом грохоте колес и 
быстро сменяющихся впечатлениях на чистом воздухе, вновь перебирая события 
последних дней, увидала свое положение совсем иным, чем каким оно казалось ей 
дома. Теперь и мысль о смерти не казалась ей более так страшна и ясна, и самая 
смерть не представлялась более неизбежною. […] Филиппов, калачи. Говорят, что 
они возят тесто в Петербург. Вода московская так хороша. А Мытищенские 
колодцы и блины». И она вспомнила, как давно, давно, когда ей было еще 
семнадцать лет, она ездила с теткой к Троице. «На лошадях еще. Неужели это была 
я, с красными руками? Как многое из того, что тогда мне казалось так прекрасно и 
недоступно, стало ничтожно, а то, что было тогда, теперь навеки недоступно. 
(19:336–37) 
 
According to Paterson’s classification of the kinds of haptic perception, the experience of 
travelling in a carriage, with its rocking motions and the movements through space that Tolstoi 
describes in the quote above (“чуть покачивавшейся своими упругими рессорами на 
быстром ходу серых,” “быстро сменяющихся впечатлениях”), qualifies as proprioceptive. 
Although Anna’s recollection seems to be most immediately triggered by reading the shop signs, 
the carriage ride (thus her proprioceptive perception) underlies the memory, since a stream of 
associations brings back her memory of another carriage ride. In addition, her movement 
through space along the shops and streets seems to structure her train of thought, setting her on a 
temporal journey to recover her past as her present carriage trip evokes a past one. In other 
words, Anna’s spatial journey, which transforms into a temporal journey, suggests the continuity 
of her identity. Although Anna herself concludes that her purity is lost irrevocably (“навеки 
недоступно”), the mere memory of past purity temporarily improves her mental state. Anna 
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resolves to confess her distress to Dolly, to leave Vronskii, and, following Dolly’s advice, to start 
her life anew (“Да, я скажу Долли всё. Она не любит Вронского. Будет стыдно, больно, но я 
всё скажу ей. Она любит меня, и я последую ее совету.  … [Я] войду к Долли и прямо 
скажу ей: я несчастна, я стою того, я виновата, но я всё-таки несчастна, помоги мне” 
18:336–37). Anna’s mental journey to her innocent past, encouraging her to start a new life 
without Vronskii, suggests that Tolstoi portrays Anna’s lost purity as something not necessarily 
irrevocable. Even if Anna cannot restore her youthful innocence, she can potentially live a moral 
life—a life not controlled by passion.      
On the one hand, the above flux in Anna’s mood from desperate to hopeful seems to be 
but a momentary instance in her stream of disorderly thoughts, reflecting her fluctuating 
emotional and mental state.19 On the other hand, Tolstoi associates such fluctuations in Anna’s 
mood with her physical sensations, suggesting that such instances can be fruitfully read and 
better understood through haptic theory. As discussed in the chapter on the haptic, Bergson and 
Proust believe that sensory memory connects a person’s past to present, ensuring the continuity 
facilitating the wholeness of his identity. For Bergson, a person literally relives his past when he 
repeats the same learned physical action, such as reciting a poem, for instance. For Proust, 
sensory memory is not only a means of restoring a person’s wholeness but also a source of 
transformation. Proust’s protagonist recovers his past after he tastes a madeleine cake. The 
recollection of his youth triggered by the sensation not only helps him feel reconnected with his 
seemingly lost past but also fosters a creative impulse, transforming him from a common, 
“accidental,” “mediocre” “mortal” (54) into a writer. Through his creative imagination, the 
                                                 
19 For instance, the final fluctuation in Anna’s mood, when she suddenly comes to her senses after throwing herself 
on the rails and wishes to save herself, is not associated with Anna’s haptic memory. It is an example of her shifting 
moods, reflecting her confused emotional and mental state.    
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protagonist-writer not only can revive his past, but can also trace the continuity of his life from 
the past into the present. As in case of Bergson’s and Proust’s subjects, Anna’s haptic 
recollections reflect her identity. Vronskii’s kisses on Anna’s body, which involuntarily surface 
on her skin, reflect her presently obsessive desire. Her two carriage rides bridge the present, 
where she feels corrupted by her passion, with the past, where she was young and innocent. The 
fact that Anna’s haptic memory brings back the recollections associated with past innocence as 
well as present corruption suggests that, in keeping with Bergson and Proust, the whole of 
Anna’s identity includes both aspects of her personality. The difference between the ways in 
which sensory recollections affect Proust’s and Tolstoi’s protagonists highlights Tolstoi’s 
anxiety over human sexuality. While the youthful recollections of Proust’s protagonist lead to his 
transformation, Anna’s recollections of her past enable only momentary fluctuation in her 
otherwise confused and depressed mental state, consistent with Tolstoi’s representation of 
Anna’s unleashed sexuality as a destructive force. 
An episode immediately before Anna’s suicide demonstrates another instance when 
Anna’s haptic memory brings forth the uncorrupted aspect of her personality, but fails to 
overcome her determination to commit suicide. When Anna is ready to throw herself under the 
train, the movement of stepping down from the platform reminds her of entering a pool of water, 
and she habitually crosses herself. Crossing oneself before entering a pool of water is a 
widespread Russian cultural custom, which Anna must have adopted as a child. Even though 
Anna is not seeking help through religion, the gesture itself seems to be imbued with an 
independently powerful, spiritual meaning, and it temporarily improves Anna’s mental state—as 
did the recollections of her youthful innocence. Anna suddenly recalls her life, with all its past 
joys:  
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Чувство, подобное тому, которое она испытывала, когда купаясь готовилась войти 
в воду, охватило ее, и она перекрестилась. Привычный жест крестного знамения 
вызвал в душе ее целый ряд девичьих и детских воспоминаний, и вдруг мрак, 
покрывавший для нее всё, разорвался, и жизнь предстала ей на мгновение со всеми 
ее светлыми прошедшими радостями. (19:348) 
 
Anna’s joyful recollections immediately before her suicide not only endow the scene with 
dramatic tension, but also emphasize the controlling and obsessive nature of her passion. 
Although Anna had wished to start her life anew (in the above episode) and sees her life in a 
brighter, happier tint (in the current episode), her passion prevails. She ultimately acts according 
to her previous decision to commit suicide in order to take revenge on Vronskii, making him 
responsible for her death. Anna’s haptic recollections suggest that, although Anna’s sensual self 
has not completely erased the uncorrupted aspect of her personality, its control is so powerful 
that Anna finds herself unable to resist the urge for revenge and suicide. As Anna recalls the 
joyous instances of her life, she nonetheless continues watching the train carefully and throws 
herself between the cars when the gap is in front of her.  
Tolstoi describes Anna’s death through tactile sensations, with visual stimulus 
deliberately suppressed. After she throws herself under the train, she feels that “something” 
“huge” and “implacable” pushes at her head and drags over her back: “[о]на хотела подняться, 
откинуться; но что-то огромное, неумолимое толкнуло ее в голову и потащило за спину” 
(19:348). Tolstoi describes the scene from Anna’s point of view, capturing what she feels in the 
instant before her death. Using the indefinite pronoun “что-то/something” instead of the noun 
“train,” which would describe the object definitively, thus supplying a clear visual image, Tolstoi 
introduces ambiguity, creating the impression that the “huge” and “implacable” object is unseen, 
only experienced tactilely as it “pushes” and “drags” Anna’s body. Also, in comparison to the 
previous version of the novel, which had been published in a literary journal Russkii vestnik in 
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1875–76, Tolstoi deletes two sentences depicting Anna’s visual experiences. In the earlier 
version, Tolstoi describes Anna seeing the “dirty sand and coal” coming “closer” to her face 
immediately before she falls on the ground (“Ближе стали видны грязный песок и уголь. Она 
упала на них лицом” [19:468]). By deleting these sentences from the final version of the novel, 
Tolstoi leaves only the depiction of Anna’s tactile sensations. Since the sense of touch is the 
major medium of sensuality, that Anna’s death is described as a tactile experience reiterates the 
notion that her death originated with indulgence in carnal experience, or, in other words, with 
“touch.”  
In the representation of Nikolai Levin’s death, which can be viewed as a parallel scene, 
Tolstoi depicts Nikolai’s passing as a spiritual as well as physical experience. The instant before 
Nikolai dies, his face is illuminated and his lips form a smile, suggesting inner peace: “И через 
минуту лицо просветлело, под усами выступила улыбка, и собравшиеся женщины 
озабоченно принялись убирать покойника” (19:74). In keeping with Plato's association of 
vision/light with clarity of perception and true knowledge, Tolstoi’s reference to the light on 
Nikolai’s face (if only in a figurative sense) suggests his spiritual insight that he gains in death. 
In addition, the light imagery when Nikolai’s face is “illuminated” suggests the reflection of a 
spiritual experience in his physical body. That Kitty learns about her pregnancy immediately 
after Nikolai’s death, leading to Tolstoi’s meditation on both death and birth being gateways into 
the spiritual realm, corroborates the notion that Nikolai’s death is spiritual as well as physical.  
While Nikolai’s death ends by engendering light, Anna’s death ends by extinguishing 
light: “И свеча, при которой она читала исполненную тревог, обманов, горя и зла книгу, 
вспыхнула более ярким, чем когда-нибудь, светом, осветила ей всё то, что прежде было во 
мраке, затрещала, стала меркнуть и навсегда потухла” (19:350). Although Anna “sees” a 
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“candle” illuminating the “book of her life,” the light goes out—just as the flash of “red fire” in 
Anna’s dream, incited by desire, had culminated in complete darkness during her train ride to 
Saint Petersburg. In keeping with Plato’s association of vision/light with mind/spirit, the light 
that illuminates the book of Anna’s life suggests that she is experiencing some spiritual insight. 
However, since Anna only reads anxieties, deceits, evil, and sorrows in the book of her life, and 
excludes the joyful moments that she had recalled before throwing herself under the train, the 
light imagery seems to tell of her distorted perception rather than of her heightened 
understanding. Thus, Anna’s final vision is not a spiritual insight but rather the figment of 
confusion.  
Finally, Tolstoi depicts Anna’s eyes as open but, of course, unseeing after her death. 
When Vronskii finds her disfigured dead body spread out on the table at the station, he reads a 
reproach to him in the frozen expression of her half-open lips and her “unclosed” eyes: 
“застывшее странное, жалкое в губках и ужасное в остановившихся незакрытых глазах, 
выражение, как бы словами выговаривавшее то страшное слово — о том, что он раскается, 
— которое она во время ссоры сказала ему” (emphasis added; 19:362). In keeping with 
Plato’s light/vision metaphor, Anna’s open but unseeing eyes suggest her ultimate descent into 
the realm of the corporeal and away from the spiritual, foreshadowed in her delirious dream 
during the train ride to Saint Petersburg.  
As Gutkin points out in the quote mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in Tolstoi, 
just as in Plato, “love of the body … strives only to achieve an end” (92–93). Anna’s “love of the 
body”—her passion for Vronskii—overpowers her emotional attachment to her son and her 
moral restrictions, reducing her personality to her carnal urges. While the light imagery in 
Nikolai’s postmortem expression suggests a spiritual insight, Anna’s open but unseeing eyes 
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point to the elimination not only of life and thus intellectual abilities in her body, but also of the 
spiritual. In other words, such interpretation suggests that Anna’s carnal desire leads to her 
becoming flesh without spirit, inanimate corporeality, underscoring Tolstoi’s representation of 
Anna’s sexuality as self-enclosed.  
Furthermore, Tolstoi depicts Anna’s postmortem facial expression from Vronskii’s point 
of view. Since Vronskii is self-centered and is devoid of spiritual sensibility, his perception of 
Anna’s death and interpretation of her expression are biased and reductive. He interprets Anna’s 
expression from within the context of their last argument—as an act of vengeance, aimed at 
forcing him to repent for his insensitivity to Anna (“выражение, как бы словами 
выговаривавшее то страшное слово — о том, что он раскается” 19:362). Although Anna’s 
wish to avenge the pain which Vronskii had caused her underlies her decision to commit suicide, 
she experiences a wide range of emotions, reflecting on her life’s past joys and sorrows, between 
the moments when she makes the decision to commit suicide and actually dies under the wheels 
of the train. She also seems to experience an instant of clarity when she comes to her senses, 
finds herself on the rails, realizes that her death is imminent, and asks God to forgive her for 
“everything” (“И в то же мгновение она ужаснулась тому, что делала. «Где я? Что я делаю? 
Зачем?» Она хотела подняться, откинуться; но что-то огромное, неумолимое толкнуло ее в 
голову и потащило за спину. «Господи, прости мне всё!» проговорила она, чувствуя 
невозможность борьбы” 19:348–49). It is true that it is unclear what Anna exactly means by 
“everything”: for instance, does she repent of her passion for Vronskii, or does she still consider 
it to be a manifestation of her “God-given” sensual nature, as she claims earlier? In either case, 
Vronskii’s self-absorption prevents him from viewing Anna’s death as an event more significant 
than a mere act of revenge to him. Since Vronskii—unlike Levin, who is able to see his brother’s 
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spiritual insight in his postmortem expression—is carnal and is insensitive to spiritual questions, 
he is preoccupied only with Anna’s physical state, searching for signs of recent beauty in her 
crushed body. Her spiritual life (and one can add, afterlife) remains beyond the scope of 
Vronskii’s earth- and self-bound concerns. Vronskii’s biased and limited point of view, which 
cannot do justice to Anna’s complex personality and rich inner life, reflects the reductive nature 
of carnal love, which takes control over Anna’s personality, reducing her, as she herself reflects, 
to a lover who loves only Vronskii’s caresses (“любовницы, страстно любящей одни его 
ласки; но я не могу и не хочу быть ничем другим” 19:343). 
In addition, the fact that Anna, unlike Nikolai Levin, dies alone and the only loved one 
who comes to see Anna after her death (at least within the framework of the novel) is Vronskii, 
who is, strictly speaking, not a family member, reflects another trait of carnal love—its 
alienating force. The representation of Anna’s body after her death, and thus her experience of 
death, is limited to Vronskii’s point of view precisely because her passion has alienated her from 
other people, who could perhaps have highlighted her other roles apart from that of Vronskii’s 
lover (for instance, as a loving mother to her son, a caring sister to Stiva, and a friend to Dolly). 
Stiva recalls Anna later in a conversation with Serёzha, but only in passing, carefully asking him 
if he still remembers his mother. Although Serёzha does remember and love his mother, he hides 
his feelings because he misses his mother and realizes the futility of his feelings and 
recollections, since they cannot being her back and he needs to get used to living with his father. 
Although both Anna’s brother and her son remember and love Anna, the person who witnesses 
Anna’s death expression and thus has a chance (but fails) to gain insight into her final emotions 
is her lover. While enriching her inner life and imbuing her personality with complexity, Anna’s 
passion proves limiting. Portraying Anna’s death through Vronskii’s perspective and reducing 
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her to a person who had been obsessed solely with passion and revenge, Tolstoi underscores the 
self-seeking and therefore alienating and reductive nature of carnal love.  
4. Levin and Kitty20 
As the Tolstoi scholar Elisabeth Stenbock-Fermor argues, Tolstoi “disassociates the 
physical from the spiritual when the spiritual achieves its summit” (58). The scholar’s 
observation suggests that Tolstoi defines spiritual experience as incorporeal, something that 
occurs outside of the body and therefore does not engage haptic perception. Stenbock-Fermor’s 
observation echoes young Tolstoi’s description of losing the feeling of his corporeality when 
enraptured by prayer (“Я не чувствовал плоти, я был — один дух” (1851; 46:62)). It is true 
that Tolstoi contrasts Anna and Vronskii’s carnal love with Levin and Kitty’s spiritual (non-
carnal) love throughout the novel. However, in contrasting the two couples, he does not exclude 
haptic (bodily) elements from the portrayal of Levin and Kitty’s non-carnal love. While 
associating sexual promiscuity with primarily cutaneous and tactile sensations, Tolstoi associates 
non-carnal love with kinesthetic perception (or, in other words, bodily dexterity), since it 
excludes direct physical contact between bodies. This chapter argues that Tolstoi uses kinesthetic 
perception to emphasize the purity of Levin and Kitty’s love and touch, which serves to unite 
them with one another, facilitates their interpersonal unities, and immerses Levin in the whole of 
the world.     
                                                 
20 Other characters, discussed above, fragment relational unity (Stiva’s affair brings household discord, Vronskii’s 
pursuit of Anna interferes with her family, Anna’s passion for Vronskii alienates her from her husband, Karenin’s 
restrained emotionality undermines his relationship with Anna), but Levin and Kitty form a successful union. In 
addition, while other previously discussed characters each have distinct haptic experiences (Stiva indulges in 
sensory perceptions of mundane phenomena, Anna indulges in cutaneous and tatile sensations as her perception 
escalates and becomes distorted, Vronskii’s haptic experiences are self-directed, and Karenin is physically rigid), 
Levin and Kitty share similar sensory (haptic/kinesthetic and visual) experiences. Since Levin and Kitty’s unity is 
revealed through their sensory kinship, it seems fitting to discuss the two characters in a single chapter.  
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The juxtaposition between caress and dexterity is crucial to Aristotle’s views on the sense 
of touch. The philosopher associates the touch of one’s body/skin (especially, those parts of the 
body causing sexual arousal) with sexual excess and corruption. By contrast, he emphasizes that 
the dexterity of the human hand facilitates intellectual and moral abilities, thus elevating them 
above the animals. In other words, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of touch: touch for pleasure, 
and dexterity for development. According to Paterson’s classification of haptic perception, 
bodily dexterity falls under the category of kinesthetic perception (which includes muscles, 
joints, movements, and the sense of balance, excluding the skin). Tolstoi’s use of these two 
forms of haptic perception (cutaneous/tactile and kinesthetic) is consistent with Aristotle’s. 
Although Levin and Kitty do touch each other throughout the novel, and even do so intimately, 
particularly after their marriage, their distinctive form of haptic perception is kinesthetic.   
In keeping with Aristotle’s conception of the hand’s dexterity as a means of 
intellectual/spiritual development, Tolstoi emphasizes both Levin’s and Kitty’s mobility and 
dexterity. Both characters are actually introduced into the novel through movement, thus using 
their kinesthetic perception. One can say that Levin “runs” into the novel. Appearing for the first 
time in Stiva’s office building, Levin does not simply walk in, but runs, quickly and easily 
climbing the stairs (“быстро и легко взбегал наверх” 18:19). Tolstoi seems to deliberately 
linger to highlight Levin’s movements: Tolstoi contrasts Levin with an official who stops to look 
at the legs of the “running person” (emphasis added; “ноги бегущего” 18:19). Tolstoi even 
seems to associate Levin’s identity with his mobility, as when Stiva recognizes the 
“вбегавший/running person” as Levin. In addition, Levin’s “strong build” and “broad shoulders” 
confirm his penchant for robust movements (Stiva, in his typically sensual manner, admires his 
friend’s strong muscles a few pages later, too): 
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Этот самый, — сказал сторож, указывая на сильно сложенного широкоплечего 
человека с курчавою бородой, который, не снимая бараньей шапки, быстро и легко 
взбегал наверх по стертым ступенькам каменной лестницы. Один из сходивших 
вниз с портфелем худощавый чиновник, приостановившись, неодобрительно 
посмотрел на ноги бегущего и потом вопросительно взглянул на Облонского. 
Степан Аркадьич стоял над лестницей. Добродушно сияющее лицо его из-за 
шитого воротника мундира просияло еще более, когда он узнал вбегавшего. (18:19) 
 
Levin’s dynamism reflects his hard-working village lifestyle, which Tolstoi conveys through his 
manifestly village looks and manners (“человека с курчавою бородой,” “не снимая бараньей 
шапки”). The fact that Tolstoi associates Levin’s physical fitness with manual work and the 
world of nature, both of which he views as uncorrupted (see the chapter on Tolstoi’s moral 
vision), one can infer that Tolstoi believes that kinesthetic perception is a morally proper way in 
which to interact with others and the world.    
 Kitty, too, is associated with movement as she is introduced. Although Kitty is first 
mentioned in the novel through Levin’s recollections of her, Kitty appears in person as she skates 
at the rink. Describing Kitty’s skating, Tolstoi mentions that she has a “springy” foot (“упругою 
ножкой” 18:32), perhaps evoking Levin’s apparently strong and resilient “running legs” in the 
previous scene. In addition, Tolstoi reinforces the connection between Levin and Kitty though a 
reference to “village” life, mentioning that a young boy in traditional Russian (village) dress runs 
dexterously by Kitty: “Отчаянно махавший руками и пригибавшийся к земле мальчик в 
русском платье обгонял ее” (18:32).   
Before Levin and Kitty properly meet, Tolstoi provides background for their relations to 
emphasize the inherently innocent nature of their associations, despite the sensual overtone that 
one discerns in Levin’s thoughts of Kitty. First, Tolstoi evokes their childhood, a time of 
innocence, devoid of sensual stirrings—let alone crude sexuality. Levin has known Kitty since 
her childhood, and he was a close friend of her late brother. Though Levin is charmed by her 
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subtle physical beauty—her slender stature (“тонкой красотою стана”), slim legs, and springy 
foot (“узкие ножки в высоких ботинках,” “упругою ножкой”)—he particularly emphasizes 
her childish innocence. Her face has an expression of child-like clarity and kindness (“прелесть 
этой, с выражением детской ясности и доброты, небольшой белокурой головки,” 
“детскость выражения ее лица”). Her smile transports Levin to the marvelous world of his own 
early childhood, permeated with blissful peace (“ее улыбка, всегда переносившая Левина в 
волшебный мир, где он чувствовал себя умиленным и смягченным, каким он мог 
запомнить себя в редкие дни своего раннего детства”) (18:32–33).   
Further, Tolstoi emphasizes that Levin sees Kitty not as an object of passion (as Vronskii 
views Anna) but as an ideal of purity, which he longs for emotionally rather than physically. 
According to Plato, the sense of vision and the light that it captures are associated with a 
person’s spiritual ascent. Consistent with Plato, Levin is particularly drawn to Kitty’s eyes, 
which he regards as meek and truthful (“выражение ее глаз, кротких, спокойных и 
правдивых”). In addition, her smile moves him to tenderness (“умиленный”). Both 
“кроткий/meek” and “умиленный/tender” are adjectives used in the Christian tradition to 
describe piety: “the meek (“кроткие” in Russian) … inherit the earth” (Matthew 5:5), and 
“умиленный” is one of the central images in the iconography of the Blessed Virgin (The Virgin 
of Tenderness, or Panagia Eleousa in Greek, or Божия Матерь «Умиление» in Russian). That 
the description of Kitty’s eyes evokes Christian imagery emphasizes not only Kitty’s own 
truthfulness and purity, but also Levin’s, since he is the one who regards her in this way.    
In keeping with Plato, the sun and light imagery referenced in Levin’s vision of Kitty 
reinforce the notion that their bond is spiritual rather than carnal. Plato’s “cave” metaphor 
describes the final stage of spiritual ascent and the attainment of true knowledge of the world as 
  
144 
a gaze directly into the sun: “Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of 
him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will 
contemplate him as he is” (207). Levin thinks of Kitty as a nearly sublime, incorporeal creature, 
and associates her with the sun in his imagination:   
Он прошел еще несколько шагов, и пред ним открылся каток, и тотчас же среди 
всех катавшихся он узнал ее.  
…Всё освещалось ею.  Она была улыбка, озарявшая всё вокруг. … Он сошел 
вниз, избегая подолгу смотреть на нее, как на солнце, но он видел ее, как солнце, и 
не глядя. (18:32) 
 
In keeping with Plato’s “cave” metaphor, Tolstoi’s association of Kitty with the sun renders her 
an embodiment of spiritual truth. The way in which Levin gazes at Kitty as if gazing at the sun 
anticipates his spiritual quest and the discovery that Kitty is the only one who can answer his 
questions about life’s meaning and “mystery.” In other words, Kitty is the “sun,” in whose 
“light”—and through whose love—Levin will attain true knowledge.  
  Kitty and Levin’s haptic interactions at the skating rink anticipate both their temporary 
separation, caused by Kitty’s infatuation with Vronskii, and their future reunion. Vronskii’s 
nonchalant pursuit of Kitty introduces a temporary break in the development of her relationship 
with Levin; however, it does not break their bond. Tolstoi shows that, because of her infatuation 
with Vronskii, Kitty temporarily fails to recognize Levin as her true love, even though she does 
implicitly love him. Having noticed Levin, who is chatting with her cousin, Kitty begins to skate 
towards them with her arms outstretched (she is a poor skater). While skating, she keeps looking 
and smiling at Levin rather than her cousin, but once she approaches them, her hand lands on her 
cousin rather than Levin: 
Она катилась не совсем твердо; вынув руки из маленькой муфты, висевшей о на 
снурке, она держала их наготове и, глядя на Левина, которого она узнала, 
улыбалась ему и своему страху. Когда поворот кончился, она дала себе толчок 
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упругою ножкой и подкатилась прямо к Щербацкому; и, ухватившись за него 
рукой, улыбаясь кивнула Левину. (18:32) 
  
Kitty’s outstretched arms while smiling at Levin produce the impression that she is actually 
stretching out to lean on him. It seems that only social norms do not allow Kitty to land on Levin 
instead.  
Tolstoi reinforces the impression of their inherent bond and future unity by describing 
Kitty as a poor skater and Levin a dexterous one: “Она подала ему руку, и они пошли рядом, 
прибавляя хода, и, чем быстрее, тем крепче она сжимала его руку” (18:33). Kitty’s leaning 
on Levin’s arm (their touch) as they skate together makes both of them more confident: Kitty 
feels more secure in skating, and Levin gains confidence in himself. “— С вами я бы скорее 
выучилась, я почему-то уверена в вас, — сказала она ему. — И я уверен в себе, когда вы 
опираетесь на меня” (18:33). As they move faster, Kitty unconsciously presses Levin’s hand, 
which suggests not only Kitty’s fear of skating but also her unconscious trust in Levin (“я 
почему-то уверена в вас”) though she is currently infatuated with Vronskii. In addition, their 
apparently well-coordinated movements (kinesthetic perception) as they skate together and touch 
one another contribute to the impression of their inherent unity and anticipate this unity in the 
future.       
Kitty’s infatuation with Vronskii temporarily severs their bond (which otherwise seems 
to be growing, given that Kitty presses Levin’s arm with an increasing strength). Tolstoi 
demonstrates their severed bond through their interrupted touch. When Levin hints at his love for 
Kitty, she immediately becomes alienated, severs their touch, and sends him away to see her 
governess Mlle Linon, who, she somewhat naughtily remarks, “loves” him:   
И действительно, как только он произнес эти слова, вдруг, как солнце зашло за 
тучи, лицо ее утратило всю свою ласковость, и Левин узнал знакомую игру ее лица, 
означавшую усилие мысли: на гладком лбу ее вспухла морщинка. […]  
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— Вы не видели М-llе Linon? … Подите к ней, она так вас любит. (18:33) 
 
Panicking, Levin alludes to his love again, but the reiterated confession alienates Kitty even 
further. Pretending not to hear, or truly not hearing, she taps her foot twice, as if stumbling, and 
skates away: “Не слыхала ли она его слов или не хотела слышать, но она как бы 
спотыкнулась, два раза стукнув ножкой, и поспешно покатилась прочь от него” (18:35). 
Tolstoi’s depiction of her stumbling “как бы/as if” makes it unclear whether Kitty moves 
accidentally or on purpose, just as it is unclear whether she does not hear or does not want to 
hear Levin’s confession. Tolstoi’s ambiguity about Kitty’s behavior may reflect not only Levin’s 
uncertainty, but also Kitty’s own embarassement and renewed frustration when Levin, whom she 
loves only as a friend, hints at his love for her again. Whether or not it is deliberate, Kitty’s 
stumbling counteracts their smooth and confident skating together, dissociating her from Levin 
and reflecting her temporary emotional estrangment from him. Kitty’s love for Vronskii severs 
not only their touch, as in the earlier episode, but also their synchronized movements. 
However, despite skating away, Kitty in fact continues to look at Levin secretly from afar 
with evident sympathy, which suggests the internal connection against the backdrop of their 
physical alienation: “«Славный, милый», подумала Кити в это время, выходя из домика с 
М-llе Linon и глядя на него с улыбкой тихой ласки, как на любимого брата. […] «…Я 
знаю, что я люблю не его; но мне всё-таки весело с ним, и он такой славный” (18:35–36). 
Kitty’s confusion between Vronskii’s pursuit and her implicit love for Levin are evident from her 
use of partitive negation: “she loves” but “not him”: “[я] знаю, что я люблю не его.” The 
partitive negation renders her expression as an affirmation (“я люблю/I love”) rather than a 
negation (“я не люблю/I don’t love”), anticipating her love for Levin in the future.  
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Kitty’s partitive negation of her affection for Levin echoes her skating towards him and 
her cousin in the earlier-mentioned scene. While stretching out her arms towards her cousin, she 
keeps looking at Levin, and actually leans on his arm shortly thereafter when they skate together. 
One could say that Kitty loves (not) Levin, just as she skates (not) towards him. Kitty’s partitive 
confession of her love for Levin, like her partitive skating in Levin’s direction, anticipates the 
reunion after their separation. 
Tolstoi emphasizes Kitty and Levin’s internal connection even at the very moment when 
she is about to reject Levin’s marriage proposal. As was previously discussed, Merleau-Ponty’s 
theory suggests that two people entwined into a single “intercorporeal” whole should be able to 
feel one another’s pain as their own. When Kitty decides to reject Levin, she realizes that her 
decision “concerns” (“касается,” which in Russian also means “touches”) Levin as well as 
herself. Although “touch” is suggested only indirectly, through Tolstoi’s phrasing, it seems to be 
imbued with haptic meaning as well. The reference to “touch” (“касается”) highlights Levin and 
Kitty’s “intercorporeal” unity, which is evident from the context of the episode. Hurting Levin, 
Kitty seems to feel his pain, empathizes with him, and rejects him reluctantly, as if out of 
necessity: “Тут только она поняла, что вопрос касается не ее одной, — с кем она будет 
счастлива и кого она любит, — но что сию минуту она должна оскорбить человека, 
которого она любит. И оскорбить жестоко... За что? За то, что он, милый, любит ее, 
влюблен в нее. Но, делать нечего, так нужно, так должно” (18:51–52). Kitty seems to take 
Levin’s position and judge her rejection from his point of view—as a cruel and painful insult, 
which he does not deserve (“оскорбить жестоко... За что?”). Their mutual love is the bond that 
connects them, so the pain that she is about to cause Levin hurts her as well. While she uses 
partitive negation to describe her feelings for Levin at the skating rink (“я люблю не его” 
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emphasis added; 18:36–36), she uses an affirmative statement when about to reject him (“она 
должна оскорбить человека, которого она любит” emphasis added; 18:51–52). Kitty’s 
susceptibility to Levin’s pain anticipates his susceptibility to Kitty’s, as Levin later feels that in 
hurting Kitty he hurts himself (discussed later in this chapter).    
 Although Tolstoi emphasizes Kitty’s innocence, she is not devoid of sensuality; this is 
captured not only through Levin’s vision of her but also through Kitty’s own haptic sensations. 
For all her innocence and truthfulness, Kitty is a young coquette, as she herself thinks at the 
skating rink: “«И неужели я виновата, неужели я сделала что-нибудь дурное? Они говорят: 
кокетство” 18:35–36). Kitty enjoys being the center of male admiration so much that she 
recognizes the powerful “intoxication” that Vronskii’s admiration arouses in Anna at the ball, 
since Kitty herself has apparently experienced it in the past: “Она [Кити] увидала в ней [Анне] 
столь знакомую ей самой черту возбуждения от успеха. Она видела, что Анна пьяна вином 
возбуждаемого ею восхищения. Она знала это чувство и знала его признаки и видела их на 
Анне” (18:86).   
Tolstoi portrays Kitty’s sensuality through her cutaneous sensations as opposed to her 
kinesthetic perception. At the ball, Kitty enjoys a cold, marble-like feeling on her naked 
shoulders and arms: “В обнаженных плечах и руках Кити чувствовала холодную 
мраморность, чувство, которое она особенно любила” (18:83). Since Kitty perceives not an 
external phenomenon—for example, the chilly air that cools her skin—but her skin itself, the 
sensation appears to have an autoerotic quality. Her awareness of her own body reflects her 
awareness of her physical attractiveness.  
Kitty’s autoerotic cold, cutaneous sensations, especially those compared with marble, 
seem to relate her to certain of Tolstoi’s other female characters, among whom cold, cutaneous 
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references suggest moral corruption. For instance, the reference to Kitty’s naked skin and its 
marble coldness is reminiscent of Hélène Kuragina (War and Peace), whose skin Tolstoi 
describes as if made of cold and rigid marble. The stone associates her with an antique sculpture, 
conveying her physical rather than spiritual beauty, and is itself associated with her explicitly 
dissolute conduct and her morally degenerate personality. In “The Death of Ivan Il’ich,” Ivan’s 
daughter is also described as sensing her cold shoulders when she hurries off to a ball while 
ignoring her father’s illness and suffering. Like Hélène, Kitty’s sensations are marble-like, and 
like Ivan’s daughter, the coldness in Kitty’s shoulders is associated with attending a ball.  
Nonetheless, despite haptic similarities with some of Tolstoi’s morally corrupted females, 
and despite the parallel between Kitty’s self-admiration and Anna’s “intoxication,” Kitty’s 
autoerotic sensations are, in fact, innocent, just as is her sensuality. They can be seen as the 
manifestation of the “fire of life” within, which eventually leads her to marry Levin and give 
birth to their child. Indeed, elsewhere Tolstoi directly associates Kitty’s awareness of her beauty 
and attractiveness with her “fire of life.” Comparing Kitty to her kind but virtually asensual 
friend Varen’ka, whom she meets at a German spa, Tolstoi writes that men should not find 
Varen’ka attractive because she lacks what Kitty has in overabundance: the “self-awareness of 
her attractiveness” and the “concealed fire of life”: “ей недоставало того, чего слишком много 
было в Кити — сдержанного огня жизни и сознания своей привлекательности” (18:227). 
Kitty’s sensuality is inherently good because it urges her to create a family, something that 
Varen’ka eventually fails to do.    
   Kitty’s physical illness after she non-verbally confesses her love for Vronskii at the ball 
can be interpreted as an expression of haptic memory, which corroborates her moral purity. 
Kitty’s haptic memory is associated with a sense of guilt, as it is for the other characters, but the 
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manifestation of her haptic memory differs. Stiva ignores his sexual debauchery and only feels 
guilty for his inappropriate smile. While his entire body has participated in amoral activity, he 
only blames his relatively insignificant smile/mouth. The relative proportions of his fault (his 
body) and his guilt (his smile/mouth) suggest his limited moral sense. Vronskii experiences no 
guilt whatsoever: his leg, hurt in the race, evokes no recollection of his causing his horse’s death. 
Anna’s sense of guilt rightfully embraces her entire body (Vronskii’s kisses on her skin), 
suggesting that her sense of guilt is equal to her “crime.” This would seem to indicate that she 
has strong moral sense; however, that moral sense is distorted by her passion, and it destroys 
Anna instead of leading her to redemption. Unlike these characters, Kitty committed no moral 
“crime,” but her entire body suffers, suggesting an amplified moral sense. Neither her older 
sister, Dolly, nor Varen’ka, considers Kitty’s non-verbal love confession to be a crime. However, 
Kitty, because of her youthful inexperience and moral purity, judges and torments herself with 
guilt and shame. Kitty’s loving gaze of Vronskii can hardly be considered a crime of the flesh, 
since no physical “fall” took place. Perhaps it is because her flesh is uncorrupted that she is 
susceptible to moral pangs more than the other, corrupted, characters.  
Kitty is temporarily influenced by Varen’ka’s selfless but dispassionate service to others. 
This allows Kitty to forget her past and facilitates her recovery from her illness. Kitty’s physical 
and emotional recovery culminates in Prince Shcherbatskii’s visit to the spa and the luxurious 
dinner in open air (nature) that he hosts. Although the abundance of food and merriment might 
remind one of Stiva’s feasts, it does not suggest Shcherbatskii’s moral corruption. To the 
contrary, Kitty’s father’s feast celebrates natural life, with its genuine vitality. The fact that 
Prince Shcherbatskii unites people in merriment with abundant treats, presents, and good cheer, 
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making even Varen’ka laugh (something Kitty has never seen before), reasserts the virtuousness 
of the event: 
Под дрожащею кругами тенью листьев, у покрытого белою скатертью и 
уставленного кофейниками, хлебом, маслом, сыром, холодною дичью стола, сидела 
княгиня в наколке с лиловыми лентами, раздавая чашки и тартинки. На другом 
конце сидел князь, плотно кушая и громко и весело разговаривая. Князь разложил 
подле себя свои покупки, резные сундучки, бирюльки, разрезные ножики всех 
сортов, которых он накупил кучу на всех водах, и раздаривал их всем, в том числе 
Лисхен, служанке и хозяину, с которым он шутил на своем комическом дурном 
немецком языке, уверяя его, что не воды вылечили Кити, но его отличные кушанья, 
в особенности суп с черносливом. […] и Варенька, чего еще Кити никогда не 
видала, раскисала от слабого, но сообщающегося смеха, который возбуждали в ней 
шутки князя. (18:246)             
 
Although Kitty remains puzzled by the clash of the two worlds—her father’s natural passion for 
life and Varen’ka’s dispassionate and self-denying service (“Она не могла разрешить задачи, 
которую ей невольно задал отец своим веселым взглядом на ее друзей и на ту жизнь, 
которую она так полюбила” 18:246), she eventually breaks away from Varen’ka’s lifestyle, as 
it is inconsistent with her inherently passionate personality.  
 Kitty’s passionate nature and subsequent “breakup” with Varen’ka’s lifestyle manifest 
themselves in interrupted, indirect touch during an incident involving an umbrella that takes 
place shortly after the feast. Kitty contrasts herself with Varen’ka, saying that while Varen’ka 
lives by the “rules,” selflessly serving others out of feelings of moral duty, Kitty herself lives by 
the “heart,” that is—emotionally and impulsively: “— Всё не то. Я не могу иначе жить, как по 
сердцу, а вы живете по правилам. Я вас полюбила просто, а вы, верно, только затем, чтобы 
спасти меня, научить меня!” (18:249). Insisting on her right to be passionate in contrast to 
Varen’ka’s moral but dispassionate personality, Kitty tears an umbrella from Varen’ka’s hands, 
opening and closing it so vigorously that she breaks a spring: 
— И по делом мне, и по делом мне! — быстро заговорила Кити, схватывая 
зонтик из рук Вареньки и глядя мимо глаз своего друга. 
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— По делом за то, что всё это было притворство, потому что это всё 
выдуманное, а не от сердца. Какое мне дело было до чужого человека? И вот 
вышло, что я причиной ссоры и что я делала то, чего меня никто не просил. Оттого 
что всё притворство! притворство! притворство!... 
— Ах, как глупо, гадко! Не было мне никакой нужды... Всё притворство! — 
говорила она, открывая и закрывая зонтик. […] 
Варенька в шляпе и с зонтиком в руках сидела у стола, рассматривая пружину, 
которую сломала Кити. (18:248–49) 
 
Since an umbrella can only function properly if all of its mechanisms are well-coordinated, 
Varen’ka’s umbrella seems to epitomize her well-organized lifestyle of “rules.” That Kitty 
breaks the spring in Varen’ka’s umbrella could be read as her dissociation from Varen’ka’s well-
organized but dispassionate lifestyle. The fact that Kitty severs only their indirect contact, 
mediated through the umbrella, and not their direct, physical contact, points to the women’s 
persistent unity despite the differences in their values and personalities. Although Kitty cannot 
live as Varen’ka does, she loves her as a friend, so their opposing lifestyles do not undermine the 
unity of their friendship.     
During his separation from Kitty, Levin also undergoes a spiritual transformation. The 
parallel between their lives is evidence of their implicit unity, anticipating their reunion. At his 
estate, where he moves after Kitty rejects him, he occupies himself with manual work. He, like 
Tolstoi himself, considers this to be the best cure for melancholy (“Arbeitscur” in German means 
to “cure by the means of work”), consistent with his predominating kinesthetic form of haptic 
perception:  
«Нужно физическое движенье, а то мой характер решительно портится», 
подумал он и решился косить, как ни неловко это будет ему перед братом и 
народом. 
— Отлично! Ты не поверишь, какой это режим полезный против всякой дури. Я 
хочу обогатить медицину новым термином: Arbeitscur. (18:262, 272) 
 
Because kinesthetic perception does not engage direct contact between bodies, which 
Aristotle considers potentially sexual, Levin’s hard, manual work seems to sublimate his 
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corporeality, thus immersing him in the texture of life rather than alienating him from it. A 
mowing scene exemplifies this notion. The way in which Levin works with the peasant Titus 
indicates his ability to connect with people through kinesthetic activity, without direct touch. 
Tolstoi shows that Levin strains his muscles and challenges his endurance as he tries to match 
the peasant who heads the mowing: “Он ничего не думал, ничего не желал, кроме того, 
чтобы не отстать от мужиков и как можно лучше сработать” (18:265), “Его удовольствие 
отравилось только тем, что ряд его был нехорош. «Буду меньше махать рукой, больше 
всем туловищем»” (18:265). Likewise, Titus announces a break exactly at the moment when 
Levin physically cannot continue his work, as if he senses Levin’s fatigue, as if their physical 
states are so perfectly coordinated. Although Levin and Titus do not make physical contact, they 
seem to be inwardly connected through their work (or, kinesthetic perception):  
Он [Levin] чувствовал, что махает из последних сил, и решился просить Тита 
остановиться. Но в это самое время Тит сам остановился и, нагнувшись, взял 
травы, отер косу и стал точить. Левин расправился и, вздохнув, оглянулся. …  
… Левин шел за ним [Titus], стараясь не отставать, и ему становилось всё 
труднее и труднее: наступала минута, когда, он чувствовал, у него не остается 
более сил, но в это самое время Тит останавливался и точил. (18:264–65) 
 
Through physical work, Levin is not only united with human community (the world of 
the peasantry), but also achieves a kind of “incorporeal” experience. When Levin achieves a 
level of dexterity allowing him to work well without thinking about his movements, he 
experiences a particular joy and forgets about his body, so much so that it seems to him that he 
does not move the scythe but that it comes to move by itself:   
Левин потерял всякое сознание времени и решительно не знал, поздно или рано 
теперь. В его работе стала происходить теперь перемена, доставлявшая ему 
огромное наслаждение. В середине его работы на него находили минуты, во время 
которых он забывал то, что делал, ему становилось легко, и в эти же самые минуты 
ряд его выходил почти так же ровен и хорош, как и у Тита. […] 
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… и чаще и чаще приходили те минуты бессознательного состояния, когда 
можно было не думать о том, что делаешь. Коса резала сама собой. Это были 
счастливые минуты. (18:265–67) 
 
The way in which Levin forgets about his body resembles young Tolstoi’s record of his own 
experience, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, when he felt that he lost the sensation of 
his body during prayer (“я не чувствовал плоти, я был — один дух” 46:62). This quote 
indicates that young Tolstoi equates the spiritual with the incorporeal, which is not the case for 
the older Tolstoi of Anna Karenina. Although Levin’s forgetting his body brings to mind 
Tolstoi’s earlier depiction of “not feeling his flesh” during his exaltation, Levin’s experience is 
manifestly corporeal. His exaltation not only originates in the corporeal realm of hard physical 
work, but also results in an increased awareness of his body. When Levin loses awareness of his 
body’s movements, he becomes particularly aware of his body’s vitality (“всё сознающее себя, 
полное жизни тело”): “Чем долее Левин косил, тем чаще и чаще он чувствовал минуты 
забытья, при котором уже не руки махали косой, а сама коса двигала за собой всё 
сознающее себя, полное жизни тело, и, как бы по волшебству, без мысли о ней, работа 
правильная и отчетливая делалась сама собой. Это были самые блаженные минуты” 
(18:267).  
Levin’s simultaneously present and absent awareness of his body recalls Anna’s 
oppressive bodily awareness. Intoxicated with opium, she falls asleep without losing her 
awareness of self: “после второго приема опиума к утру заснула тяжелым, неполным сном, 
во всё время которого она не переставала чувствовать себя” (19:332). Although Tolstoi does 
not discuss Anna’s body directly in this scene, the references to her “heavy” sleep and continual 
“feeling” suggest Anna’s not only mental but also physical experience. While Levin loses the 
sense of his body while doing hard physical work, Anna cannot rid herself of her awareness of 
  
155 
her body even in sleep, when it should happen naturally. The contrast reveals Anna’s improper 
and Levin’s proper ways of being in the world. While Anna’s indulgence in carnal pleasures 
(cutaneous and tactile) leads to the fatal intertwinement of self and body—and eventually the 
destruction of life in the body—Levin’s manual work (kinesthetic perception) results in his 
embodiment of natural vitality. While Anna is attached only to her body, Levin connects his 
body with the natural world, embodying life’s force as he partakes in it.       
 Although Levin’s dominating haptic perception is kinesthetic, he does experience 
cutaneous sensations as well. The cold drops of rain on Levin’s hot, sweaty shoulders give him a 
pleasurable and joyful sensation during his work. His sweat cools his body, and the sun burning 
on his back, his head, and his arm exposed by a rolled-up sleeve consolidate his strength and 
resilience:      
Не понимая, что это и откуда, в середине работы он вдруг испытал приятное 
ощущение холода по жарким вспотевшим плечам. Он взглянул на небо во время 
натачиванья косы. Набежала низкая, тяжелая туча, и шел крупный дождь. Одни 
мужики пошли к кафтанам и надели их; другие, точно так же как Левин, только 
радостно пожимали плечами под приятным освежением. (18:265) 
В самый жар косьба показалась ему не так трудна. Обливавший его пот 
прохлаждал его, а солнце, жегшее спину, голову и засученную по локоть руку, 
придавало крепость и упорство в работе […] (18:266–67)  
 
The contact with the world of nature (rather than another person’s body) seems to sublimate 
Levin’s cutaneous sensations. Levin and nature’s reciprocal physical contact reflects Levin’s 
“entwinement” with the world of nature, his immersion in it. While Levin touches the world of 
nature through his manual work, nature reciprocates, touching Levin with heat and rain and thus 
assisting him.  
This “entwinement” is also reflected in Levin’s participation in nature’s creative forces, 
which Tolstoi equates with creating life itself. Looking over the field at dinnertime, Levin is 
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stunned by how the landscape has changed because of his and the peasants’ work, noting that it 
looks completely new:   
Левин оглянулся вокруг себя и не узнал места: так всё переменилось. Огромное 
пространство луга было скошено и блестело особенным, новым блеском, со своими 
уже пахнущими рядами, на вечерних косых лучах солнца. И окошенные кусты у 
реки, и сама река, прежде не видная, а теперь блестящая сталью в своих извивах, и 
движущийся и поднимающийся народ, и крутая стена травы недокошенного места 
луга, и ястреба, вившиеся над оголенным лугом, — всё это было совершенно ново. 
(18:267–68)    
  
In his “Confession,” written shortly after Anna Karenina, Tolstoi expresses his belief that the 
common folk collectively bear creative forces, co-creating life: “действия … трудящегося 
народа, творящего жизнь” (23:40). As such, the peasants’ work in the field participates in the 
regenerative forces inherent in nature. Levin’s participation in the peasants’ work not only unites 
him with the peasants but also intertwines him with nature’s inherently transformative renewal, 
which nature thus lends him in turn. Levin’s refuge in physical work transforms him and cures 
his sorrow after the emotional distress of Kitty’s rejection. 
 Levin’s long-range visual experiences, which conclude his transformation, not only 
emphasize his transition’s spiritual nature (in keeping with Plato’s hierarchy of the senses) but 
also associate him with Kitty, whom he notices on the road the morning after a night of 
meditation on life’s true meaning. Looking at the clouds in the night sky, Levin realizes that his 
views on life have changed as seamlessly as the clouds have changed their shapes:   
«Как красиво! — подумал он, глядя на странную, точно перламутровую раковину 
из белых барашков-облачков, остановившуюся над самою головой его на середине 
неба. — Как всё прелестно в эту прелестную ночь! И когда успела образоваться эта 
раковина? Недавно я смотрел на небо, и на нем ничего не было — только две белые 
полосы. Да, вот так-то незаметно изменились и мои взгляды на жизнь!» (18:291–92)  
    
While Levin looks at the sky, Tolstoi emphasizes Kitty’s far-sightedness (“дальнозоркость,” as 
Tolstoi refers to Kitty’s eyes elsewhere). While travelling in the carriage, Kitty looks at the dawn 
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on the horizon. Her vision seems to be so far-ranged that she does not even notice Levin, who 
apparently walks by in close proximity: “Светлая и задумчивая, вся исполненная изящной и 
сложной внутренней, чуждой Левину жизни, она смотрела через него на зарю восхода” 
(18:292).   
The scene concludes with a reference to their reciprocal gaze. When Kitty has passed by 
Levin, her carriage nearly disappearing in the distance, it seems to Levin that she casts her 
“truthful” eyes on him, recognizes him, and smiles: “В то самое мгновение, как виденье это 
уж исчезало, правдивые глаза взглянули на него. Она узнала его, и удивленная радость 
осветила ее лицо” (18:292). Kitty has no recollection of Levin on the road (as it turns out in a 
later scene that will feature their confessions of love), so he apparently has only imagined their 
mutual gaze. Even so, the visual connection, even if only imagined by him, concludes his inner 
transformation, as he realizes that Kitty is the key to his understanding the mystery of life and 
thus the answer to his meditation:  
Только одни на свете были эти глаза. Только одно было на свете существо, 
способное сосредоточивать для него весь свет и смысл жизни. Это была она. Это 
была Кити. […] Там только, в этой быстро удалявшейся и переехавшей на другую 
сторону дороги карете, там только была возможность разрешения столь 
мучительно тяготившей его в последнее время загадки его жизни. (18:292).  
 
While Anna’s love for Vronskii alienates her from the world, Levin’s love for Kitty not 
only immerses him in the world but also enriches his perception of it. At first, when Kitty leaves 
his sight, Levin feels alienated: the road, the fields, and the village seem empty to him, and he 
himself feels estranged from everything: “Лай собак показал, что карета [Кити] проехала и 
деревню, — и остались вокруг пустые поля, деревня впереди и он сам, одинокий и чужой 
всему, одиноко идущий по заброшенной большой дороге” (18:293). However, he then 
notices a mysterious transformation in the sky and feels as if it returns his questioning gaze: 
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“Небо поголубело и просияло и с тою же нежностью, но и с тою же недосягаемостью 
отвечало на его вопрошающий взгляд” (18:293). The anthropomorphic qualities of the sky’s 
“gaze”—its “tenderness” and “inaccessibility” in the current scene—evoke the image of Kitty, 
whom Levin loves but who has rejected him. Since Levin had not perceived the sky as either 
“tender” or “inaccessible” in his preceding meditation, the referential phrase “с тою же/with the 
same” (“с тою же нежностью, но и с тою же недосягаемостью”) seems to be attributed to 
Kitty’s own tenderness and inaccessibility. So, Kitty enriches his perception of the world of 
nature. What is more, although the sky’s “gaze” communicates its distance and even 
inaccessibility to Levin, it nonetheless returns his own, revealing Levin’s implicit unity with 
both the world of nature and with Kitty. The sky-Kitty’s returned gaze to Levin suggests that 
Levin’s love for Kitty immerses him in the world, even as he believes that Kitty is “inaccessible” 
to him. In addition, Levin had identified Kitty with the sun in the earlier skating scene, their first 
scene together in the novel. When Levin confesses his romantic interest to her at the rink, she 
becomes upset with him, and Levin compares her to a sun hiding in the clouds. The “tenderness” 
of the sky, which now seems to return Levin’s gaze, suggests hope for—and indeed anticipates—
the couple’s re-union.    
Tolstoi emphasizes Levin and Kitty’s enduring connection in the scene leading to their 
confession of love. When Levin and Kitty meet at a party, a year after their “encounter” on the 
road, they feel a “mysterious” (“таинственный”) bond growing between them: “У них шел 
свой разговор с Левиным, и не разговор, а какое-то таинственное общение, которое с 
каждою минутой всё ближе связывало их” (18:411). Their bond is revealed in Levin’s ability 
to sense Kitty’s feelings, evocative of the way in which she had anticipated and empathized with 
his pain when about to reject his proposal. Tolstoi portrays Levin and Kitty’s love not so much as 
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a desire for physical closeness, but primarily as a deep form of empathy: the ability not only to 
understand but also to feel the other’s emotional state as if it were one’s own, which is consistent 
with Merleau-Ponty’s conception of “intercorporeality.” Tolstoi portrays Levin and Kitty’s love 
for one another as empathy, which, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term, “intertwines” them into a single 
whole by allowing them to feel the sensations of another.  
Levin and Kitty’s confession of love reinforces the impression of their “mysterious 
communication,” as previously mentioned (“таинственное общение” 18:411). They reveal their 
love for one another virtually without words while playing secrétaire—a game requiring the 
almost impossible task of recovering the other player’s message from only the first letters of 
each written word. The fact that Levin and Kitty intuit long and complex messages from scarce 
fragments produces the impression of near-telepathic communication: 
Не было никакой вероятности, чтоб она могла понять эту сложную фразу; но он 
посмотрел на нее с таким видом, что жизнь его зависит от того, поймет ли она эти 
слова. 
Она взглянула на него серьезно, потом оперла нахмуренный лоб на руку и стала 
читать. Изредка она взглядывала на него, спрашивая у него взглядом: «то ли это, 
что я думаю?». […] 
В разговоре их всё было сказано; было сказано, что она любит его и что скажет 
отцу и матери, что завтра он приедет утром. (18:418–19) 
 
The fact that Levin and Kitty can guess one another’s messages suggests that their love for one 
another creates an inner bond so powerful that they can not only sense one another’s feelings but 
even guess one another’s thoughts—in specific words.  
  In addition, Levin and Kitty’s mutual confession engages their kinesthetic perception 
(writing on the table) and vision (looking intensely into one another’s eyes), along with a couple 
of fragmented phrases, but it excludes any direct touch between them. After their confession, 
Levin and Kitty do not touch (at least, not within the framework of the novel) until the next 
morning when Levin arrives to propose, emphasizing the purity of their love. It is worth 
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mentioning that Vronskii and Anna’s confession of love for one another at Princess Betsy’s party 
ends in their physical contact, with manifestly sexual overtones. Vronskii feels Anna’s gaze and 
touch burn him through; Anna is so excited that she seems to see her own eyes shining in the 
darkness, presumably envisaging their romance.     
While Anna’s love for Vronskii leads her to read hostility and hatred in other people, 
revealing her growing isolation in the scenes before her suicide, Levin’s love for Kitty allows 
him to see all people as “nice and good” (“добрые славные”) and thus immerses him in human 
community: “Не в одной этой комнате, но во всем мире для него существовали только он, 
получивший для себя огромное значение и важность, и она. Он чувствовал себя на высоте, 
от которой кружилась голова, и там где-то внизу, далеко, были все эти добрые славные 
Каренины, Облонские и весь мир” (18:406). In contrast to Anna, Levin even changes his 
opinions about people whom he previously did not like, such as, for instance, Turovtsyn. Levin 
dislikes him until Kitty tells him about Turovtsyn’s generous help for Dolly when her children 
were ill. Looking again at Turovtsyn, Levin suddenly begins to see him as good, and cannot 
understand why he did not notice this goodness before:  
— Не дурной, а ничтожный. 
— И неправда! И поскорей не думайте больше так! — сказала Кити. — Я тоже 
была о нем очень низкого мнения, но это, это — премилый и удивительно добрый 
человек. Сердце у него золотое. 
 … Левин еще раз взглянул на Туровцына и удивился, как он прежде не 
понимал всей прелести этого человека. 
— Виноват, виноват, и никогда не буду больше дурно думать о людях! — 
весело сказал он, искренно высказывая то, что он теперь чувствовал. (18:412–13) 
 
Tolstoi’s reference to “height” in describing Levin’s exaltation does not seem accidental. 
As previously discussed, Plato describes the quest for true knowledge as the ascent from a cave 
to the earth’s surface, where a person can see the sun. While Anna’s passionate delirium on the 
train ends in her feeling as if she is “falling,” Levin’s love for Kitty makes him feel as if he is 
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soaring. Although Levin idealizes people, and therefore also sees reality in a somewhat distorted 
way, Tolstoi’s reference to “height” suggests that Levin’s perception of people as “good” is 
correct from a spiritual perspective, since it facilitates his connection with human community.         
Finally, Levin’s love for Kitty causes him not merely to idealize the world, but rather to 
see how all seemingly isolated things in the world are, in fact, intertwined into a harmonious 
whole. On his way to Kitty’s house to make his official proposal, Levin experiences a moment of 
perfect sensory harmony, when visual, aural, kinesthetic, and olfactory sensations occur 
simultaneously in a single act of perception: 
И что он видел тогда, того после уже он никогда не видал. В особенности дети, 
шедшие в школу, голуби сизые, слетевшие с крыши на тротуар, и сайки, 
посыпанные мукой, которые выставила невидимая рука, тронули его. Эти сайки, 
голуби и два мальчика были неземные существа. Всё это случилось в одно время: 
мальчик подбежал к голубю и улыбаясь взглянул на Левина; голубь затрещал 
крыльями и отпорхнул, блестя на солнце между дрожащими в воздухе пылинками 
снега, а из окошка пахнуло духом печеного хлеба, и выставились сайки. Всё это 
вместе было так необычайно хорошо, что Левин засмеялся и заплакал от радости. 
(18:424) 
 
Tolstoi juxtaposes two versions of the scene: the first as it actually took place, and then Levin’s 
perception of it. First, Tolstoi only introduces the participants of the scene: the boys going to 
school, the grey-blue pigeons flying down from the roof to the road, and the rolls appearing in 
the window. But then, Tolstoi describes the way in which Levin perceives the scene, capturing 
Levin’s sensory impressions. Tolstoi creates a series of kinesthetic, visual, aural, and olfactory 
images flowing seamlessly into one another, stitching discrete impressions into a whole and thus 
emphasizing the totality of Levin’s experience. A boy runs up to a pigeon (kinesthetic image) 
and glances at Levin (visual image), as the pigeon flaps its wings (aural) fluttering off 
(kinesthetic image) and sparkling in the sun amidst the air (visual), which is trembling with snow 
dust (kinesthetic and visual). Then, Levin smells the baked bread (olfactory) and the rolls appear 
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(visual) in the window. The phrases “всё это случилось” and “всё это вместе” emphasize the 
unity of the phenomena described and the wholeness of Levin’s experience. For Levin, a simple 
street scene becomes a sublime spiritual moment. The rolls seem to appear in the window as if 
put there by an “invisible hand,” anticipating the scene at the end of the novel when Levin stares 
at the sky, thinking of the divine order of the world and imagining the stars to be thrown by 
somebody’s “dexterous” (“меткою рукой”) and, one can infer, divine and invisible, hand. Levin 
also perceives the rolls, the pigeons, and the two boys as “unearthly” spiritual beings. Levin’s 
love for Kitty harmonizes his perception of the world, intertwining seemingly unrelated incidents 
into a single event.  
Even though Levin perceives the event as unearthly, he is not alienated from it, but rather 
partakes. The street scene “touches” Levin (“дети, шедшие в школу, голуби сизые, слетевшие 
с крыши на тротуар, и сайки, посыпанные мукой, которые выставила невидимая рука, 
тронули его”), and the boy who initiates the action by running up to the pigeon includes Levin 
in the scene by looking at him, incorporating him in harmonious unity. The boy’s glance makes 
Levin a part of the scene rather than an external observer. Because Levin regards the world as 
harmonious, he himself partakes in its harmony. Although Levin observes the scene through his 
long-range senses of vision, hearing, and smell, he is not alienated, but, on the contrary, is 
immersed. The scene “touches” Levin. While of course Tolstoi means that Levin is touched (or 
moved) emotionally, in the context of the discussion of touch in the novel, this “emotional” 
touch confirms Levin’s immersion in the scene’s harmonious wholeness. In addition, the 
“invisible hand” seems to bear a double meaning: it is both the hand of a person in the house, 
whom Levin cannot see from the street and who puts the rolls in the window, and the invisible 
hand of the divine force that seems to be present, unseen, and inspires Levin’s exaltation. Once 
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again, Levin attains unity and integration not by touching, but, on the contrary, by maintaining 
distance (perceiving it through vision, hearing, and smell, without touch).  Paradoxically, this 
does not alienate him from the world but entwines him with it, inspiring him to perceive reality 
as a harmonious, inclusive whole.   
When Levin comes to see Kitty and propose to her, they touch and kiss: “Она сделала 
всё, что могла, — она подбежала к нему и отдалась вся, робея и радуясь. Он обнял ее и 
прижал губы к ее рту, искавшему его поцелуя” (18:426). Unlike Anna and Vronskii, Levin 
and Kitty’s touch is inclusive and uniting, as their love. Levin and Kitty’s love binds their entire 
family into a single whole, entwining Levin with Kitty’s family members. When Kitty’s mother 
sees how Levin and Kitty hold hands, she runs up to Levin, embraces his head, kisses him, and 
wets his cheeks with tears: “Княгиня, увидав их, задышала часто и тотчас же заплакала и 
тотчас же засмеялась и таким энергическим шагом, какого не ждал Левин, подбежала к 
ним и, обняв голову Левину, поцеловала его и обмочила его щеки слезами” (18:426). Then, 
when Kitty’s father embraces Levin, Levin feels an inexplicable tenderness for the old count, 
whom he used to perceive as a “stranger” (“чужой”) in the past:  
— Я давно, всегда этого желал! — сказал он, взяв за руку Левина и притягивая 
его к себе. — Я еще тогда, когда эта ветренница вздумала... 
— Папа! — вскрикнула Кити и закрыла ему рот руками. 
— Ну, не буду! — сказал он. — Я очень, очень... ра... Ах! как я глуп... 
Он обнял Кити, поцеловал ее лицо, руку, опять лицо и перекрестил ее. 
И Левина охватило новое чувство любви к этому прежде чуждому ему 
человеку, старому князю, когда он смотрел, как Кити долго и нежно целовала его 
мясистую руку. (18:426) 
 
Stiva’s unfaithfulness fragments his family and makes its members “чужие/strangers” to one 
another. Likewise, Anna’s passion for Vronskii alienates her from other people, severing her 
physical contact with them. Levin and Kitty’s love, by contrast, intertwines former “strangers” 
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into a new family, including new people into their tactile circle and thus their “intercorproeal” 
whole.    
 Levin and Kitty’s love not only unites former strangers, but even merges them into one 
“intercorporeal” whole, or “one flesh” (“плоть едину”) as Tolstoi’s representation of their 
wedding ceremony suggests. The Christian sacrament of marriage presupposed that the wedded 
spouses become “one flesh” (“плоть едину”): “сего ради оставит человек отца и матерь и 
прилепится к жене, будет два в плоть едину” (19:24). Tolstoi suggests that Levin and Kitty 
become “one flesh” not because of any sexual (physical) attraction, but because God has brought 
them together and bound them with love: “Расстоящияся собравый в соединение и союз 
любве положивый” (19:19). Therefore, Tolstoi shows that Levin and Kitty’s “intercorporeal” 
whole is incorporeal in origin, commanded and sanctified by God.  
Tolstoi focuses on Levin and Kitty’s hands during the wedding ceremony. Levin takes 
Kitty’s hand (her right hand in his) and leads her around the lectern (“— Берите за руку невесту 
и ведите, — сказал шафер Левину” 19:17). The gesture of holding hands, which is then 
reinforced by their exchange of the rings, signifies their union, their “merging” into “one flesh” 
sanctified by God. It is true that Levin and Kitty’s feelings and thoughts differ during the 
ceremony. Levin listens to the words of the service carefully, reflects on them, and finds 
correspondences to his own feelings, fearing his inability to be a good husband and pleaing to 
God for help. To the contrary, Kitty can hardly hear the words, delighted with her life’s long-
anticipated change. While Levin believes that Kitty shares his feelings, she, as Tolstoi 
emphasizes, does not:  
«Расстоящияся собравый в соединение и союз любве положивый» — как 
глубокомысленны эти слова и как соответственны тому, что чувствуешь в эту 
минуту! — думал Левин. — Чувствует ли она то же, что я?» 
И, оглянувшись, он встретил ее взгляд. 
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И по выражению этого взгляда он заключил, что она понимала то же, что и он. 
Но это было неправда; она совсем почти не понимала слов службы и даже не 
слушала их во время обручения. Она не могла слушать и понимать их: так сильно 
было одно то чувство, которое наполняло ее душу и всё более и более усиливалось. 
Чувство это была радость полного совершения того, что уже полтора месяца 
совершилось в ее душе и что в продолжение всех этих шести недель радовало и 
мучало ее. (19:19)   
 
Although Levin’s and Kitty’s experiences of their wedding and their new married statuses differ, 
this does not alienate them from one another. On the contrary, giving his hand to Kitty after the 
ceremony, when they are leaving the church, Levin experiences a new kind of closeness with her, 
feeling that the two of them have indeed become one: “Левин … подал ей руку и, ощущая 
новую странную близость, пошел из церкви […] [Levin] чувствовал, что они уже были 
одно” (19:25).  
  Despite their differing attitudes to some events (for instance, the wedding ceremony), 
Levin and Kitty are bound on a larger emotional and moral level. Unlike Anna and Vronskii, 
Levin and Kitty care for one another’s emotional comfort more than their own. An episode in 
which Tolstoi describes Levin and Kitty’s temporary alienation during married life is a telling 
example of how their temporary discords cannot divide their “intercorporeal” unity. The episode 
evokes previous instances of Levin and Kitty’s empathy towards one another but describes their 
oneness more explicitly, thus revealing their deepened bond. When Levin comes home half an 
hour later than expected, Kitty, who has been worried about him, accuses him of neglect. 
Suddenly, Levin experiences the torment of inner conflict: on the one hand, he instinctively 
wants to take offense, but on the other hand, he cannot be insulted by Kitty, because he feels that 
she is a part of himself:  
Но только что она открыла рот, как слова упреков бессмысленной ревности, всего, 
что мучало ее в эти полчаса, которые она неподвижно провела, сидя на окне, 
вырвались у ней. Тут только в первый раз он ясно понял то, чего он не понимал, 
когда после венца повел ее из церкви. Он понял, что она не только близка ему, но 
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что он теперь не знает, где кончается она и начинается он. Он понял это по тому 
мучительному чувству раздвоения, которое он испытывал в эту минуту. Он 
оскорбился в первую минуту, но в ту же секунду он почувствовал, что он не может 
быть оскорблен ею, что она была он сам. (19:50) 
 
Tolstoi describes Levin’s inner conflict as “doubling” (“раздвоение”), evocative of Anna’s 
“doubling” inner conflict between her sensual and moral selves. While Anna’s inner conflict 
fragments the whole of her identity, Levin’s “doubling” emphasizes his “intercorporeal” unity 
with Kitty, the way in which Levin feels that they have become one whole human being: he does 
not know where he ends and she begins (“он теперь не знает, где кончается она и начинается 
он”). Levin’s emotional attachment to Kitty is so powerful that he perceives Kitty as a part of 
himself, and thus he experiences a discord with her as a discord within himself.   
As Tolstoi elaborates on Levin’s feelings towards Kitty, he uses a bodily metaphor to 
highlight Levin and Kitty’s “intercorporeal” bond. Levin feels like a man who has been punched 
in the back and wishes to take revenge, but realizes that he has accidentally punched himself and 
that there is no one else to take revenge on. The only thing left, then, is to endure the pain and 
console himself: “Он испытывал в первую минуту чувство подобное тому, какое 
испытывает человек, когда, получив вдруг сильный удар сзади, с досадой и желанием 
мести оборачивается, чтобы найти виновного, и убеждается, что это он сам нечаянно 
ударил себя, что сердиться не на кого и надо перенести и утишить боль” (19:50). Since 
Levin cannot hurt Kitty, he comforts her despite the initial pain that she has caused him, leading 
to their reconciliation. Because the two are merged into one, they are not only prevented from 
hurting one another but also double their happiness (“удвоенное счастье любви”), thus 
reinforcing their unity: “Они помирились. Она, сознав свою вину, но не высказав ее, стала 
нежнее к нему, и они испытали новое удвоенное счастье любви” (19:51).        
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Since Levin and Kitty’s union originates in emotional and moral kinship, rather than in 
sexual desire (although their relationship does not exclude it), their touch reinforces rather than 
undermines their connection. Overall, Tolstoi avoids describing Levin and Kitty’s sensual touch 
directly, emphasizing their sensual modesty even after their marriage. For instance, when 
referring to their honeymoon, Tolstoi particularly mentions that there was no “honey” in it, 
perhaps implying that Levin and Kitty experienced not only intensive sexual desire and pleasure 
but also guilt (consistent with Tolstoi’s own fear of controlling sexual drives). Both Levin and 
Kitty come to regard their honeymoon as the most humiliating, disgusting, shameful, and 
unhealthy time in their life, when they were hardly themselves and which they would have liked 
to expunge from their memories: “медовый месяц … остался в воспоминании их обоих 
самым тяжелым и унизительным временем их жизни. Они оба одинаково старались в 
последующей жизни вычеркнуть из своей памяти все уродливые, постыдные 
обстоятельства этого нездорового времени, когда оба они редко бывали в нормальном 
настроении духа, редко бывали сами собою” (19:51).  
Although most other manifestations of Levin and Kitty’s sensuality are only hinted at, 
they are described with shimmering erotic overtones and as apparently pleasant and bonding 
experiences for Levin and Kitty. The episode where Kitty does her lace work exemplifies this 
notion. While working on her lace, Kitty looks at the back of Levin’s head as he is working by 
the table, wishing that he would sense her gaze and turn to her. Levin does feel her gaze, 
interrupts his work, comes up to Kitty, and sits with her on the couch. Sitting close to his wife, 
Levin touches her and turns her head, saying something about her “strand of hair” (“косичка”). 
This apparently evolves into a more explicit fondling, which Tolstoi implies but omits from the 
narrative. The fact that Tolstoi omits any depiction of their fondling, having them guiltily jump 
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away from each other when the servant Kuz’ma comes in, emphasizes not only the couple’s 
sexual modesty but also their tender intimacy, with its youthful freshness, affection, and shyness:   
— А у тебя косичка, — сказал он, осторожно поворачивая ее голову. — 
Косичка. Видишь, вот тут. Нет, нет мы делом занимаемся.  
Занятие уже не продолжалось, и они, как виноватые, отскочили друг от друга, 
когда Кузьма вошел доложить, что чай подан. (19:54)  
 
The scene concludes with Kitty’s offer for Levin to play four hands as soon as he returns from 
some household work that he has been called off to:   
— А из города приехали? — спросил Левин у Кузьмы. 
— Только что приехали, разбираются. 
— Приходи же скорее, — сказала она ему, уходя из кабинета, — а то без тебя 
прочту письма. И давай в четыре руки играть. (19:54)  
 
Two people playing one instrument, synchronizing the movements of their four (“redoubled”) 
hands as if they belonged to one person, suggests Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “intercorporeality”: 
Levin and Kitty’s love has merged the two into “one body,” therefore having “four hands.” 
Though Tolstoi only refers to their playing four hands in passing, it is perhaps the best haptic 
expression of Levin and Kitty’s sensuality facilitating the “redoubled/удвоенное” happiness 
discussed above. 
Just as the couple’s love facilitates Levin’s bond with Kitty’s family, it also reconnects 
Levin with his brother Nikolai, who is dying of consumption. As discussed in the chapter on 
Tolstoi’s moral vision, the premature deaths of the author’s brothers in 1856 and 1860 shattered 
him deeply, driving him to the brink of suicide. Affected by these experiences, Tolstoi portrays 
death as an ontological rift, a force that separates people. Tolstoi reveals Levin’s alienation from 
his dying brother as a corporeal rift between their bodies. Watching his brother dying, Levin 
shudders when he thinks about his “terrifying” body and withered limbs, even though he wants 
to help him:  
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«Не может быть, чтоб это страшное тело был брат Николай», подумал Левин. 
[…] 
… Ему и в голову не приходило подумать, чтобы разобрать все подробности 
состояния больного, подумать о том, как лежало там, под одеялом, это тело, как, 
сгибаясь, уложены были эти исхудалые голени, кострецы, спина и нельзя ли как-
нибудь лучше уложить их, сделать что-нибудь, чтобы было хоть не лучше, но 
менее дурно. Его мороз пробирал по спине, когда он начинал думать о всех этих 
подробностях. (19:60, 62) 
  
To the contrary, Kitty is not afraid of Nikolai’s condition but rather feels sorry for him, willing to 
ameliorate his state: “Но Кити думала, чувствовала и действовала совсем не так. При виде 
больного ей стало жалко его. И жалость в ее женской душе произвела совсем не то 
чувство ужаса и гадливости, которое она произвела в ее муже, а потребность действовать, 
узнать все подробности его состояния и помочь им” (19:62-63). Tolstoi emphasizes that 
Kitty’s actions, and thus her touch, are more than merely physical and instinctive though they are 
practical and mundane. Her actions are imbued with spiritual meaning: she not only improves 
Nikolai’s physical condition but also cares for his spiritual state, as if preparing him for the 
afterlife in which she, as a Christian, apparently believes:  
… деятельность … была не инстинктивная, животная, неразумная, было то, что, 
кроме физического ухода, облегчения страданий, и Агафья Михайловна и Кити 
требовали для умирающего еще чего-то такого, более важного, чем физический 
уход, и чего-то такого, что не имело ничего общего с условиями физическими. […] 
Катя точно так же, кроме всех забот о белье, пролежнях, питье, в первый же день 
успела уговорить больного в необходимости причаститься и собороваться” (19:66). 
  
Although Kitty mentions that she has learned a great deal about nursing at the spa, 
Tolstoi suggests that Kitty, as a woman (“жалость в ее женской душе”), has an intuitive 
knowledge of life and death, knows how to act, and does so with gentle (and feminine, as Tolstoi 
reiterates) consideration (“только женщинам свойственною, неоскорбляющею и 
сочувствующею тихою оживленностью” 19:61). Kitty’s arrangements (changing Nikolai’s 
clothing and bed sheets, cleaning his room, and inviting a doctor to see him) temporarily 
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improve Nikolai’s physical state, but also, more importantly, offer him an emotional connection 
with Kitty. Tolstoi conveys their connection through their mutual touch: Nikolai strokes Kitty’s 
hand gently with gratitude, and Kitty presses his hand with both of hers: “— Мне гораздо уж 
лучше, — сказал он. — Вот с вами я бы давно выздоровел. Как хорошо! — Он взял ее 
руку и потянул ее к своим губам, но, как бы боясь, что это ей неприятно будет, раздумал, 
выпустил и только погладил ее. Кити взяла эту руку обеими руками и пожала ее” (19:64).  
Apart from connecting with Nikolai herself, Kitty also bridges the rift between Nikolai 
and her husband, helping Levin to overcome his terror of his brother’s imminent death. Prompted 
by Kitty, Levin lifts and holds his brother’s body in his arms while Kitty changes the linens and 
fixes the pillow:  
Как ни страшно было Левину обнять руками это страшное тело, взяться за те места 
под одеялом, про которые он хотел не знать, но, поддаваясь влиянию жены, Левин 
сделал свое решительное лицо, какое знала его жена, и, запустив руки, взялся, но, 
несмотря на свою силу, был поражен странною тяжестью этих изможденных 
членов. Пока он поворачивал его, чувствуя свою шею обнятою огромной 
исхудалой рукой, Кити быстро, неслышно перевернула подушку, подбила ее и 
поправила голову больного и редкие его волоса, опять прилипшие на виске. (19:65) 
 
Encouraging Levin to help her, Kitty facilitates Levin and Nikolai’s mutual touch. Despite 
Nikolai’s physical deterioration, his body presses on Levin’s arms, weighing on his muscles. 
While Levin supports his brother’s body, Nikolai grasps Levin’s neck with his large hand. The 
brothers’ reciprocal physical touch also facilitates their emotional reconnection. Levin begins to 
feel not only the terror of observing Nikolai’s deteriorating body but also the grief of losing a 
person he deeply loves. The brothers’ mutual love for one another, which both of them finally 
reveal, is reflected in their touch as Levin lowers Nikolai back into bed. Pulling Levin’s hand, 
Nikolai draws it to his lips and kisses it. As Nikolai pulls, Levin yields to his guidance, thus 
reciprocating his touch. As Nikolai kisses him, Levin cannot hold back his tears, and they shake 
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his entire body: “Больной удержал в своей руке руку брата. Левин чувствовал, что он хочет 
что-то сделать с его рукой и тянет ее куда-то. Левин отдавался замирая. Да, он притянул 
ее к своему рту и поцеловал. Левин затрясся от рыдания и, не в силах ничего выговорить, 
вышел из комнаты” (19:65). 
While Nikolai’s death causes Levin to feel alienated, Kitty’s love is the force that 
reintegrates him with the texture of life. Tolstoi writes that Levin and Kitty’s love bridges the 
gap in the texture of Levin’s life, saving him from despair and reconnecting him with life by 
convincing him that, while death is imminent, he should live on, love, and rejoice: “но теперь, 
благодаря близости жены, чувство это не приводило его в отчаяние: он, несмотря на 
смерть, чувствовал необходимость жить и любить. Он чувствовал, что любовь спасала его 
от отчаяния и что любовь эта под угрозой отчаяния становилась еще сильнее и чище” 
(19:75). The chapter about Nikolai’s death concludes with the announcement of Kitty’s 
pregnancy. Tolstoi continues his meditations on death and birth a bit later in the novel, revealing 
that the birth of Levin and Kitty’s son reconciles him with his brother’s death. The miracle of 
birth makes him view death not as the end of life, but only as a window into the unearthly realm, 
as birth is: “Но и то горе (Nikolai’s death) и эта радость (Levin’s child’s birth) одинаково 
были вне всех обычных условий жизни, были в этой обычной жизни как будто отверстия, 
сквозь которые показывалось что-то высшее” (19:291). Levin and Kitty’s sensual touch 
yields a child and therefore counteracts death, as Tolstoi suggests, by bridging the gap in Levin’s 
heart and in his life’s corporeal texture that was left by Nikolai’s death.  
Tolstoi emphasizes that Kitty’s pregnancy is a spiritual event by showing how it 
transforms Levin’s perception of Kitty’s body. Levin begins to experience the pleasure of being 
close to his beloved, free from sensuality and thus pure: “совершенно чистое от чувственности 
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наслаждение близости к любимой женщине” (19:130–31). It seems that since, according to 
Tolstoi, Kitty’s pregnancy and childbirth are spiritual events, the novel includes a detailed 
depiction of the couple’s touch during Kitty’s labor while excluding or only hinting at their more 
sensual touches.  
Tolstoi’s depiction produces the impression that Kitty’s touch includes Levin in her 
physical experience of childbirth. During labor, Kitty clasps Levin’s hand with unusual force and 
then pushes it away, apparently repeating her contractions with her hand: “те минуты, когда она 
призывала его к себе, и он держал ее за потную, то сжимающую с необыкновенною 
силою, то отталкивающую его руку, — казались ему часами, то часы казались ему 
минутами” (19:290). Through Kitty’s press and push, Levin can, in a way, sense Kitty’s labor 
pains and contractions and thus participate in her physical experience, feeling her agony through 
her touch. Kitty’s pulling and pushing away Levin’s hand is reminiscent of Anna’s childbirth 
scene, when she pulls and pushes away Karenin’s hand. Although their gestures are in some 
ways alike and reflect a woman’s typical experience during childbirth, they contrast the two 
heroines. While Anna’s pressing and pushing away of Karenin’s hand reflects her conflicted 
personality, torn between her moral guilt and her aversion towards Karenin, Kitty’s gesture, to 
the contrary, points to her bond with Levin and reasserts the impression of their “intercorporeal” 
whole.  
Tolstoi reinforces the spiritual nature of Levin and Kitty’s physical bond by comparing 
their newborn child to a flame over a lamp (“огонек над светильником”): “А между тем там, в 
ногах постели, в ловких руках Лизаветы Петровны, как огонек над светильником, 
колебалась жизнь человеческого существа, которого никогда прежде не было и которое 
так же, с тем же правом, с тою же значительностью для себя, будет жить и плодить себе 
  
173 
подобных” (19:293). Tolstoi’s “flame” symbolism of the newborn’s life derives from the 
Christian tradition rather than from Western philosophy. In Plato, comparison with “flame” (fire) 
instead of sun (light) would suggest undeveloped spirituality. To the contrary, Christian tradition 
does not distinguishe between “flame” and “light.” A lit candle or a lit lamp represents the divine 
light, Christ as “the light of the world” (John 12:8), as well as the faithful’s prayers and 
aspirations towards God. While both Levin-Kitty and Anna-Vronskii yield a child, Tolstoi 
associates only Levin and Kitty’s child with light. This would seem to indicate that, since Levin 
and Kitty’s love originates in moral and emotional kinship rather than carnal desire, their touch 
yields light, which reinforces the righteousness of their bond and their touch.     
The fact that Kitty’s childbirth reconnects Levin with his faith, helping him overcome the 
spiritual crisis escalated by his brother’s death, emphasizes the event’s spiritual nature. Levin 
rediscovers his faith during Kitty’s childbirth, when he begins to pray for her life with his past 
youthful ingenuity and without questioning his faith (“несмотря на столь долгое и казавшееся 
полным отчуждение, чувствуя, что он обращается к Богу точно так же доверчиво и 
просто, как и во времена детства и первой молодости” 19:291). After a long course of doubts 
and meditations on faith, Levin realizes that he is trying to answer a “big” question about the 
meaning of his life, something that the materialistic, scientific knowledge that had replaced his 
faith cannot do:  
«Без знания того, что я такое и зачем я здесь, нельзя жить. А знать я этого не 
могу, следовательно, нельзя жить», говорил себе Левин. […]  
И, счастливый семьянин, здоровый человек, Левин был несколько раз так 
близок к самоубийству, что спрятал шнурок, чтобы не повеситься на нем, и боялся 
ходить с ружьем, чтобы не застрелиться. (19:371) 
… Организм, разрушение его, неистребимость материи, закон сохранения силы, 
развитие — были те слова, которые заменили ему прежнюю веру. (19:367)  
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Tolstoi describes Levin’s spiritual insight in terms of bodily sensations—comparing him to a 
person who is cold in the winter without warm clothing. Materialistic knowledge, Tolstoi 
suggests, is like a thin, lace shirt that cannot protect the body from cold in the winter and thus 
endangers it with imminent death. On the contrary, faith is like a warm fur coat, which can 
protect the body: “… и Левин вдруг почувствовал себя в положении человека, который 
променял бы теплую шубу на кисейную одежду и который в первый раз на морозе 
несомненно, не рассуждениями, а всем существом своим убедился бы, что он всё равно 
что голый и что он неминуемо должен мучительно погибнуть” (19:367). In other words, 
Tolstoi’s comparison suggests that faith, however unreasonable from a materialistic point of 
view, is the most reasonable thing for a person to have—like a warm coat in the winter cold. It is 
crucial for human life, something that alone can provide the answer to the meaning of life and 
thus protect this life from physical annihilation. 
Tolstoi shows how Levin’s rediscovered faith not only immerses him in the world, but 
also allows him to perceive the world as infinitely expanding. His faith relates him to the 
universal human community: “Я со всеми людьми имею только одно твердое, несомненное 
и ясное знание, и знание это не может быть объяснено разумом — оно вне его и не имеет 
никаких причин и не может иметь никаких последствий” (19:377). Further, his corporeality 
relates him to the world of nature and connects him with all material things: “в моем теле, в 
теле этой травы и этой букашки (вот она не захотела на ту траву, расправила крылья и 
улетела) совершается по физическим, химическим, физиологическим законам обмен 
материи. А во всех нас, вместе с осинами, и с облаками, и с туманными пятнами, 
совершается развитие” (19:378).  
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Finally, faith allows Levin to aspire beyond the material, towards the spiritual realm. In 
keeping with Plato’s association of vision with intellectual/spiritual knowledge, it is no accident 
that Tolstoi describes Levin’s aspiration for the spiritual in terms of his visual perception. 
Looking at the sky, Levin realizes that he is correct both when he sees the firm vault of the sky 
and when he strains his vision to see beyond it. By the “firm vault of the sky,” Tolstoi means the 
material—tangible and visible—world, accessible to one’s senses, and by the world beyond the 
visible range, he implies a spiritual one, inaccessible to corporeal perception: 
«Разве я не знаю, что это — бесконечное пространство, и что оно не круглый свод? 
Но как бы я ни щурился и ни напрягал свое зрение, я не могу видеть его не 
круглым и не ограниченным, и, несмотря на свое знание о бесконечном 
пространстве, я несомненно прав, когда я вижу твердый голубой свод, я более прав, 
чем когда я напрягаюсь видеть дальше его». […]  
«Неужели это вера? — подумал он, боясь верить своему счастью. (19:381–82) 
 
While Anna’s sensuality shuts down her vision (she begins to “narrow” her eyes to avoid seeing 
her position), Levin “narrows” (strains) his eyes to see beyond the material world into the 
spiritual. Unlike Anna’s passion for Vronskii, Levin’s love for Kitty does not alienate him from 
people or from physical reality but, on the contrary, intertwines him with both, as well as 
reconnecting him with his faith and thus leading him to embrace both the corporeal and the 
spiritual aspects of life.    
Kitty is immersed in the texture of life as well, but in a different way from Levin. Since 
Kitty never loses her faith, she does not undergo any spiritual transformation. However, she does 
undergo a transformation as a woman, becoming a mother to her child and engaging in her 
maternal duties. Both Kitty and Anna experience haptic sensations in their interactions with their 
children; however, their haptic experiences differ. Tolstoi emphasizes the tactile and cutaneous 
sensations in Anna’s interactions with her son: Anna tenderly strokes Serёzha, touching him and 
feeling the warmth of his body, or touches and admires (although with lesser emotional 
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engagement) her little daughter’s body as she plays with her. As was previously discussed, 
Anna’s dominating tactile and cutaneous interactions with her children, especially Serёzha, are 
consistent with her sensual nature. By contrast, Tolstoi emphasizes that Kitty interacts with her 
child primarily through her muscles. Bathing the child, she squeezes the sponge in one, smooth 
motion, revealing her flexing muscle (“напрягая мускул”)—the detail that stands out, given 
Kitty’s otherwise gentle built: 
Кити стояла с засученными рукавами у ванны над полоскавшимся в ней 
ребенком […]. Одною рукою она поддерживала под голову плавающего на спине и 
корячившего ножонки пухлого ребенка, другою она, равномерно напрягая мускул, 
выжимала на него губку.  …  
Кити нагнулась к нему [baby], — он просиял улыбкой, уперся ручками в губку 
и запрукал губами, производя такой довольный и странный звук, что не только 
Кити и няня, но и Левин пришел в неожиданное восхищение. (19:397) 
 
Although Kitty interacts with her baby through her muscles, rather than through tactile and 
cutaneous activity more characteristic of a tender caress, Kitty’s touch with her child is 
reciprocal, like Anna’s touch with her son. While Kitty bathes the child and sqeezes the sponge 
over him, he presses his hand against the sponge. The verb “уперся” implies a certain degree of 
muscular tension, reverberating with Kitty’s flexing muscle. Although Kitty and her son’s touch 
may seem to be indirect (mediated through the sponge) and thus to suggest their alienation, it is 
in fact consistent with the kinesthetic form of haptic perception that Tolstoi emphasizes in 
Levin’s and Kitty’s physicalities. Kitty and her baby are connected with one another through the 
dominating kinesthetic, rather than tactile and cutaneous, form of touch.  
In fact, the peaceful, mundane scene of the child’s bath concludes Levin’s thus-far 
troubled efforts to connect with his son emotionally. While Levin feels immersed in the world on 
the cosmic level, he struggles to love his own son. As he explains to Kitty, he had expected that 
his love for him would be an all-embracing, pleasant feeling, whereas he felt only pity and 
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aversion. Levin’s feelings for his son are transformed during an incident preceding the bathing 
scene, when Kitty and the child are caught in a thunderstorm, and Levin is terrified that a falling 
tree may have harmed them. This fear proves a transformative experience for Levin, through 
which he recognizes his love for his son (“Нынче после этого страха во время грозы я понял, 
как я люблю его” 19:397). The bathing episode confirms Levin’s acquired love for the child. 
When Kitty demonstrates to Levin that their son has begun to recognize people, Levin is 
delighted, as are Kitty and the nanny (“не только Кити и няня, но и Левин пришел в 
неожиданное восхищение” 19:397).  
The scene sequence ending the novel portrays Levin under the night sky, illuminated by 
lightning, as he mediates on his acquired love for his son and his regained faith. Since both sky 
and light are associated with vision, and vision, according to Plato, is the most spiritual sense, the 
scene reaffirms Levin’s predisposition towards the spiritual rather than the carnal:     
Уже совсем стемнело, и на юге, куда он смотрел, не было туч. Тучи стояли с 
противной стороны. Оттуда вспыхивала молния, и слышался дальний гром. Левин 
прислушивался к равномерно падающим с лип в саду каплям и смотрел на 
знакомый ему треугольник звезд и на проходящий в середине его млечный путь с 
его разветвлением. При каждой вспышке молнии не только млечный путь, но и 
яркие звезды исчезали, но, как только потухала молния, опять, как будто 
брошенные какой-то меткой рукой, появлялись на тех же местах. (19:397–98) 
 
The reference to God’s “dexterous hand” (“меткой рукой”) along with the light imagery 
confirms the connection between physical dexterity and long-ranged sight, both of which Tolstoi 
associates with Levin and Kitty to convey their correct, moral way of living.       
 Tolstoi endows Levin and Kitty with distinctively kinesthetic perceptions, rather than 
tactile and cutaneous sensations. By emphasizing their bodily dexterity and muscular work, 
reducing their physical contact with one another, and excluding their indulgence in tactile and 
cutaneous perception of worldly phenomena, Tolstoi shows their moral purity. In addition, both 
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characters are far-sighted, which, in keeping with Plato’s philosophy, emphasizes their spiritual 
rather than carnal predispositions. Levin and Kitty’s love does not exclude sexual relations but 
originates in their moral affinity and emotional susceptibility to one another’s feelings. They 
achieve emotional and physical unity, which Tolstoi conveys through references to them 
becoming “one flesh,” or an “intercorporeal” whole in the terms of Merleau-Ponty.  
While Tolstoi portrays Anna’s beloved, Vronskii, as a corrupted man with limited—if 
any—moral sense, he portrays Levin’s beloved, Kitty, as his opposite—the embodiment of the 
spiritual. Tolstoi endows Kitty with intuitive spiritual knowledge and inherently strong moral 
sense (demonstrated when she cannot forgive herself for her infatuation with Vronskii and later 
with Veslovskii). She has an innate ability to love and forgive (when she forgives Levin for his 
past sexual transgressions). She is naturally perspicascious and can sense her husband’s dying 
brother Nikolai’s physical and emotional needs, even as Levin fails to do so, despite his learning. 
Tolstoi also associates Kitty directly with sunlight at the beginning of the novel, when Levin 
looks at her at the skating rink, which, in keeping with Plato’s “cave” metaphor suggests that 
Kitty does not need to strive for the spiritual but rather embodies the spiritual. While Anna’s 
passion for Vronskii alientes her and distorts her judgment, Levin’s love for Kitty immerses him 
into both human community and material creation, bringing him to view his existence and 
surroundings as a harmoniously intertwined whole.    
5. Karenin 
Tolstoi’s moral vision suggests that the body is a battlefield between the carnal and the 
spiritual. However, instead of suggesting that we deny the body in favor of the spirit, he asserts 
that the body can serve to either satisfy carnal desires or to achieve spiritual goals. By “spiritual,” 
Tolstoi does not mean any incorporeal exaltation or set of ethical rules, but rather one’s personal 
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ability to empathize with others. Since, for Tolstoi, both carnal and spiritual experiences are 
corporeal, he views indulgence in bodily sensations (such as sex, gluttony, and leisure) and 
alienation from bodily experiences (such as intellectual activity and religious dogmatism without 
personal empathy) as equally harmful. Depicting Karenin, Tolstoi shows that his fear of the 
emotional sphere, reflected in his alienation from the corporeal, undermines his ability to connect 
with Anna through touch and causes suffering to his own body.      
Unlike Stiva and Anna, Karenin is a cerebral rather than a corporeal character. For 
instance, Karenin recurrently emphasizes the importance of morality, which he views as a set of 
Christian ethical principles rather than a personal, moral feeling. When he prepares to admonish 
Anna for her inappropriate conduct with Vronskii, he appeals to religious dogmas and social 
norms, trying to avoid discussing their feelings. Likewise, he recalls famous historical figures 
who were similarly deceived by their wives instead of admitting that Anna’s unfaithfulness has 
hurt him. Karenin’s interests are consistent with his intellectual rather than carnal pursuits. 
Karenin’s reading interests are limited to religion, history, politics, and economics, all of which 
appeal to a reader’s mind. Although Karenin is familiar with the arts and reads poetry—for 
example, he reads the presumably ultra-romantic Duc de Lille’s Poésie des enfers (The Poetry of 
Hell, invented by Tolstoi as a parody of Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal)—he does so out of duty 
rather than to satisfy his emotional needs or for aesthetic pleasure. He also defends classical 
education and the study of language structures because he believes that such studies instill moral 
principles. He condemns the natural sciences as harmful, as he reckons that they incite nihilism 
and therefore undermine a person’s religious beliefs. In addition, Karenin’s enthusiasm for his 
job as a state official and his appreciation for clear organization, including his meticulous 
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punctuality and love for organizing the writing tools on his desk, highlight his cerebral 
(intellectual and well-organized) persona.  
Though Karenin is capable of expressing his emotions (as the reader learns in the course 
of the novel), he is generally an emotionally reserved person who prefers to suppress his feelings 
and avoid emotional engagement. Karenin perceives the sphere of personal relations as a 
frightening “пучина жизни/bottomless deep of life” and prefers to deal only with its “reflection” 
by sorting out the lives of other people, such as petitioners asking for professional interference in 
their affairs:  
Всю жизнь свою Алексей Александрович прожил и проработал в сферах 
служебных, имеющих дело с отражениями жизни. И каждый раз, когда он 
сталкивался с самою жизнью, он отстранялся от нее. Теперь он испытывал чувство, 
подобное тому, какое испытал бы человек, спокойно прошедший над пропастью по 
мосту и вдруг увидавший, что этот мост разобран и что там пучина. Пучина эта 
была — сама жизнь, мост — та искусственная жизнь, которую прожил Алексей 
Александрович. Ему в первый раз пришли вопросы о возможности для его жены 
полюбить кого-нибудь, и он ужаснулся пред этим. (18:151) 
 
Tolstoi emphasizes Karenin’s alienation by describing his contact with life as a “collision” 
(“сталкивался с самою жизнью”) that scares and estranges him (“отстранялся от нее 
[жизни]”).  
Karenin wrongly perceives his feelings—particularly, pity, empathy, and compassion—
as a kind of illness, an “emotional disturbance” (“душевное расстройство”), and tries to 
suppress its manifestations, which leads not only to alienation from but even aggression towards 
the person who evokes his pity. Tolstoi exemplifies this estrangement by describing that when 
Karenin sees a child or a woman crying, he becomes irritated and drives them away instead of 
helping them: 
Вид слез приводил его в растерянное состояние, и он терял совершенно 
способность соображения. Правитель его канцелярии и секретарь знали это и 
предуведомляли просительниц, чтоб отнюдь не плакали, если не хотят испортить 
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свое дело. «Он рассердится и не станет вас слушать», говорили они. И 
действительно, в этих случаях душевное расстройство, производимое в Алексее 
Александровиче слезами, выражалось торопливым гневом. «Я не могу, не могу 
ничего сделать. Извольте итти вон!» кричал он обыкновенно в этих случаях. 
(18:293)  
 
Karenin’s compassion casts him into inner confusion, “disorganization” (to translate the word 
“расстройство” literally) of his rational, typically poised and ordered world, which causes him 
great distress and estrangement (“отстранялся”).   
Tolstoi’s reference to “reflections of life” in the description above, depicting Karenin’s 
professional sphere, evokes Plato's discussion of the cave’s “shadows.” According to Plato, 
looking at “shadows” defines a person’s limited knowledge about the world. In keeping with 
Plato, the fact that Karenin prefers to deal with “reflections” of life suggests the limitations of his 
knowledge. In addition, Tolstoi’s references to Karenin’s eyes as “tired” seem to corroborate this 
interpretation. Since Plato associates vision not only with intellectual but also moral ascension, 
Karenin’s “tired” eyes suggest his limited knowledge of true morality. Despite Karenin’s 
intellectual superiority and adherence to religious dogma, his emotional restraint proves to be a 
moral flaw. Since empathy is not only an emotional but also a moral quality, Karenin’s fear of 
empathetic feelings (“пучина жизни”) renders him insensitive towards Anna and even towards 
their son once she announces her affair with Vronskii.  
Consistent with Karenin’s reserved personality, his marriage to Anna (before the affair) 
seems to have been based on mutual respect rather than intimate affection or sensual attraction. 
Although Karenin is attached to Anna (“[т]а привязанность, которую он испытывал к Анне” 
19:77), he shows this attachment in a typically restrained manner, often concealing his love for 
her in banter (“тоном насмешки над тем, кто бы в самом деле так говорил” 18:111). As 
glimpses of their relationship before Anna’s infatuation with Vronskii suggest, Karenin and 
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Anna’s interactions were typically polite but unemotional: Karenin would discuss his 
professional life with Anna, and she would willingly encourage him to do so. In turn, she would 
share her daily joys and concerns. Perhaps the only time that Karenin reveals his affection for 
Anna is when she returns from Moscow. Karenin’s speech breaks when he tells Anna that he is 
glad that he will no longer have to dine alone (“Опять буду обедать не один, — продолжал 
Алексей Александрович уже не шуточным тоном. — Ты не поверишь, как я привык...” 
18:114). At the same time, he seeks physical contact with her, not only touching but pressing and 
kissing her hand twice during the day: “И он, долго сжимая ей руку, с особенною улыбкой 
посадил ее в карету” (18:114); “Он поцеловал ее руку и подсел к ней. […] Он пожал ей 
руку и опять поцеловал ее” (18:117, 119). His “special” smile, “prolonged” pressing, and 
recurring kiss (“опять”) on Anna’s hand, along with his breaking voice, suggest an emotional 
agitation betraying his genuine, but typically concealed, affection.  
In keeping with Plato’s mind/body dichotomy, Karenin’s rational personality and 
reserved emotionality are reflected in both his physique and his haptic interactions with people 
and physical reality. Since his mind dominates his life, his body appears “fleshless.” Karenin’s 
legs are bony and chilly; he cracks his knuckles, reasserting their boniness, and his white, moist 
hands bulge with bluish veins. Karenin looks on with curiosity at those with stronger and fuller 
bodies, be they Vronskii, Stiva, or a gentleman of the bed-chamber with “fat calves”: “… эти 
другие люди, эти Вронские, Облонские... эти камергеры с толстыми икрами. И ему 
представлялся целый ряд этих сочных, сильных, не сомневающихся людей, которые 
невольно всегда и везде обращали на себя его любопытное внимание” (19:91). He often 
addresses people with his typically “cold” smile, tone, gesture, or gaze, which evokes his “bony” 
and “chilly” body and reasserts his “fleshless” rationality—a mind deprived of the flesh. 
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Karenin’s bony body makes a sharp contrast with the others’ strong and full bodies, producing 
the impression that his body lacks muscle, fat, and blood—all traits constituting a living body, so 
without them he appears “lifeless.”  Although his bulging veins suggest blood coursing through 
his body, they also evoke veins’ typically bluish tint (which Tolstoi does not mention but which 
the reader can elicit), emphasizing the lifelessness of his white skin. In addition, the fact that his 
veins bulge highlights the impression of his fleshlessness, typical of aging, lean bodies in 
general.     
Karenin seems to be more passionate and even, it seems, intimate in his professional life 
than his personal one. When Karenin reads his groundbreaking proposal on the settlement of 
racial minorities, he touches the edges of the paper “tenderly”: “его белые с напухшими 
жилами руки, так нежно длинными пальцами ощупывавшие оба края лежавшего пред ним 
листа белой бумаги” (18:335). By comparison, Stiva perceives his daughter’s skin as “tender” 
when he strokes her neck to express his affection. Although Karenin touches and kisses Anna’s 
hands with evident emotional attachment, as discussed above, Tolstoi does not qualify these 
touches and kisses as “tender.” The way in which Tolstoi omits any explicit qualifiers in his 
description of Karenin’s touches with Anna but explicitly depicts Karenin’s touch on the paper 
as “tender” renders the latter nearly sensual, which highlights his impassive and a-sensual 
individuality when it comes to his personal and especially intimate relations. 
Other instances also emphasize Karenin’s alienation from the corporeal realm. Karenin 
has fathered only one child during his eight years of marriage (compared to Stiva’s nine children 
over roughly the same period). Karenin is intellectually daring (he undertakes groundbreaking 
socio-economic reforms), but physically “timid”: he is concerned that he might have to fight 
Vronskii in a duel. Additionally, a doctor suggests that Karenin increase his physical movements 
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and decrease his intellectual activity in order to improve his health. Perhaps the most explicit 
manifestation of the imbalance between Karenin’s mind and body is epitomized in his 
comparison to a child, wherein Tolstoi juxtaposes physical movement with intellectual activity. 
Explaining the way in which Karenin copes with distress, Tolstoi concludes that, if a child needs 
muscular movement to alleviate pain, Karenin needs intellectual movement to alleviate 
emotional unease, so he “speaks well and intelligently”: 
Как убившийся ребенок, прыгая, приводит в движенье свои мускулы, чтобы 
заглушить боль, так для Алексея Александровича было необходимо умственное 
движение, чтобы заглушить те мысли о жене, которые в ее присутствии и в 
присутствии Вронского и при постоянном повторении его имени требовали к себе 
внимания. А как ребенку естественно прыгать, так и ему было естественно хорошо 
и умно говорить. (18:218) 
 
Although speaking is a physical activity involving muscles and joints, Tolstoi particularly 
emphasizes that Karenin’s speaking is a manifestation of his mind rather than his body.  
Tolstoi asserts that Karenin’s “fleshless” and “lifeless” body is the result of his emotional 
restraint. Karenin’s body appears “lifeless” or “dead” (“мертвенность”) when he tries to 
suppress his outburst of “emotional disturbance” as Anna confesses her love for Vronskii after 
the steeplechase. When Anna starts crying, Karenin sits still and does not look at Anna, in order 
to conceal his emotional distress:  
Алексей Александрович не пошевелился и не изменил прямого направления 
взгляда. Но всё лицо его вдруг приняло торжественную неподвижность мертвого 
[…] (18:224) 
Когда, возвращаясь со скачек, Анна объявила ему о своих отношениях к 
Вронскому и тотчас же вслед за этим, закрыв лицо руками, заплакала, Алексей 
Александрович, несмотря на вызванную в нем злобу к ней, почувствовал в то же 
время прилив того душевного расстройства, которое на него всегда производили 
слезы. (18:293–94) 
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Karenin’s efforts to suppress his emotionality “deaden” him, bringing him to resemble a lifeless 
statue or a corpse, thus reasserting Tolstoi’s notion that Karenin’s restrained emotionality 
alienates him from life.   
 Karenin’s haptic interactions with Anna reflect his emotional and moral rigidity, which is 
evident from the episodes in which he cracks his knuckles. For instance, Karenin cracks his 
knuckles when he prepares to admonish Anna for her misconduct at Princess Betsy’s party. 
Karenin is genuinely confused and does not know how to approach his conversation with Anna. 
Unwilling to discuss Anna’s feelings or his own, Karenin settles on a speech resembling a formal 
report rather than an intimate conversation, indicating his awkwardness in personal affairs: “в 
голове его ясно и отчетливо, как доклад, составилась форма и последовательность 
предстоящей речи” (18:152). After agonizing hesitation, Karenin decides to avoid any personal 
emotional engagement by appealing to social norms and religious dogmas, stressing his 
husbandly duty to point out Anna’s questionable behavior and protect her reputation in society. 
Once Karenin finishes composing his speech, he cracks his knuckles to regain his poise and to 
finalize his decision: “Этот жест, дурная привычка — соединение рук и трещанье пальцев 
— всегда успокоивал его и приводил в аккуратность, которая теперь так нужна была ему” 
(18:153). Dealing with a complicated matter in the simplest and least personal way, Karenin 
seems to impose order on his body by forcing his unruly joints back into place, in the same way 
that he (unsuccessfully, as it turns out) tries to impose order onto his and Anna’s lives. Karenin’s 
gesture reasserts not only the rigidity of his body but also the rigidity of his personality—his fear 
of dealing with inevitably ambiguous personal matters, adhering to unquestionable and 
impersonal social and religious norms instead.  
  
186 
Tolstoi associates Karenin’s knuckle-cracking with his cruelty towards Anna in the 
episode when he writes a note to her after she has confessed her love for Vronskii. Karenin 
cracks his knuckles as he sits to write down his decision. Karenin is hurt by Anna’s 
unfaithfulness but is unwilling to admit it. He typically appeals to Christian ethics, yet, in this 
case, he abuses Christian moral norms, sanctifying his concealed desire to take revenge on Anna 
for hurting him. When Karenin offers Anna to stay with him as his wife, allegedly giving her the 
chance to keep her good name and improve her morality, he also threatens to take away her son 
if she decides to leave, forcing her to choose between her passion for Vronskii and her love for 
her son. Presenting Anna with such a terrible choice, Karenin, in fact, acts out of self-pity and 
self-preservation, fearing the changes that Anna’s infatuation brings to their relationship and 
their lives. Trying to keep Anna by his side, he secretly hopes that his relationship with Anna 
will be restored to such a degree that he will feel no discord, even at the cost of Anna’s 
unhappiness: “отношения восстановятся прежние … то есть восстановятся в такой степени, 
что я не буду чувствовать расстройства в течении своей жизни. Она должна быть 
несчастлива, но я не виноват и потому не могу быть несчастлив” (18:298–99). Karenin 
convinces himself that he acts morally, according to Christian principles, but, as Tolstoi points 
out, he does not seek spiritual guidance in Christianity: “Только при таком решении я 
поступаю и сообразно с религией, — сказал он себе, — только при этом решении я не 
отвергаю от себя преступную жену, а даю ей возможность исправления и даже — как ни 
тяжело это мне будет — посвящаю часть своих сил на исправление и спасение ее” 
(18:298). Karenin is satisfied with the fact that his decision coincides with Christian morality 
outwardly, but ignores the inner difference between his decision and the Christian principles it 
purports to follow. While the main principle of Christianity is to love and forgive, as Karenin 
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will only realize at Anna’s “deathbed,” his decision here demonstrates neither love nor 
forgiveness: [П]ереживая эти тяжелые минуты, он и не подумал ни разу о том, чтоб искать 
руководства в религии, теперь, когда его решение совпадало с требованиями, как ему 
казалось, религии, эта религиозная санкция его решения давала ему полное 
удовлетворение и отчасти успокоение” (18:298). Karenin’s emotional restraint undermines his 
moral sense, rendering him unable to empathize with Anna as Christian principles would dictate. 
His actions against Anna reveal his desire for revenge and show that he acts out of self-
protection rather than genuine Christian love. Thus, the rigidity of his body (his knuckle 
cracking) reflects not only his emotional but also moral stiffness—his moral flaw.      
However, Karenin’s habit of cracking his knuckles, as well as his body’s boniness and 
chilliness, may testify not only to the emotional and spiritual coarseness that renders him cruel 
towards Anna, but also to his own emotional and physical fragility. The earlier-discussed 
reference to “collision,” which Tolstoi uses to describe Karenin’s typical emotional detachment, 
may also suggest the distress that he experiences when forced to deal with the disorganization of 
“real life” events. His “collisions” with “real life” seem not only to disorganize his emotional 
state but also to dislocate his joints, introducing discord in his body’s organization and causing 
him physical discomfort. An episode included only in Tolstoi’s earlier Russkii vestnik version of 
the novel21 manifestly demonstrates the link between Karenin’s dislocated joints and his fragile 
emotional sphere. Tolstoi associates Karenin’s emotional distress with his body’s brittleness, 
comparing Karenin’s emotional devastation after learning of Anna’s unfaithfulness with his 
physical breakdown, as if all of his joints have been fractured (“сломаются все суставы тела”). 
The canonical version only depicts Karenin’s emotional state—not the physical manifestation: 
                                                 
21 Anna Karenina was initially printed in Russkii vestnik in 1875–76. The revised version of this edition became the 
novel’s canonincal final draft (18:458).  
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“… когда беда пала на его голову, он не только не думал о том, как развязать это 
положение, но вовсе не хотел знать его, не хотел знать именно потому, что оно было 
слишком ужасно, слишком неестественно” (18:213). In the Russkii vestnik edition, Tolstoi 
complements the depiction of Karenin’s emotional state with a bodily metaphor, evoking his 
joints: “… ничего нельзя придумать, если в дороге сломаются все суставы тела … Из-за 
привычного увлеченья движением Алексей Александрович не хотел признаться, что он 
уже разбит вдребезги, хотя во глубине души он чувствовал это” (18:503). Karenin’s bony 
and chilly body reflects not only his self-absorbed, emotionally and spiritually rigid personality, 
but also suggests his vulnerability. One can speculate that Tolstoi decided to delete this episode 
from the final version of the novel precisely because it brings forth Karenin’s vulnerability and 
suffering. Such a representation of Karenin resonates with Tolstoi’s early plans for the novel, 
wherein Karenin, rather than Anna, was supposed to be the protagonist—the deceived husband 
suffering from his dissolute wife’s unfaithfulness. In the final version of the novel, Tolstoi 
emphasizes Anna’s moral struggle and Karenin’s cruelty, thus introducing psychological 
complexity and moral ambiguity in the portrayal of both. Although Tolstoi edits out the above 
episode, thus downplaying Karenin’s vulnerability and suffering because of Anna’s 
unfaithfulness, his emotional fragility is still evident from Tolstoi’s references to Karenin’s 
bodily discomfort, such as his habit of cracking his knuckles, and his chilliness, as analyzed 
below.          
Given Karenin’s emotional vulnerability, his inability to empathize with Anna, who has 
caused him pain, is psychologically understandable—yet not from a moral perspective, as Tolstoi 
suggests in an episode in the final edition of the novel. Tolstoi shows that Karenin suffers not 
only because Anna has hurt him, but also because he cannot forgive her in the way that Christian 
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ethics require. In other words, Karenin yields to his emotions, but these are guided by selfishness 
rather than by any compassion for Anna. Thus, his irritation with Anna reflects not only his 
emotional vulnerability but also his lack of genuine faith, which, Tolstoi demonstrates, hurts 
Karenin himself.  
Seized by a desire for vengeance, Karenin ponders Anna’s unfaithfulness to him and the 
happiness that she experiences with Vronskii—despite her moral crime. These thoughts 
apparently cause him so much emotional turmoil that he groans as if out of “inner pain” and 
actually changes his position in the carriage (apparently feeling not only emotional but also 
physical discomfort), which accidentally removes the warm rug from his legs and exposes him to 
the winter cold, thus causing even more physical discomfort:        
А в душе Алексея Александровича, несмотря на полное теперь, как ему казалось, 
презрительное равнодушие к жене, оставалось в отношении к ней одно чувство — 
нежелание того, чтоб она беспрепятственно могла соединиться с Вронским, чтобы 
преступление ее было для нее выгодно. Одна мысль эта так раздражала Алексея 
Александровича, что, только представив себе это, он замычал от внутренней боли и 
приподнялся и переменил место в карете и долго после того, нахмуренный, 
завертывал свои зябкие и костлявые ноги пушистым пледом. (18:297) 
 
Tolstoi juxtaposes Karenin’s legs, which are “sensitive to the cold” (“зябкие”), with the warm 
rug, which he removes accidentally in anger. This episode suggests that Karenin’s irritation with 
Anna worsens his own physical state—miserable as it is. Karenin’s physical discomfort, revealed 
by both his movement inside the carriage and by his chilly legs, suggests that, although his 
irritation is psychologically understandable under the given circumstances, it is morally wrong. 
In other words, Karenin’s inability to empathize with Anna alienates him from his own body, 
aggravating, it seems, the pain from his “collision” with real life (i.e. Anna’s unfaithfulness).  
Tolstoi’s reference to the item covering the body (the warm rug) in the description of 
Karenin’s irritation with Anna emphasizes his moral shortcomings. Elsewhere, Tolstoi compares 
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Levin’s religious beliefs with clothes (which are also the items covering the body, just like the 
rug). Tolstoi associates a lack of faith with thin muslin clothes, which cannot warm a person in 
winter, and faith with a warm fur coat (“Левин вдруг почувствовал себя в положении 
человека, который променял бы теплую шубу на кисейную одежду и который в первый 
раз на морозе несомненно, не рассуждениями, а всем существом своим убедился бы, что 
он всё равно что голый и что он неминуемо должен мучительно погибнуть” 18:367). Since 
Karenin’s hostility towards his unfaithful wife causes him to move and thus expose his chilly 
legs rather than warming them, the action reasserts the falsehood of Karenin’s psychologically 
understandable but morally wrong aggression towards Anna. Karenin’s inability to empathize 
with Anna in spite of the pain that she has caused him reveals his lack of genuine faith, which, as 
is evident from his emotional and physical discomfort, not only undermines his ability to connect 
with Anna but also harms Karenin himself.   
While Tolstoi associates Karenin’s restrained emotionality with his body’s bony 
composition, he links his ability to empathize with his “physicality.” The earlier-mentioned 
episode, in which Anna confesses her love for Vronskii, reveals Karenin’s inward “physical 
pity” behind the “lifeless” mask that he puts on while trying to restrain an outbreak of “emotional 
disturbance” or compassion: “Слова жены, подтвердившие его худшие сомнения, произвели 
жестокую боль в сердце Алексея Александровича. Боль эта была усилена еще тем 
странным чувством физической жалости к ней, которую произвели на него ее слезы” 
(18:294). In other words, Tolstoi expresses Karenin’s emotional confusion through the mixed 
depiction of his body as both internally “physical” and externally “deadened.” 
The reference to Karenin’s heart (“слова жены … произвели жестокую боль в 
сердце”) as an organ hidden inside his body does not seem accidental, and contributes to the 
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inside–outside opposition describing Karenin’s confused personality. Karenin’s pity for himself 
seems to struggle with his pity for Anna, but in fact both cause him pain in his heart, meaning 
that his pity for Anna aggravates his own suffering (“произвели жестокую боль в сердце 
Алексея Александровича. Боль эта была усилена еще тем странным чувством физической 
жалости к ней”). As previously mentioned, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of “intercorporeality” 
suggests that, if two bodies are united into an “intercorporeal” whole, one body cannot inflict 
pain on the other without experiencing that pain itself. Despite his outward alienation from Anna 
and his cruelty towards her as their confrontation unfolds, Karenin’s “physical pity” for Anna 
and the pain in his heart suggest his implicit but suppressed “intercorporeal” connection.  
Tolstoi also refers to Karenin’s physicality in a scene when he argues with Anna, but his 
physicality in this episode is violent and alienating, as is his emotion. Shortly before Anna’s 
childbirth, Karenin, in a fit of rage, rushes into Anna’s room, pushes her away from her drawer, 
takes a briefcase of her correspondence with Vronskii, and presses her arm into his large (and 
apparently strong) fingers with such force that her bracelet leaves a red impression on her skin:    
― Что вам нужно?! ― вскрикнула она. 
― Письма вашего любовника, ― сказал он. 
― Их здесь нет, ― сказала она, затворяя ящик; но по этому движению он 
понял, что угадал верно и, грубо оттолкнув ее руку, быстро схватил портфель, в 
котором он знал, что она клала самые нужные бумаги. Она хотела вырвать 
портфель, но он оттолкнул ее. […]       
― Нет! ― закричал он своим пискливым голосом, который поднялся теперь 
еще нотой выше обыкновенного, и, схватив своими большими пальцами ее за руку 
так сильно, что красные следы остались на ней от браслета, который он прижал, 
насильно посадил ее на место. (18:383) 
 
Although Karenin’s physique seems to be altered from its typically “lifeless” state, suffused with 
blood and muscular strength, his physicality in this episode derives from his jealousy and rage 
rather than compassion. Karenin’s rage is produced by Anna’s violation of his demands (he has 
accidentally found Vronskii in his house, though he had forbidden Anna to see him), as a desire 
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to take revenge on her: “Она не исполнила его требования, и он должен наказать ее и 
привести в исполнение свою угрозу ― требовать развода и отнять сына” (18:382). It is hard 
to pinpoint the exact difference between Karenin’s two bodily physicalities: the reference to his 
“physical” pity is generally no different from the “physical” force which he applies as he presses 
Anna’s arm. However, there is a difference on a haptic level—on the level of the 
“intercorporeal” connection between him and Anna in these two episodes. While Karenin’s pity 
makes him feel the pain of Anna’s suffering, as in the above episode, his rage brings him to 
cause Anna’s pain. In other words, instead of empathizing with Anna’s suffering, he takes 
revenge on her by transferring his own pain onto Anna’s body, thus causing her to feel his 
emotional pain physically. Hurting Anna, Karenin does not feel her pain, which, in keeping with 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory, indicates his alienation from Anna caused by a lack of compassion and 
pity.  
While Karenin does not feel compassion for Anna in this episode, Anna, in fact, does 
empathize with Karenin, albeit for an instant. It is perhaps a stretch to draw a direct connection 
between Karenin’s pressing Anna’s hand and her feeling of compassion, but the sequence is 
worth pointing out. As the argument unfolds, after Karenin forcefully presses Anna’s arm into 
his hand, his typically composed speech fails him and he cannot pronounce the word “suffered” 
properly (“Вам всё равно, что вся жизнь его рушилась, что он пеле... педе... пелестрадал” 
18:384). His broken speech betrays his loss of control and genuine agony as he tries to cope with 
his feelings, hesitating between pity for himself and anger for Anna. Noticing Karenin’s agony, 
Anna—irrationally, given the way that Karenin treats her—feels sorry for him and guilty for the 
pain that she has caused. Tolstoi points out that Karenin’s broken speech makes Anna believe 
that he is not as rational and cruel as he seems, but that he also has feelings and thus can suffer 
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and empathize, triggering her pity (“И в первый раз она на мгновение почувствовала за него, 
перенеслась в него, и ей жалко стало его” 18:384). Since the scene in which Karenin 
forcefully squeezes Anna’s arm is separated from the scene in which she feels compassion for 
him, divided by the exchange in which Karenin’s broken speech reveals his agony, it is perhaps 
possible to view Karenin’s forceful touch on Anna’s arm as a primary stage inciting Anna’s 
compassion. In other words, when Karenin transfers his pain onto Anna physically, she can 
eventually sense his pain and come to empathize.  
However, these brief instances of Karenin’s agony and Anna’s pity do not lead to the 
couple’s reconciliation, which Tolstoi shows through their tactile interactions at the end of the 
episode. Unlike Anna, Karenin remains absorbed in his self-pity and insensitive to his spouse’s 
sorrow. When he is about to leave, Anna takes his hand and implores him to leave their son, but 
Karenin flushes in rage, tears his hand away, and leaves: “Алексей Александрович вспыхнул 
и, вырвав у нее руку, вышел молча из комнаты” (18:384). Karenin’s self-pity prevents him 
from connecting with Anna and thus undermines their touch.   
While Karenin’s fear of “душевное расстройство” (“inner disturbance”) undermines his 
connection with Anna, he overcomes this alienation when he succumbs to compassion by Anna’s 
“deathbed.” While Anna is burning up with a post-natal fever, she asks Karenin to visit. On his 
way, Karenin wishes that Anna would die, because her death would deliver him from the 
emotional and social troubles that her unfaithfulness has caused him. However, seeing Anna in 
agony, he finds himself unable to restrain his “душевное расстройство/emotional disturbance,” 
succumbs to his pity, falls on his knees, presses his forehead to Anna’s burning arm, and cries 
like a child: 
Душевное расстройство Алексея Александровича всё усиливалось и дошло теперь 
до такой степени, что он уже перестал бороться с ним; он вдруг почувствовал, что 
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то, что он считал душевным расстройством, было, напротив, блаженное состояние 
души, давшее ему вдруг новое, никогда неиспытанное им счастье. Он не думал, что 
тот христианский закон, которому он всю жизнь свою хотел следовать, 
предписывал ему прощать и любить своих врагов; но радостное чувство любви и 
прощения к врагам наполняло его душу. Он стоял на коленах и, положив голову на 
сгиб ее руки, которая жгла его огнем через кофту, рыдал, как ребенок. (18:434) 
 
Tolstoi associates Karenin’s genuine compassion for Anna with his spiritual epiphany, the 
Christian awakening of a truly “blissful” and “joyful” feeling of love and forgiveness for one’s 
enemies—one which Karenin has never experienced before, despite his formal religiosity. 
Tolstoi shows that Karenin’s epiphany affects not only his emotional state, but his body as well. 
When Karenin presses his head to Anna’s arm, he can feel her burning skin against his forehead 
(“положив голову на сгиб ее руки, которая жгла его огнем через кофту”). Unlike in the 
previous episode, wherein Karenin presses Anna’s bracelet into her arm, causing rather than 
sensing her pain, his sensory susceptibility to Anna’s skin in this episode reflects his emotional 
susceptibility to her suffering. In other words, Karenin’s sensing reveals his compassion.    
This episode reverberates with an episode earlier discussed, wherein Karenin feels 
“physical pity” for Anna in his “heart” after she confesses her love for Vronskii. Both episodes 
depict Karenin’s compassion for Anna. However, Karenin’s body appeared “lifeless” even 
though he felt compassion in his “heart” in the earlier episode. His physical “lifelessness” 
conceals rather than reveals his compassion for Anna and thus undermines their connection. By 
contrast, in the current episode, Karenin not only feels compassion for Anna in his “soul” (which 
can be viewed as a synonym for “heart”) but also communicates it through his body: kneeling 
and crying rather than preserving his poise, as well as touching Anna’s body and sensing her 
skin.   
Karenin’s manifested compassion results in his and Anna’s simultaneous touch. Anna 
responds to Karenin’s touch with her own, embracing his head: “Она обняла его 
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плешивеющую голову, подвинулась к нему и с вызывающею гордостью подняла кверху 
глаза” (18:434). Fearing death, Anna admits (or at least tries to, as discussed in the chapter on 
Anna) her guilt and begs for forgiveness. Karenin, in turn, forgives Anna under the influence of 
his newly-discovered joy of compassion. Anna’s regret for her misdeed and Karenin’s 
forgiveness facilitate a temporary unity, reflected in simultaneous touch.   
Karenin’s surrender to the empathic aspect of his nature facilitates not only his haptic 
unity with Anna (however temporary), but also his own bodily transformation. Prompted by the 
newly-discovered bliss of forgiveness, Karenin forgives and pities everyone (even Anna and 
Vronskii), regrets that he does not spend enough time with his son, and feels particularly 
attached—however irrationally—to Anna’s newborn daughter: “Но к новорожденной 
маленькой девочке он испытывал какое-то особенное чувство не только жалости, но и 
нежности” (18:141). Karenin’s love for the child, which is not his and should, in theory, remind 
him of his wife’s unfaithfulness, emphasizes the integration with human community that his 
discovery of selfless love and forgiveness has allowed.  
While Tolstoi conveys the way in which Anna reunites Stiva’s family members through 
tactile contact, he shows Karenin’s spiritual transformation through his transformed facial 
musculature. Karenin’s typically rigid body gains elasticity and mobility after his spiritual 
transformation, which is evident from the episode in which he looks at Anna’s daughter. Tolstoi 
lingers on Karenin’s changing expression to show how his smile moves his hair and skin 
(suggesting muscles moving beneath) when he sees the newborn baby: “С минуту он [Каренин] 
молчал и с тем же унылым лицом смотрел на ребенка; но вдруг улыбка, двинув его волоса 
и кожу на лбу, выступила ему на лицо, и он так же тихо вышел из комнаты” (18:443). 
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Although Karenin does not touch the child,22 the flexibility of his moving muscles reflects his 
emotional response to her, expressing his joy.      
Karenin’s changed physique—from rigid to pliable—reflects the acquired flexibility of 
his moral and social judgment. His pity for his “enemies” (Anna and Vronskii) and care for the 
child (born of his wife’s liaison with another man) seem to be irrational, at least from commonly-
held social and psychological points of view. However, Karenin finds nothing unnatural in his 
feelings and is at peace:  
Он по нескольку раз в день ходил в детскую и подолгу сиживал там, так что 
кормилица и няня, сперва робевшие пред ним, привыкли к нему.  […] В такие 
минуты в особенности Алексей Александрович чувствовал себя совершенно 
спокойным и согласным с собой и не видел в своем положении ничего 
необыкновенного, ничего такого, что бы нужно было изменить. (18:141) 
 
Karenin’s attitude towards his own son also changes under the influence of his spiritual 
epiphany. Having learned about Anna’s infidelity, Karenin begins to feel alienated not only from 
Anna but also from their son Serёzha, because he reminds him of his unfaithful wife. He even 
sometimes thinks that Serёzha is not his own. However, after his spiritual awakening, Karenin 
begins to take an interest in his son’s upbringing. He does so in that awkward, typically 
Kareninian, “rational” manner, drawing advice from pedagogical books instead of simply loving 
and acting according to his impulse. One of Karenin’s educational measures, as Serёzha 
mentions during Anna’s visit on his birthday, is to forbid him to take cold showers:    
— Как ты одеваешься без меня? Как... — хотела она начать говорить просто и 
весело, но не могла и опять отвернулась. 
— Я не моюсь холодною водой, папа не велел. А Василия Лукича ты не видала? 
Он придет. А ты села на мое платье! 
                                                 
22 It is hard to say why Karenin does not touch the girl. On the one hand, the fact that he responds to her only 
through his facial expressions without touching her may suggest a certain degree of persisting alienation. The fact 
that Karenin’s transformation is only temporary would corroborate this point. On the other hand, Levin, who 
apparently comes to love his son after initial repulsion, does not touch the baby either, even though he delights in the 
way that the infant recognizes Kitty. It is probable that it was not customary for men to physically care for their 
newborn or for young children. If so, this point would require further investigation into nineteenth-century Russian 
customs for noblemen’s participation in looking after, or at least interacting with, their newborns.       
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И Сережа расхохотался. Она посмотрела на него и улыбнулась. 
— Мама, душечка, голубушка! — закричал он, бросаясь опять к ней и обнимая 
ее. (19:105)  
 
The detail might well be unintentional on Tolstoi’s part, reflecting nothing but Serёzha’s childish 
naivety and spontaneity. He hurries to share all of his news with his long-lost mother, whom he 
has greatly missed. Yet, if this detail does matter as a sensory element, it might suggest that 
Karenin has warmed up to his son just as he did to Anna’s newborn daughter. Karenin, who 
generally feels uncomfortable with expressing his emotions directly, shows his care and love 
indirectly by forbidding his son to take cold showers. Since Tolstoi associates coldness with 
Karenin’s emotional restraint and alienation, his interdiction against cold showers may suggest 
his own transformation and “warming up” to his son, trying to establish a connection with him.   
Karenin’s spiritual epiphany by Anna’s “deathbed” does not resolve the inner conflict 
between his irrational compassion and his social norms. His feelings of compassion encourage 
him to sacrifice his self-interest and social reputation for Anna, and to preserve their family, but 
society, personified by Princess Betsy and Stiva, demands that he grant Anna a divorce. 
Describing the tension between these two contradictory forces in Karenin’s life, Tolstoi uses 
haptic references—the verb “руководить/guide,” which in the original Russian means “to lead 
by hand.” The two forces pull Karenin—one can add “by hand”—in opposite directions, 
depriving him of inner peace: “Он чувствовал, что, кроме благой духовной силы, 
руководившей его душой, была другая, грубая, столь же или еще более властная сила, 
которая руководила его жизнью, и что эта сила не даст ему того смиренного спокойствия, 
которого он желал” (emphasis added; 18:441).  
Finding himself in a state of acute emotional isolation after Anna leaves him for 
Vronskii, Karenin bonds with his old friend Lidiia Ivanovna, who takes care of both his 
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household and his emotional life. However, although Karenin finds emotional consolation in 
Lidiia, she fails to be Karenin’s spiritual guide. The sham spirituality to which she introduces 
Karenin obstructs rather than promotes the inner spirituality that he had discovered by Anna’s 
“deathbed.” Karenin is conflicted about giving Anna a divorce and is in need of guidance. 
However, since he has become disappointed with both religious dogmatism and spiritual 
exaltation, he falls prey to Lidiia’s sham spiritual mysticism. Lidiia introduces him to a spiritual 
charlatan, Landau, whose advice Karenin apparently follows. He denies Anna the divorce and 
thus prevents her from starting a new family with Vronskii, further aggravating her emotional 
state and social status. 
Tolstoi reveals Landau to be a spiritual fraud by referring to his vision, specifically 
emphasizing his “closed” eyes. During the séance, Karenin references a saying that the one who 
stays spiritually alert (with his eyes open) is granted spiritual knowledge (light): “— Надо 
только не закрывать глаз, чтобы не лишиться света, — продолжал Алексей 
Александрович” (19:314). Ironically, Landau closes his eyes shortly thereafter, when Lidiia 
begins to read from mystic books: “…сказал с той же улыбкой Landau и закрыл глаза” 
(19:315). To top it off, Landau even falls asleep (or perhaps pretends to), thus keeping his eyes 
shut. When Karenin later approaches Laudau and touches his hand to receive “guidance,” 
Landau’s eyes are closed again. The only person who seems to see and understand the absurdity 
of the situation is Stiva Oblonskii, who is also present. He observes this scene with his eyes wide 
open, unable to believe that he is not asleep and that what he sees is not a hallucination: “Степан 
Аркадьич встал тоже и, широко отворяя глаза, желая разбудить себя, если он спит, 
смотрел то на того, то на другого. Всё это было наяву. Степан Аркадьич чувствовал, что у 
него в голове становится всё более и более нехорошо” (19:317).  
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In keeping with Plato’s notion of vision as the supreme sense, being the most intellectual 
and the most spiritual, as well as Karenin’s own utterance connecting visual vigilance (open 
eyes) with spiritual knowledge, Landau’s closed eyes reveal his spiritual blindness, and therefore 
reveal his “advice” to Karenin to be a spiritual fraud. Blindly following Landau’s advice, 
Karenin reveals his own moral flaw. His emotional fragility renders him unable to take personal, 
moral responsibility for Anna’s fate, and he resorts to yet another spiritual “truth” instead of 
following the empathetic impulse that he had discovered by Anna’s “deathbed.”  
Tolstoi associates Karenin’s emotional fragility and mental rigidity with physical 
“fragility” and “rigidity”: his “bony” and “chilly” legs, his cracking of his knuckles, his rigid and 
“lifeless” facial expression. Tolstoi shows that Karenin’s fear of empathy causes physical 
suffering to his “bony” body “sensitive to the cold,” as well as undermining his physical contact 
with Anna. By contrast, Karenin’s epiphany by Anna’s “deathbed,” wherein he finally succumbs 
to his empathetic impulse, not only reconnects him with Anna but also seems to alter his own 
physicality. It transforms his body from bony and rigid to pliable, as is evident from Karenin’s 
interactions with Anna’s little daughter. The reference to Serёzha’s “warm” showers suggest 
Karenin’s own “warming” up, as he tries to become closer with his son. However, Tolstoi’s 
treatment of “vision” in the Lidiia-and-Landau episodes reveals that Karenin’s emotional 
fragility renders him unable to fully sustain the inward joy of forgiveness and love that he had 
experienced, thus undermining his moral integrity once again as he displaces his responsibility 
for Anna by blindly following the charlatan’s advice instead of acting on his own inner morality. 
6. Vronskii 
Tolstoi’s representation of Vronskii’s haptic experiences can be best understood through 
Plato’s mind-body dichotomy. No other character is identified so straightforwardly with his body 
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as is Vronskii. Since Plato associates the “mind” with spiritual ascension and therefore morality, 
and the “body” with base, carnal pursuits, this chapter argues that Vronskii’s identification with 
his body testifies to his immoral, self-absorbed personality, which renders him unable to 
empathize with others and undermines his ability to connect through touch.  
Vronskii experiences a powerful and joyful awareness of his body (“радостное сознание 
своего тела”) and feels love for “himself”—that is to say, Tolstoi clarifies, for “his body” 
(“любил себя, своего тела”): “«Хорошо, очень хорошо!» сказал он себе сам. Он и прежде 
часто испытывал радостное сознание своего тела, но никогда он так не любил себя, своего 
тела, как теперь” (18:331). Tolstoi associates Vronskii’s bodily self-awareness with two moral 
flaws: his raw ambition and his carnal love for Anna. The scene, in which Vronskii enjoys his 
body, takes place after Vronskii’s meeting with his former army friend Sviiazhskii, who, unlike 
Vronskii, has succeeded significantly in his career. Vronskii envies his friend’s success, but 
Sviiazhskii pampers his ambition, assuring Vronskii of his importance for the state. The fact that 
Vronskii is on his way to see Anna also contributes to his delight in life and, consequently, in his 
body: “воспоминание о дружбе и лести Серпуховского, считавшего его нужным 
человеком, и, главное, ожидание свидания — всё соединялось в общее впечатление 
радостного чувства жизни” (18:330). 
It does not seem accidental that Vronskii identifies with his body through the “lower” 
senses of touch (haptic) and smell, according to Plato’s and Aristotle’s hierarchies. He delights in 
the dull pain of his “strong” (muscular) leg, the muscular movement of his chest as he breathes, 
the tingling of his face and neck after he douses them in water, and the smell of brilliantine on his 
moustache:  
… общее впечатление радостного чувства жизни. Чувство это было так сильно, что 
он невольно улыбался. Он спустил ноги, заложил одну на колено другой и, взяв ее 
  
201 
в руку, ощупал упругую икру ноги, зашибленной вчера при падении, и, 
откинувшись назад, вздохнул несколько раз всею грудью.  
… Ему приятно было чувствовать эту легкую боль в сильной ноге, приятно было 
мышечное ощущение движений своей груди при дыхании. Тот самый ясный и 
холодный августовский день, который так безнадежно действовал на Анну, казался 
ему возбудительно оживляющим и освежал его разгоревшееся от обливания лицо и 
шею. Запах брильянтина от его усов казался ему особенно приятным на этом 
свежем воздухе. (18:331)  
 
Vronskii’s bodily awareness testifies to his base rather than intellectual/spiritual predisposition. 
Although Levin, too, experiences powerful muscular sensations, he does not derive pleasure 
from the sensations alone, but rather from the manual work that his muscles accomplish. 
Additionally, unlike Vronskii, Levin only enjoys those muscles in his body that are used for 
work—the muscles in his legs and his arms, but not his chest. Vronskii’s pleasure in the 
movement of his chest muscles suggests his baseness: unlike Levin, who appreciates skill, 
Vronskii enjoys primitive physiological functions that require none. Finally, while Levin no 
longer feels his bodily presence when he achieves the summit of spiritual exaltation, as discussed 
in detail in the respective chapter, Vronskii feels his body with an enhanced acuity, reasserting 
his carnal rather than moral predisposition.   
 While Stiva also indulges in the impressions of the “lower” senses of touch, taste, and 
smell (probing the oysters’ texture, smelling a tobacco case or a cambric handkerchief), 
Vronskii’s sensory perception is directed not into the world, but, on the contrary, towards his 
own body. John Bayley refers to Vronskii’s indulgence in bodily sensations as “joyful solipsism” 
(Leo Tolstoy 29). While Stiva’s senses immerse him in the texture of physical reality, Vronskii’s 
isolate him from it. Vronskii’s sensory perception is “reversible,” to use Merleau-Ponty’s term. 
However, if, in Merleau-Ponty, the “reversibility” of the senses ensures the entwinement of all 
things, Vronskii’s senses connect him only with himself. His sensory self-absorption reflects his 
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“love” for “himself” and, consequently, anticipates both his emotional and sensory insensitivities 
towards others.  
In order to emphasize Vronskii’s baseness, Tolstoi associates him several times with 
beef—by definition, a flesh devoid of soul/spirit/intellect. Tolstoi establishes the link between 
Vronskii and beef on two occasions. On the first occasion, Vronskii eats a beefsteak before the 
race as he thinks of arranging a date with Anna at her dacha (18:158). On the second occasion, 
he mentally calls the depraved prince whom he is ordered to escort “stupid beef” (“глупая 
говядина” 18:374). The latter episode helps reveal the meaning of the former. As will be 
discussed in more detail, Vronskii undergoes a kind of spiritual awakening between the race 
scene and the prince episode. Vronskii’s term for the prince (“глупая говядина”) associates beef 
with the prince’s absent morality and immersion in carnal pleasures. Vronskii’s disapproval for 
the prince’s conduct, evident in the derogatory term, indicates that Vronskii’s inner 
transformation enables him not only to recognize the prince’s conduct as immoral but also to 
loathe it, thus showing that Vronskii dissociates himself from the moral depravity that the prince 
represents. Therefore, Vronskii’s eating beef (flesh without soul/spirit/intellect) in the former 
episode testifies to his depravity before his moral transformation. His pursuit of carnal pleasures 
regardless of the harm that they may cause (for instance, for Kitty and Anna) reveals his 
dominating corporeality and lack of moral sense.    
Consistent with the dominance of Vronskii’s “lower” senses, Tolstoi describes his 
“highest” sense of vision as limited. Vronskii is an amateur artist who should have sharp visual 
perception. However, the way in which Tolstoi describes his sight suggests that he perceives the 
world not as it is, but as it would be in a framed picture: 
Всё, что он видел в окно кареты, всё в этом холодном чистом воздухе, на этом 
бледном свете заката было так же свежо, весело и сильно, как и он сам: и крыши 
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домов, блестящие в лучах спускавшегося солнца, и резкие очертания заборов и 
углов построек, и фигуры изредка встречающихся пешеходов и экипажей, и 
неподвижная зелень дерев и трав, и поля с правильно прорезанными бороздами 
картофеля, и косые тени, падавшие от домов и от дерев, и от кустов, и от самых 
борозд картофеля. Всё было красиво, как хорошенький пейзаж, только что 
оконченный и покрытый лаком. (18:331)      
 
Even though Vronskii’s eyes capture reality, and the images that they capture are rich in detail, 
the carriage’s window frame limits his field of vision. What is more, even though Vronskii’s 
carriage has a window, an aperture that has the potential to connect him with the outside world, 
he perceives the opening not as a lens but as a flat canvas coated with a layer of varnish, 
producing the impression that the window is sealed. As an artist, Vronskii is an imitator of 
existing schools and is incapable of painting reality as he sees it in nature. Vronskii’s visual 
perceptions do not connect him to but alienate him from the outside world. In keeping with 
Plato’s conception of vision as a moral sense, Vronskii’s visual deficiency suggests moral 
deficiency. In addition, Tolstoi recurrently associates Vronskii with “shadows.” Vronskii appears 
in the shadows at the train station during Anna’s journey from Moscow to Saint Petersburg, so 
hidden that Anna cannot distinguish his face. Society members also refer to Vronskii as Anna’s 
“shadow” (not only implying that he follows her like a shadow, but also suggesting the shady 
nature of their relationship). The references to “shadows,” which Plato associates with 
undeveloped knowledge and morality, reinforce Tolstoi’s portrayal of Vronskii as a carnal 
person lacking moral sense. 
Vronskii’s limited vision is consistent with his corrupted morals. He belongs to a 
depraved circle of Saint Petersburg’s young men, whose “honor code”—with its ideals of 
elegance, beauty, generosity, bravery, cheerfulness, and passion—propagates rather than restricts 
immoral conduct: 
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В его петербургском мире все люди разделялись на два совершенно 
противоположные сорта. Один низший сорт: пошлые, глупые и, главное, смешные 
люди, которые веруют в то, что одному мужу надо жить с одною женой, с которою 
он обвенчан, что девушке надо быть невинною, женщине стыдливою, мужчине 
мужественным, воздержным и твердым, что надо воспитывать детей, зарабатывать 
свой хлеб, платить долги, — и разные тому подобные глупости. Это был сорт 
людей старомодных и смешных. Но был другой сорт людей, настоящих, к 
которому они все принадлежали, в котором надо быть главное элегантным, 
красивым, великодушным, смелым, веселым, отдаваться всякой страсти не краснея 
и над всем остальным смеяться. (18:121)     
 
Tolstoi emphasizes Vronskii’s corruption by suggesting that, while his body is physically 
“clean,” it is morally corrupted. When Vronskii returns from Moscow to his apartment in Saint 
Petersburg, his dissolute acquaintance Baroness Shilton makes the joke that a decent person’s 
worse crime is “uncleanliness” (“нечистоплотность”): “— Ну, теперь прощайте, а то вы 
[Вронский] никогда не умоетесь, и на моей совести будет главное преступление 
порядочного человека, нечистоплотность” (18:121). In the original Russian, the word 
“чистоплотность” (“cleanliness”) literally means “clean/pure flesh” (“чистая плоть”). In 
Russian, “чистый” means both clean and pure, thus lending itself to the juxtaposition of physical 
and moral cleanliness. In the antique Western philosophical (Plato and Aristotle) and Orthodox 
Christian traditions, “clean flesh” implies moral purity, suggesting that a person is free from base 
desires: both those which originate in the body (such as sexual desire or gluttony) and those 
originating in human personality, which Christianity associates with mankind’s fallen (corporeal) 
state. For instance, Tolstoi includes pride, envy, vanity, and idleness (along with sexual desire) 
among the vices, as is evident from the diaries and letters discussed in the chapter on his moral 
vision. Tolstoi’s recurring references to Vronskii’s physical cleanliness (as when he douses 
himself with water or as when his upbeat mood is compared to feeling refreshed after having 
taken a bath) emphasize his moral “uncleanliness.”  
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Vronskii’s thoughtless courtship of Kitty highlights the link between his love for 
personal hygiene and his moral corruption. Vronskii feels that Kitty’s love makes him feel “clean 
/ pure” and “fresh”: “«То и прелестно, — думал он, возвращаясь от Щербацких и вынося от 
них, как и всегда, приятное чувство чистоты и свежести, происходившее отчасти и оттого, 
что он не курил целый вечер…” (18:62). The first part of Tolstoi’s sentence, describing 
Vronskii’s feeling of being “refreshed” and “pure,” is intended to persuade the reader that his 
experience is spiritual. However, Tolstoi undercuts that implication in the second part of the 
sentence, when he comments (in Vronskii’s voice) that Vronskii had not smoked the entire 
evening and that this had contributed to his feeling of “refreshment” after visiting the 
Shcherbatskiis. In other words, he is refreshed by the clean air in the house rather than by the 
family atmosphere of innocence and purity. By using the rhetoric of a spiritual experience to 
describe Vronskii’s physical experience, Tolstoi suggests that Vronskii does not distinguish 
between the two. Consequently, Vronskii is unable to distinguish the “pleasant” from the “good.” 
He enjoys his courtship of Kitty and calls it “good pleasure” (“хорошее удовольствие”), 
without realizing the harm that his thoughtlessness causes her:  
Если б он мог слышать, что говорили ее родители в этот вечер, если б он мог 
перенестись на точку зрения семьи и узнать, что Кити будет несчастна, если он не 
женится на ней, он бы очень удивился и не поверил бы этому. Он не мог поверить 
тому, что то, что доставляло такое большое и хорошее удовольствие ему, а главное 
ей, могло быть дурно. (18:62) 
 
The inability to distinguish between right and wrong testifies to Vronskii’s moral ignorance.  
The self-absorption and corruption reflected in Vronskii’s “reversed” sensory perception 
and love for bodily hygiene undermine his ability to establish unity with another being (animal 
or person). The steeplechase scene gives perhaps the most explicit example of how Vronskii’s 
self-absorption undermines his touch. In racing, apart from dexterity, strength, and endurance, an 
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equestrian’s success depends on his ability to use physical contact to coordinate his movements 
with his horse’s (tactile perception), as well as his capacity to orient himself properly in space to 
direct his horse as it moves among competitors and overcomes obstacles (proprioceptive 
perception).  
Vronskii and Frou-Frou’s movements, while a bit rough at the beginning, are well-
coordinated throughout the race. In fact, their movements become synchronized so perfectly that 
it seems that they share a kind of telepathic connection—or, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term, have 
become a single “intercorporeal” whole. Frou-Frou predicts Vronskii’s intentions so accurately 
that he need not urge her onwards. When Vronskii thinks that they should get ahead of their 
competitor Makhotin, Frou-Frou—having understood Vronskii’s thoughts, as Tolstoi writes—
speeds up. When Vronskii thinks that it is better to pass Makhotin on the outside, Frou-Frou 
switches her lead and goes around the other horse as Vronskii had imagined. Both Vronskii and 
Frou-Frou experience brief doubt before one of the obstacles, but both overcome it 
simultaneously, and the horse conquers the obstacle with flair:  
В то самое мгновение, как Вронский подумал о том, что надо теперь обходить 
Махотина, сама Фру-Фру, поняв уже то, что он подумал, безо всякого поощрения, 
значительно наддала и стала приближаться к Махотину с самой выгодной стороны, 
со стороны веревки. … Вронский только подумал о том, что можно обойти и извне, 
как Фру-Фру переменила ногу и стала обходить именно таким образом. […]  
Вместе с Фру-Фру он еще издалека видел эту банкетку, и вместе им обоим, ему и 
лошади, пришло мгновенное сомнение. Он заметил нерешимость в ушах лошади и 
поднял хлыст, но тотчас же почувствовал, что сомнение было неосновательно: 
лошадь знала, что нужно. (18:209) 
 
Their perfect coordination and smooth movements among the competitors and through the 
obstacles suggest the perfect work of their haptic (tactile and proprioceptive) perception, putting 
them in the race’s lead.  
  
207 
However, Vronskii’s ambition interferes with their synchronization. Although Vronskii is 
winning the race, he wants to come in a long first. He urges Frou-Frou onwards with the reins, 
until she is galloping so quickly that he nearly stops feeling how they move. He can only judge 
their speed by observing that he has become closer to the ground and sensing that the horse’s 
movements have become smoother. In other words, Frou-Frou’s acceleration leads to Vronskii’s 
disorientation, undermining his haptic perception. When Frou-Frou jumps over the last and 
simplest obstacle, Vronskii accidentally makes an inaccurate move, landing on the horse’s back 
earlier than he is supposed to and breaking her spine: “в это самое время Вронский, к ужасу 
своему, почувствовал, что, не поспев за движением лошади, он, сам не понимая как, 
сделал скверное, непростительное движение, опустившись на седло” (18:210). Tolstoi 
emphasizes that Vronskii’s self-love, which fuels his ambition, is immoral. Interfering with his 
haptic perception and undermining his ability to synchronize with Frou-Frou, it leads not only to 
Vronskii’s loss of the race but also to Frou-Frou’s death, as she is put down shortly afterwards.      
Vronskii’s love for himself is stronger than his alleged love for Frou-Frou. One can 
perhaps notice the signs of their alienation even before the race. It is true that Vronskii looks at 
Frou-Frou with admiration and tenderness: he gazes at the strong muscles showing through her 
thin satin-smooth skin (“Вронский опять невольно обнял одним общим взглядом все стати 
своей любимой лошади. … Резко выступающие мышцы из-под сетки жил, растянутой в 
тонкой, подвижной и гладкой, как атлас, коже, казались столь же крепкими, как кость” 
18:191). Interacting with Frou-Frou, Vronskii perceives her body rather than his, which suggests 
that his attention is directed to the horse rather than to his own ego. He can sense and partake in 
Frou-Frou’s excitement before the race: his blood rushes to his heart, and he wants to move and 
bite, like Frou-Frou: “Волнение лошади сообщилось и Вронскому; он чувствовал, что кровь 
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приливала ему к сердцу и что ему так же, как и лошади, хочется двигаться, кусаться; было 
и страшно и весело” 18:192). In turn, Frou-Frou tries to catch him by his sleeve, reciprocating 
Vronskii’s touch with her own attempt (“Вронский погладил ее крепкую шею, поправил на 
остром загривке перекинувшуюся на другую сторону прядь гривы … Она … вытянула 
крепкую черную губу ко Вронскому, как бы желая поймать его за рукав” 18:192). Vronskii 
and Frou-Frou’s mutual touch and shared excitement suggest their unity.  
However, it does not seem accidental that Vronskii perceives the richest tactile 
impressions of his horse’s body through his vision (“обнял одним общим взглядом … резко 
выступающие мышцы из-под сетки жил, растянутой в тонкой, подвижной и гладкой, как 
атлас, коже”). When he touches Frou-Frou, stroking her “strong” neck and fixing the mane on 
her “sharp” withers, his tactile impressions are not as rich as his visual impressions (“Вронский 
погладил ее крепкую шею, поправил на остром загривке перекинувшуюся на другую 
сторону прядь гривы…” 18:192). According to Montagu, it is touch rather than vision that is 
the most intimate of the senses. As was previously discussed, Stiva strokes his beloved 
daughter’s neck but only looks at his son, whom he loves less. The subtlety of Vronskii’s visual 
rather than tactile perceptions as he examines and admires Frou-Frou suggests his emotional 
alienation from her, despite his admiration of her physical strength and subtle form.  
As with his morality, Vronskii’s ambition also taints his love for Frou-Frou. Although 
she is a horse and not a human, she is a living being who deserves no less respect and care than a 
person. In fact, Tolstoi emphasizes her “humanity” by referring to her intelligence and her 
“speaking” gaze (“Она была одно из тех животных, которые, кажется, не говорят только 
потому, что механическое устройство их рта не позволяет им этого” 18:192; “смотрела на 
хозяина своим говорящим взглядом” 18:211). Though it seems that Vronskii loves his horse, 
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his love is contingent on her successful performance and therefore on his self-interest. The 
outcome of the race reveals the flaw in Vronskii’s affection for Frou-Frou. His tenderness grows 
along with his confidence in his victory: “теперь он был уверен в успехе. Волнение его, 
радость и нежность к Фру-Фру всё усиливались” (18:209), thus suggesting that his tenderness 
for Frou-Frou is not unconditional. Once Vronskii falls, he sees his competitor Makhotin racing 
past him. Driven by his ambition to continue the race, Vronskii cruelly kicks Frou-Frou with his 
boot and pulls at the reins, trying to force her onto her legs: “С изуродованным страстью 
лицом, бледный и с трясущеюся нижнею челюстью, Вронский ударил ее каблуком в 
живот и опять стал тянуть за поводья” (18:210). Vronskii’s frustrated ambition not only 
destroys his unity with Frou-Frou, but renders his touch violent. Vronskii can see only his failure 
and frustration and does not see his horse’s physical suffering. Tolstoi suggests that not only 
Frou-Frou but also Vronskii is “injured.” However, while Frou-Frou’s injury is physical, 
Vronskii’s “damage” is moral: when he hits Frou-Frou, his face is “disfigured with passion” 
(“изуродованным страстью лицом”). While Vronskii admires his horse’s beauty and 
performance so long as she satisfies his ambition, he not only disregards but also exacerbates her 
pain once she can no longer serve him.  
Vronskii leaves the racetrack in sorrow and frustration, but the ambiguous way in which 
Tolstoi renders Vronskii’s feelings makes it impossible to conclude if the character is upset for 
losing the race or breaking his horse’s back: “— Ааа! — промычал Вронский, схватившись за 
голову. — Ааа! что я сделал! — прокричал он. — И проигранная скачка! И своя вина, 
постыдная, непростительная! И эта несчастная, милая, погубленная лошадь! — Ааа! что я 
сделал!” (18:211). The ambiguity of Vronskii’s feelings shows his moral ambiguity. The fact 
that he cannot conceive of the gravity of moral injury to a living being (whom, furthermore, he 
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claims he loves), and cannot distinguish it from his vexation for losing the race, testifies to his 
moral degeneration. In addition, even if one accepts Vronskii’s genuine sorrow for Frou-Frou, 
his speedy recovery suggests that this “sorrow” is extremely short-lived, as is any sense of 
responsibility for Frou-Frou’s injury. He recovers from his frustration in just half an hour’s time 
and, the next day, seems to recall the event as if in the distant past. 
Vronskii’s haptic memory in Vrede’s garden, the aforementioned episode that takes place 
the morning after, reasserts Vronskii’s deficient moral sense. As was discussed in the chapter on 
Stiva, Stiva’s smile preserves the memory of his misdeed and triggers his recollection, 
interrupting his gustatory delights, upsetting him, and quickly wiping the smile from his face. 
Stiva’s haptic memory testifies to his moral sense, however rudimentary. Unlike Stiva’s body, 
Vronskii’s preserves no upsetting memories of the race. On the contrary, he delights in his body 
and even in the pain in his leg, which he hurt the day before during the fall: “ощупал упругую 
икру ноги, зашибленной вчера при падении. … Ему приятно было чувствовать эту легкую 
боль в сильной ноге” (18:331). Tolstoi introduces a hundred-page gap between the steeplechase 
episode and this episode, which takes place the next day. Not unusually for the novel, which 
frequently intertwines two plot lines and switches between locations, this gap gives the reader 
the false impression that there is a significant time gap between these two events, which naturally 
allows Vronskii to forget the steeplechase incident and carelessly delight in his pain without any 
recollection of his horse’s death. Vronskii’s mood also shifts from frustration after the race to a 
“joyful sense of life” (“радостное чувство жизни”) the next day, so radically that it reinforces 
the impression of a significant temporal interval between these two episodes. The pain in 
Vronskii’s leg not only leaves his “joyful sense of life” intact, but rather contributes to it: 
“впечатление радостного чувства жизни […] радостное сознание своего тела […] ощупал 
  
211 
упругую икру ноги, зашибленной вчера при падении […] Ему приятно было чувствовать 
эту легкую боль в сильной ноге” (18:331). Vronskii’s haptic forgetfulness reflects his moral 
ignorance.   
Vronskii also manifests his typically self-absorbed personality in his relationship with 
Anna. In this regard, Frou-Frou can be viewed as a surrogate for Anna. Just as Vronskii’s 
ambitious pursuit of victory renders him insensitive to his horse’s movements and causes mortal 
injury, his persistently throughtless pursuit of Anna renders him insensitive to her feelings and 
results in her ruin. The way in which Tolstoi refers to Vronskii’s “trembling jaw” (“с 
трясущеюся нижнею челюстью” 18:210; “с дрожащею нижнею челюстью” 18:157), 
depicting his bewilderment both as he stands by his injured horse and as he tries to calm Anna 
after their first act of intercourse, reinforces the association. Since Vronskii’s body is morally 
“unclean,” and since he perceives reality through the “lower” base senses, his love for Anna can 
only be carnal—self-absorbed and possessive rather than spiritually selfless and sacrificial (like 
Levin and Kitty’s). When Vronskii becomes acquainted with Anna on the train in Moscow, he is 
immediately attracted to her. However, Vronskii’s attraction to Anna manifests itself not as the 
innocent admiration for her beauty but rather as an envious and possessive urge to belong with 
her. Consistent with his corrupted morals, which encourage him to act on his passions, Vronskii 
disregards the fact that Anna is married with a son and does not consider pursuing her to be 
inappropriate.  
Tolstoi reveals Vronskii’s desire to belong with Anna through his envious gaze and 
touch. The gaze as well as the touch can be viewed as haptic elements in this scene, since 
Vronskii does not simply look at Anna but observes how she touches her brother Stiva. Anna 
touches Stiva twice during the scene. First, she leaves the train car to greet him at the railway 
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station. Vronskii watches Anna from the car: he sees how she approaches her brother and throws 
her arm around his neck. The resolve and gracefulness of the gesture stun Vronskii and cause 
him to smile with admiration: “она движением, поразившим Вронского своею 
решительностью и грацией, обхватила брата левою рукой за шею, быстро притянула к 
себе и крепко поцеловала. Вронский, не спуская глаз, смотрел на нее и, сам не зная чему, 
улыбался” (18:67). When Anna returns to the car to say goodbye to Mme. Vronskaia, Vronskii’s 
mother, with whom she traveled in the same car, she shakes hands with him as well. Vronskii 
seems to perceive their formal handshake personally: he registers the haptic qualities of her hand, 
its strong, brave, energetic movement. Moreover, he perceives these qualities of her hand as 
something “special,” and this gives him joy: “как чему-то особенному, обрадовался тому 
энергическому пожатию, с которым она крепко и смело тряхнула его руку” 18:68). It is 
possible that Vronskii is delighted to touch Anna because touch is a more intimate form of 
interaction that vision. He can now personally experience the strength and energy of her hand—
something that he could have only observed when Anna hugged her brother. Vronskii seems to 
think that the handshake has established a kind of intimate connection. The next time that Anna 
leaves the car to join her brother, leaning on his arm and chatting cheerfully, Vronskii suddenly 
regrets that their conversation has nothing to do with him: “В окно он видел, как она подошла 
к брату, положила ему руку на руку и что-то оживленно начала говорить ему, очевидно о 
чем-то не имеющем ничего общего с ним, с Вронским, и ему это показалось досадным” 
(18:68). Vronskii’s “досада” (regret, frustration) reflects his envy of Stiva and Anna’s intimate 
bond, which does not include him (“ничего общего с ним”).  
Vronskii’s envy of Anna’s intimate bond with Stiva becomes possessive after their brief 
conversation in the blizzard, on their way from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. Vronskii reads the 
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struggle in Anna’s face suggesting her attraction. When he returns to his car, he feels like a 
tsar—a status that represents being in the center and in control: “Вронский ничего и никого не 
видал. Он чувствовал себя царем, не потому, чтоб он верил, что произвел впечатление на 
Анну, — он еще не верил этому, — но потому, что впечатление, которое она произвела на 
него, давало ему счастье и гордость” (18:110).  
Tolstoi ridicules Vronskii, while also reminding the reader of his moral degeneration, 
when he mentions that Vronskii has “forgotten” about Anna’s husband and is particularly 
perplexed when he watches Karenin take Anna’s hand with an air of propriety: “«Ах, да! муж!» 
Теперь только в первый раз Вронский ясно понял то, что муж было связанное с нею лицо. 
… он увидал, как этот муж с чувством собственности спокойно взял ее руку” (18:112). 
Given that the scene is conveyed through Vronskii’s eyes, it is possible that Karenin’s gesture is 
not as possessive as Vronskii interprets it to be. Since Vronskii believes that he alone has the 
right to love Anna (“Он только зa собой признавал несомненное право любить ее” 18:112), 
he views Karenin as his rival and apparently reads his own desire for Anna’s possession into 
Karenin’s gesture. Vronskii’s love for Anna is self-centered, envious, and possessive—therefore, 
insensitive.   
Although Vronskii strives for unity with Anna, he does so by interfering with her existing 
bonds, reflecting carnal love’s general nature according to Tolstoi. Although examples of 
Vronskii’s interferences with Anna’s existing bonds are discussed in detail in the chapter on 
Anna, one more example may be added. In Moscow, when Anna enters the carriage with Stiva 
and they talk about the tragic death of a watchman under the train, Anna suddenly interrupts to 
ask about Vronskii. When Stiva responds with the hope that Vronskii will marry Kitty, Anna 
lingers, shaking her head as if trying to physically drive away something that has bothered her:  
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— А ты давно знаешь Вронского? — спросила она. 
— Да. Ты знаешь, мы надеемся, что он женится на Кити. 
— Да? — тихо сказала Анна. — Ну, теперь давай говорить о тебе, — прибавила 
она, встряхивая головой, как будто хотела физически отогнать что-то лишнее и 
мешавшее ей. (18:70) 
 
The “something” that Anna is trying to drive away seems to be her surfacing attraction to 
Vronskii, who is both “something superfluous” (“лишнее”) and a source of “disturbance” 
(“мешавшее”). While Vronskii’s interference in this episode may seem insignificant, as it only 
interrupts the course of Anna’s conversation with Stiva, his selfish pursuit of Anna severs her 
connections with countless others (almost everyone but Stiva), leaving her in a state of acute 
emotional isolation.   
Vronskii’s insensitivity is also reflected in the instance of his self-kiss on his hand. 
Although this episode was analyzed in the chapter on Anna, it is worthwhile to elaborate on 
Tolstoi’s representation of Vronskii in this episode. During Princess Betsy’s party, Anna casts a 
loving gaze on Vronskii, thus non-verbally confessing her love. When Vronskii escorts Anna to 
her carriage, he kisses her hand goodbye and feels that her gaze and touch burn him through: “Ее 
взгляд, прикосновение руки прожгли его” (18:149). While Vronskii had earlier sensed Anna’s 
hand, with its strong and energetic movements, when shaking hands after they first became 
acquainted, he now feels his own body when he kisses Anna’s hand goodbye. While the former 
episode suggests Vronskii’s attention to Anna’s body, the latter episode highlights his self-
absorption: he registers sensations of his own body but not of Anna’s. Anna’s touch increases 
Vronskii’s bodily self-awareness. When Tolstoi wants to emphasize instances when touch 
facilitates unity, he switches perspectives between the characters who touch (for instance, Stiva 
and his daughter, or Anna and her son) in order to reveal the sensations of both parties and thus 
the reciprocity of their touch. In this scene, Tolstoi only shows Vronskii’s perspective, 
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reinforcing the impression that Vronskii is only concerned with his own bodily sensations and 
the joy of being loved.  
The burning fervor that Vronskii feels when his romantic interest “looks at”/touches him 
is perhaps typical of any romantic relationship, as is the subsequent gesture of kissing his hand 
on the spot where Anna has touched it (“Он поцеловал свою ладонь в том месте, где она 
тронула его” 18:149). However, Tolstoi’s choice of Vronskii’s own hand, rather than any 
external memento of his and Anna’s shared touch, seems to be symptomatic of Vronskii’s self-
centered personality and is consistent with his (“reversible”) sensory delight in his own body 
(discussed at the beginning of this chapter). While kissing his own hand, Vronskii not only 
thinks of his love for Anna while delighting in the notion that these feelings are shared, but also 
evidently relishes in the successful pursuit. Instead of meditating on their feelings (as a person in 
love would most likely do), he thinks about the “goal” that he has achieved that evening: “Он 
поцеловал свою ладонь в том месте, где она тронула его, и поехал домой, счастливый 
сознанием того, что в нынешний вечер он приблизился к достижению своей цели более, 
чем в два последние месяца” (18:150). Vronskii’s rejoicing in securing Anna’s favor testifies 
to his self-interest.  
Tolstoi also reinforces Vronskii’s corporeal rather than spiritual predisposition by 
describing his intercourse with Anna as a murder with necrophilic overtones. It is true that the 
reference to murder reflects Tolstoi’s disapproval of sexuality, and especially his disapproval 
when sexual drives are satisfied outside of the marital bond. Tolstoi describes the couple’s kisses 
and caresses in a repugnant manner—the “jumping on,” “cutting,” and “hiding” of the corpse. 
Yet, the murder metaphor is also a commentary on Vronskii. Vronskii compares himself to a 
murderer, his intercourse with Anna with an act of murder, and the first period of their romance 
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as a corpse: “Он же чувствовал то, что должен чувствовать убийца, когда видит тело, 
лишенное им жизни. Это тело, лишенное им жизни, была их любовь, первый период их 
любви” (18:157). Furthermore, Vronskii also thinks of Anna’s body as a corpse that he “uses” 
nonetheless: “Но, несмотря на весь ужас убийцы пред телом убитого, надо резать на куски, 
прятать это тело, надо пользоваться тем, что убийца приобрел убийством” (18:158). 
Vronskii’s “necrophilic” tendencies in the scene reveal him as someone who is plunged in the 
midst of the corporeal and devoid of the spiritual.  
 As was discussed in the chapter on Anna, Tolstoi emphasizes the alienating nature of 
Vronskii’s touch by showing how the consummation of the couple’s passion leads to Anna’s 
acute sense of shame and isolation, with Vronskii’s hand/touch remaining her only possession: 
“Она держала его руку и не шевелилась. Да, эти поцелуи — то, что куплено этим стыдом. 
Да, и эта одна рука, которая будет всегда моею, — рука моего сообщника” (18:158). 
Though Vronskii admires Anna, he chases her as if their romance were little more than a 
competition, delighting in his victory. His selfish and persistent pursuit of Anna reasserts his 
inability to distinguish between love and ambition. Vronskii’s intertwined passion and drive 
render him superficial, unable to understand either the consequences of his pursuit or Anna’s 
feelings as the object of that pursuit. For instance, he cannot understand Anna’s moral 
devastation after their first act of intercourse, or why Anna cannot be entirely satisfied with their 
passion and cannot leave her son as their relationship evolves. Vronskii’s superficiality 
contributes to the couple’s inner divisions, even as they are united physically.       
Nonetheless, Vronskii does not always act out of self-interest. His relationship with Anna 
transforms him and awakens his ability to empathize. A scene taking place during their meeting 
in Vrede’s garden reveals the process of his transformation. The scene begins by demonstrating 
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Vronskii’s typical self-centeredness, which is reflected in his distinctively “reversible,” body-
centric sensory perceptions. When Vronskii sees Anna, her appearance excites him and 
stimulates his bodily self-awareness. He feels as if an electrical charge runs through him, filling 
his body with a “new force” flowing from his resilient legs to his breathing lungs, even tickling 
his lips: “тотчас же будто электрический ток пробежал по его телу. Он с новой силой 
почувствовал самого себя, от упругих движений ног до движения легких при дыхании, и 
что-то защекотало его губы” (18:331). However, when Anna bursts into tears as she shares 
Karenin’s decision to take away her son, her emotions suddenly move him, and Vronskii 
unexpectedly—perhaps even for himself—empathizes: “Он не мог бы сказать, что именно так 
тронуло его; ему было жалко ее” (18:334). Tolstoi describes the way in which Vronskii senses 
Anna’s grief as “touch” (“тронуло его”). Although Tolstoi uses the verb “тронуть/touch” only 
figuratively, to express Vronskii’s receptiveness to Anna’s emotions, the verb produces the 
impression of an invisible but corporeal bond surfacing between them, as if joining them into one 
“intercorporeal” whole. Vronskii’s sensory perception responds to her distress, revealing his 
compassion: Vronskii feels something rising in his throat, tickling his nose, and for the first time 
feels ready to cry. “Он почувствовал тоже, что что-то поднимается к его горлу, щиплет ему 
вносу, и он первый раз в жизни почувствовал себя готовым заплакать” (18:334).  
Anna seems to evoke not only Vronskii’s compassion but also his moral sense. His 
sensory response to Anna’s distress reveals that his carnal passion has developed into a deeper 
emotional connection, in which he has overcome his self-centeredness and undergone a moral 
awakening. Apart from feeling sorry for Anna and wishing to help her, Vronskii also realizes 
that he had done something wrong, that he is to be blamed for Anna’s suffering: “ему было 
жалко ее, и он чувствовал, что не может помочь ей, и вместе с тем знал, что он виною ее 
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несчастья, что он сделал что-то нехорошее” (18:334). Vronskii finally recognizes the 
importance of Anna’s son—something that he had not understood in the past. He asks Anna if 
she could possibly take her son with her upon leaving Karenin: “Разве нельзя взять сына и всё-
таки оставить его [Каренина]?” (18:335).  
 Vronskii’s inability to name these sensations and feelings precisely (“что-то 
поднимается к его горлу”, “сделал что-то нехорошее”; emphasis added) reflects the novelty 
of his moral experience, and thus his persistently poor understanding of what morality is. In his 
case, it derives from his sensory perception. The fact that Vronskii’s body responds to Anna’s 
distress before his mind does, testifies to the physical rather than intellectual/spiritual nature of 
his moral sense, thus suggesting its limitations. Vronskii cannot completely overcome his self-
centeredness, contributing to the tension in his relationship and aggravating his discord with 
Anna. 
Although Vronskii undergoes a moral awakening, this does not lead to the complete 
transformation of his personality. His ambition and passion continue to dominate his mindset. On 
her “deathbed,” Anna tries to repent, recognizing Karenin’s moral superiority and begging for 
his forgiveness. She does so also on Vronskii’s behalf. As she does this, she asks Karenin to take 
Vronskii’s hands away from his face, as Vronskii has been hiding his face in his hands. When 
Karenin fulfills her request, Vronskii feels gravely ashamed. The moral superiority and 
generosity of Anna’s husband, whom Vronskii had viewed as a ridiculous figure according to his 
former honor code, stuns and humiliates him: “Роли вдруг изменились. Вронский чувствовал 
его высоту и свое унижение, его правоту и свою неправду. Он почувствовал, что муж был 
великодушен и в своем горе, а он низок, мелочен в своем обмане” (18:437). In addition, 
once Vronskii realizes that he has lost Anna, his passion for her suddenly escalates and 
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aggravates his suffering. Losing Anna and suffering humiliation from her husband, Vronskii 
loses the two driving forces that have comprised his life’s meaning: his passion and his ambition.  
The fact that ambition and passion are the most powerful triggers for Vronskii’s bodily 
self-awareness (“радостное сознание своего тела”) suggests that he believes that these alone 
comprise his life’s meaning. It is not accidental, then, that having lost his life’s only value, 
Vronskii strives for physical annihilation and attempts suicide:   
Мысль его быстро обежала жизнь вне его любви к Анне. 
«Честолюбие? Серпуховской? Свет? Двор?» Ни на чем он не мог остановиться. 
Всё это имело смысл прежде, но теперь ничего этого уже не было. […] 
«Разумеется», повторил он, когда в третий раз мысль его направилась опять по 
тому же самому заколдованному кругу воспоминаний и мыслей, и, приложив 
револьвер к левой стороне груди и сильно дернувшись всей рукой, как бы вдруг 
сжимая ее в кулак, он потянул за гашетку. (18:439)  
 
Vronskii’s attempted suicide can be viewed as a form of self-touch, consistent with his typically 
self-centered personality. While his genuine compassion for Anna helps him overcome his 
preoccupation with himself, his hurt pride and humiliation as he loses her aggravate his self-
absorption. Although Vronskii does recognize his past ambitions as being of false value, he 
undergoes no epiphany and acquires no insight into the meaning of his life or of life in general 
(unlike Levin, who seeks and finds the meaning of life in the world of nature and human 
community, even when Kitty temporary rejects him). Unlike Levin, Vronskii has no pursuits 
extending beyond his own personality or, one can say, his own body, given that Tolstoi equates 
the two in Vronskii’s case. Since Vronskii’s pursuits are body- and self-centered, their failure 
results in an attempt to destroy both—the body and the self. Vronskii’s self-touch—be it 
pleasurable or destructive—testifies to the immoral nature of his self-centeredness, which causes 
harm not only to others but also to Vronskii himself.          
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Vronskii’s haptic interactions with Anna reveal that his emerging morality battles but 
never overcomes his preoccupation with himself. On the one hand, Vronskii sympathizes with 
Anna, takes responsibility for her life, and sacrifices his military career for her. He shows 
compassion and patience with her, even when she (unfairly) accuses him of unfaithfulness and 
torments him with obstinate jealousy and antagonism. Despite the tensions between them, 
Vronskii is capable of yielding to Anna’s wishes. He initiates reconciliation with her in the 
course of one of their numerous arguments. When he returns home from a party later than Anna 
had expected, she reproaches him for being insensitive to her hardship, leaving her alone while 
enjoying his social freedom. Anna’s reproach initiates their argument; however, after a brief 
exchange of caustic remarks, Vronskii pauses and opens his hand for her to take, unwilling to 
continue fighting: “— Анна, зачем, зачем? — сказал он после минуты молчания, 
перегибаясь к ней, и открыл руку, надеясь, что она положит в нее свою” (19:283). 
Vronskii’s insensitivity and Anna’s jealousy cause an emotional gap between them, reflected in 
the corporeal space that separates them. Vronskii’s open hand reflects an invitation to unity, an 
effort to bridge that gap.  
As Vronskii tries to establish his unity with Anna by opening his hand, Anna rejects the 
gesture, undermining their touch and thus their unity. Although Anna is glad of his “invitation to 
tenderness” (“вызову к нежности”) and wants to respond to it (“отдаться своему влечению”), 
she feels that “some strange power of evil” (“какая-то странная сила зла”) will not allow her to 
reciprocate. Despite her genuine tenderness, Anna is unwilling to yield and lose the argument, to 
admit that her jealousy and accusations may be unfounded. Driven by her desire to win, Anna 
does not take Vronskii’s hand, giving him a bitter answer once again. So, he closes his hand and 
moves away: “Рука его закрылась, он отклонился, и лицо его приняло еще более, чем 
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прежде, упорное выражение” (19:283). His closed hand suggests his withdrawal from Anna, 
leaving them as isolated entities, with an unbridged (and, ultimately, unbridgeable) gap between 
them.  
Vronskii’s moral awakening pushes him to act outside of his “honor code,” taking 
genuine care of Anna and even initiating reconciliation with her, trying to establish unity 
between them. However, Vronskii is unwilling to give up his social freedom and continues 
enjoying the luxuries of his social life, of which Anna is deprived, inciting her jealousy and 
aggravating their conflict. Although it is true that Anna is to be blamed for the failure of 
Vronskii’s attempt at reconciliation, it is also true that Vronskii, for all his sacrifices, remains 
insensitive to Anna’s needs. Drawing a comparison between Vronskii-Anna’s and Levin-Kitty’s 
relationships, Tolstoi shows that Levin is willing to give up his hunting for Kitty’s comfort, and 
that it is this sensitivity to Kitty’s wishes that consolidates their unity. Despite his efforts, 
Vronskii remains insensitive to Anna’s social and emotional isolation, unwilling to sacrifice his 
interests for her as Levin does for Kitty. Anna and Vronskii’s inability to achieve reconciliation 
reflects the nature of their carnal love, which causes the attraction-repulsion in their relationship 
and between their hands.     
While Anna severs their touch and thus their chance for reconciliation in the episode 
described above, Vronskii does the same a bit later. Tolstoi shows that while, despite Vronskii 
and Anna’s arguments, Vronskii is capable of feeling compassion for Anna’s suffering, his 
compassion is not strong enough to override his irritation. When Vronskii, annoyed by Anna’s 
unreasonable obstinacy, is about to leave the room, he for a moment thinks that Anna has said 
something and is suddenly struck by compassion. He lingers, inviting Anna to share her 
concerns, but when she stubbornly refuses to do so, he exits the room as he had intended. 
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However, upon leaving, he notices her pale face and quivering lips in the mirror. He wants to 
comfort her again, but before he can come up with anything to say, his legs carry him out as if 
driven by inertia:  
«Я ни в чем не виноват пред нею, — думал он. Если она хочет себя наказывать, 
tant pis pour elle». Но, выходя, ему показалось, что она сказала что-то, и сердце его 
вдруг дрогнуло от состраданья к ней. 
— Что, Анна? — спросил он. 
— Я ничего, — отвечала она так же холодно и спокойно. 
«А ничего, так tant pis», подумал он, опять похолодев, повернулся и пошел. 
Выходя, он в зеркало увидал ее лицо, бледное, с дрожащими губами. Он и хотел 
остановиться и сказать ей утешительное слово, но ноги вынесли его из комнаты, 
прежде чем он придумал, что сказать. (19:329–30)     
 
In this last section of the scene, Tolstoi contrasts Vronskii’s compassionate vision with his 
neglectful haptic perception (that is, his seeing Anna’s suffering in the mirror to his feeling his 
legs carry him out of the room).  
As previously discussed, Vronskii’s vision fails to connect him with the external world in 
the carriage scene, when he sees the world only as a framed picture. Likewise, Vronskii’s visual 
(as opposed to tactile) perception of Frou-Frou reflects his emotional alienation, despite his 
admiration of her form. In both of these scenes, Vronskii’s visual perception suggests his limited 
moral sense. However, in this scene, Vronskii’s vision is associated with his compassion, thus 
reasserting his moral awakening.  Nonetheless, Vronskii’s vision here is indirect: he notices 
Anna’s upset face not when he looks at her, but when he looks at her reflection in the mirror. His 
indirect gaze suggests his alienation from Anna despite his compassion—his lack of 
determination to reach out to her, and thus his limited ability to connect. The inertia of 
Vronskii’s legs (his haptic perception) overrides—or rather outruns—his moral impulse for 
compassion, which suggests that Vronskii’s selfish antagonism eventually prevails over any 
selfless moral sense.  
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By portraying Vronskii’s bodily self-awareness, Tolstoi points to Vronskii’s self-
centeredness and overbearing ambition, which render him insensitive and undermine his ability 
to connect. During the race, Vronskii’s ambition confuses his proprioceptive perception and 
interrupts his perfectly synchronized movements with his horse, leading to his loss and Frou-
Frou’s death. Vronskii’s physical “cleanliness” reflects his moral corruption, which is also 
suggested by his limited vision. Vronskii’s ambition and corrupted honor code undermine his 
ability to connect with Anna: her love for him enhances his bodily self-awareness, which reflects 
his joy but simultaneously reasserts his self-absorption and neglect of the consequences that his 
thoughtless courtship has on Anna’s life. Although Vronskii does undergo a moral awakening 
when his senses respond to Anna’s distress, and he does try to take care of her, he often remains 
insensitive to her feelings, unable to yield his interests to hers—exacerbating their alienation 
from one another and preventing them from achieving unity.  
7. Koznyshev and Varen’ka  
Unlike Levin and Kitty, Sergei Koznyshev and Varen’ka demonstrate another example of 
unsuccessful unity. This brief section analyzes both characters to show how their haptic 
experiences reflect their alienation from life’s corporeal layer, which consequently undermines 
their chance to establish a union.   
 Koznyshev is a philosopher-idealist whose “idealism” reflects his disbelief in the world’s 
material foundations. Koznyshev’s philosophical idealism is reflected in the way in which he 
interacts with the world—particularly with the world of nature, which Tolstoi seems to view as 
the epitome of material/corporeal life. Tolstoi portrays Koznyshev vis-à-vis Levin, thus 
emphasizing the brothers’ opposing ways of interacting with nature. While Levin interacts with 
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the world of nature through his muscles, dexterity, and sweat, Koznyshev only brushes against it 
without immersing himself through corporeal force. 
A fishing episode provides perhaps the best example of Koznyshev’s alienation from 
nature. When Koznyshev decides to go fishing, he does not want to walk and asks Levin to take 
him by carriage instead. Through his unwillingness to walk, Koznyshev avoids using his 
muscular strength and uses an intermediary (a carriage) in its place. Tolstoi also shows that 
Koznyshev avoids physical contact with nature when he refuses to walk through wet grass to 
reach the riverbank. Although Koznyshev is comfortable with sunbathing or lounging on the 
bank, he is physically uncomfortable with touching the wet grass, so his contact with nature is 
superficial, limited to pleasant experiences that do not require him to challenge his physical 
abilities or personal hygiene. His contact with the road and with the grass is indirect, mediated 
through the carriage. 
Being alienated from the world of nature, Koznyshev even causes it harm, interfering 
with its reproductive forces (though inadvertently and only on a minor scale). As the carriage 
moves through the grass, it pulls seeds from the earth as they stick to the wheels (presumably, to 
be wasted: crushed or left elsewhere on uncultivated earth). Koznyshev’s selfish and carefree 
treatment of nature apparently causes Levin much distress, as Tolstoi’s wistful tone in his 
depiction of the seeds on the carriage wheels seems to suggest: 
Утренняя роса еще оставалась внизу на густом подседе травы, и Сергей Иванович, 
чтобы не мочить ноги, попросил довезти себя по лугу в кабриолете до того 
ракитового куста, у которого брались окуни. Как ни жалко было Константину 
Левину мять свою траву, он въехал в луг. Высокая трава мягко обвивалась около 
колес и ног лошади, оставляя свои семена на мокрых спицах и ступицах. (18:255) 
 
At the river, Koznyshev meditates on the beauty of nature but catches no fish, which, once again, 
reasserts his alienation from the natural world. In other words, Koznyshev’s interest in 
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philosophy, and particularly in its idealist branch, results in his ignorance of the value of the 
material world, which he perceives only as an aesthetic category and a prompt for philosophical 
meditation rather than as the source of life.  
 Koznyshev’s philosophical idealism is also reflected in his personal relations. Koznyshev 
remains faithful to the memory of a woman, Marie, to whom he apparently had been married, 
and who has since died. In other words, Koznyshev invests his emotions in the immaterial ghost 
of the woman he loved. Commenting on his half-brother, Levin points out that Koznyshev is 
unlikely to marry Varen’ka because he lives only an “ideal” or “spiritual” life and cannot 
reconcile it with “mundane reality,” and thus with Varen’ka as a real woman: “он так привык 
жить одною духовною жизнью, что не может примириться с действительностью” (19:131). 
Koznyshev’s “idealism” is a negative rather than positive trait. Despite his intellectualism, 
Tolstoi suggests that Koznyshev’s personality is deficient (“недостаток”); he lacks, as Levin 
says, the “force of life” (“сила жизни”), the desire to persistently strive for a chosen goal: 
“недостаток чего-то … недостаток силы жизни, того, что называют сердцем, того 
стремления, которое заставляет человека из всех бесчисленных представляющихся путей 
жизни выбрать один и желать этого одного” (18:253). Tolstoi associates Koznyshev’s lack of 
“life force” with his lack of “heart,” which, in the context of haptic theory, could result not only 
in his dispassionate personality and loyalty to a deceased lover, but also in his insufficient 
corporeality. Koznyshev’s alienation from the material / corporeal layer of life undermines his 
ability to establish unity with Varen’ka.   
Unlike Koznyshev, Varen’ka is mundane: she volunteers at a German spa, rendering 
practical help to the patients (for instance, bringing them glasses of water or blankets, walking 
with a blind woman or a child). Her practical help for other people seems to immerse her in the 
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very texture of the material world. However, her practicality conceals her emotional alienation in 
intimate relations. Despite her selfless service and ability to connect with a vast body of patients 
at the spa (for example, she effortlessly calms Nikolai Levin when he makes a public scene), she 
does not connect with any of them on a personal level.  Just like Koznyshev, her heart has been 
broken: she was in love with a man who, obeying his mother’s request, married another woman. 
In other words, Varen’ka does not seek new love, but dwells on her lost one as Koznyshev does.   
Varen’ka’s nickname “Angel” reflects not only the rightfully-earned title for her 
kindness, but also her tranquil—verging on cold and dispassionate—personality.  In fact, Tolstoi 
describes Varen’ka as “cold” on a number of occasions. For instance, when she comes across a 
song that she used to sing for her beloved, she quickly overcomes her emotional agitation and 
sings in a typically “calm” and “cold” manner (“И она спела это так же спокойно, холодно и 
хорошо, как и прежде” 18:233). Despite her kindness, Varen’ka is emotionally alienated and 
cold.  
Varen’ka’s coldness is also indirectly suggested in her lack of sensuality. As Kitty 
comments, Varen’ka lacks the life force, or the “fire of life” (“огонь жизни”; emphasis added), 
associated with the sense of one’s own attractiveness. While Kitty is aware of and delights in her 
own attractiveness, as at the ball at the beginning of the novel, Varen’ka lacks this sense: “… она 
не могла быть привлекательною для мужчин еще и потому, что ей недоставало того, чего 
слишком много было в Кити — сдержанного огня жизни и сознания своей 
привлекательности” (18:233). Kitty concludes that Varen’ka’s lack of the inner “fire of life” 
renders her dispassionate and thus unattractive to men.  
Despite Varen’ka’s practicality, Kitty describes Varen’ka to Levin as “spiritual” and 
alienated from mundane “reality,” implying her selfless and dispassionate personality: “— Да, 
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но в ней [Вареньке] нет этой действительности, как во мне [Кити] […]. Она вся 
духовная...” (19:132).   Her “spirituality” is reflected in her physique: she has a dry body and a 
disproportionally big head (“слишком большая сухость тела и несоразмерная голова, по 
среднему росту” 18:227). In the context of Plato’s mind/body division, Varen’ka’s 
“disproportionally big head” compared to her “too dry” body (producing the impression of a 
body lacking in meat/muscle/flesh, as least in this introductory portrayal) could suggest that the 
“mind/spirit” is dominant. Kitty and Varen’ka’s hands come into contact during their handshake, 
which serves to contrast Varen’ka’s calm, motionless, and impassive handshake with Kitty’s 
strong, energetic and passionate one. While Kitty’s handshake suggests her strong muscles, 
Varen’ka’s hand lacks muscular strength: “Кити покраснела от радости и долго молча жала 
руку своего нового друга, которая не отвечала на её пожатие, но неподвижно лежала в её 
руке” (18:230).  
For all of Varen’ka selfless service to others, her meek hand and dry body suggest her 
insufficient corporeality, her deficiency. Varen’ka’s tranquility is not so much an expression of 
her self-asserted composure as it is of her resignation—her lack of any wish or desire, which 
manifestly differentiates her from Kitty: “с грустным разочарованием, ничего не желавшая, 
ничего не жалевшая” (18:236). Varen’ka insists that she is happy, but asserts this happiness 
using a double negative structure (“I am not unhappy”) before a positive statement (“I am very 
happy”): “я не несчастна; напротив, я очень счастлива” (18:234). The double negative 
produces the impression that Varen’ka is trying to convince herself that she is happy. Tolstoi 
suggests that Varen’ka’s impassive personality is not entirely inborn. As Kitty notices when 
Varen’ka shares the story of her past love, a “little flame” (“огонек”) seems to kindle up in her, 
which, Kitty guesses, used to illuminate her whole being: “— Я любила его, и он любил меня; 
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но его мать не хотела, и он женился на другой. Он теперь живет недалеко от нас, и я 
иногда вижу его. Вы не думали, что у меня тоже был роман? — сказала она, и в красивом 
лице ее чуть брезжил тот огонек, который, Кити чувствовала, когда-то освещал ее всю” 
(18:233). Since Tolstoi associates even Levin and Kitty’s non-carnal love with their manifest 
physicality, Varen’ka’s incorporeality—her dry body, meek hand, and “little” flame (contrasted 
with Kitty’s overabundant “fire of life”)—reflects her resignation from desiring a personal, 
intimate connection with another, and therefore a retreat from love.    
Nonetheless, as was discussed in the chapter on Kitty and Levin, Tolstoi suggests that 
Kitty and Varen’ka’s friendship changes not only Kitty but also Varen’ka. When Kitty has a 
heated argument with Varen’ka shortly before her departure, manifesting her typically passionate 
nature and rejecting Varen’ka’s tranquil but dispassionate lifestyle, she grabs Varen’ka’s 
umbrella and opens and closes it frantically, breaking a spring:  
— Ах, как глупо, гадко! Не было мне никакой нужды... Всё притворство! — 
говорила она, открывая и закрывая зонтик. […] 
Варенька в шляпе и с зонтиком в руках сидела у стола, рассматривая пружину, 
которую сломала Кити. (18:248–49) 
 
Varen’ka umbrella, a mechanism that can only function if it is finely constructed, seems to 
suggest Varen’ka’s measured lifestyle. The damaged spring, broken by Kitty, suggests that 
Varen’ka, too, undergoes a transformation under Kitty’s influence. Perhaps it is therefore not 
accidental that it is Kitty who acquaints Varen’ka with the man whom she begins to fancy for the 
first time after her unhappy past.   
However, since both Koznyshev and Varen’ka are alienated from life’s corporeal layer, 
they fail to form a union—to become “one flesh” through the sacrament of marriage. Despite 
their mutual sympathy and consideration of one another as a perfect match, both of them have 
doubts about marriage. In spite of their mutual attraction, they are not passionate enough about 
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one another. Koznyshev views Varen’ka as the perfect wife but still feels conflicted about 
betraying the memory of his late beloved: “«Но, кроме этого, сколько бы я ни искал, я ничего 
не найду, что бы сказать против моего чувства. Если бы я выбирал одним разумом, я 
ничего не мог бы найти лучше»” (19:136). Varen’ka, too, is conflicted about her feelings for 
Koznyshev. She lists the rational, social advantages of their marriage, but she cannot decide 
whether she loves him or not, concluding that she is “almost certainly” in love with him. 
Consistent with her own doubts, she is equally afraid of whether he will or will not propose: 
“Быть женой такого человека, как Кознышев, после своего положения у госпожи Шталь 
представлялось ей верхом счастья. Кроме того, она почти была уверена, что она влюблена 
в него” (19:137). 
  The degree of the pair’s alienation from the corporeal and therefore from one another 
becomes explicit during their “declaration of love,” which, in fact, never takes place. Although 
Koznyshev eventually decides to propose to Varen’ka, he fails to physically pronounce his 
proposal out loud, which is consistent with his alienation from the corporeal. Tolstoi graphically 
symbolizes the division between Koznyshev’s mind and body, dividing Koznyshev’s “proposal” 
with a chapter break. At the end of Part 6 Chapter IV, Koznyshev sees Varen’ka picking 
mushrooms and resolutely walks towards her in order to propose. Part 6 Chapter V begins with 
what the reader understands to be Koznyshev’s proposal speech. By the end of the speech, 
however, the reader realizes that Koznyshev has pronounced the speech only in his mind, while 
remaining ten steps away from Varen’ka:     
Он почувствовал, что решился. Варенька, только что присевшая, чтобы поднять 
гриб, гибким движением поднялась и оглянулась. Бросив сигару, Сергей Иванович 
решительными шагами направился к ней.   
[End of Part 6. Chapter IV.] 
[Beginning of Part 6. Chapter V.] «Варвара Андреевна, когда я был еще очень 
молод, я составил себе идеал женщины, которую я полюблю и которую я буду 
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счастлив назвать своею женой. Я прожил длинную жизнь и теперь в первый раз 
встретил в вас то, чего искал. ».  
Сергей Иванович говорил себе это в то время, как он был уже в десяти шагах от 
Вареньки. (19:135–36) 
 
Koznyshev’s alienation from the corporeal layer of life, from “mundane” reality 
(“действительность”), undermines his ability to speak—to act on a corporeal and not only 
intellectual level. Koznyshev offers his “hand” to Varen’ka (“Я люблю вас и предлагаю вам 
руку”) only in his imagination, not in actual life.  
 Like Koznyshev, Varen’ka proves helpless in the face of romance—the chance to 
establish an intimate personal bond. Tolstoi does not refer to Varen’ka’s haptic experiences in 
this scene as he does in Koznyshev’s case. However, Varen’ka’s lack of corporeal awareness 
may be seen in her failure to recognize and use her attractiveness to encourage Koznyshev. 
Instead of facilitating Koznyshev’s confession, Varen’ka, to the contrary, distracts him as if by 
accident, slipping into a discussion about mushrooms and undermining Koznyshev’s troubled 
efforts to propose: 
Вареньке лучше было молчать. После молчания можно было легче сказать то, 
что они хотели сказать, чем после слов о грибах; но против своей воли, как будто 
нечаянно, Варенька сказала: 
— Так вы ничего не нашли? Впрочем, в середине леса всегда меньше. […]        
Он повторял себе и слова, которыми он хотел выразить свое предложение; но 
вместо этих слов, по какому-то неожиданно пришедшему ему соображению, он 
вдруг спросил: 
— Какая же разница между белым и березовым? (19:137–38) 
 
Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s “love confession” ends in their separation, which Tolstoi shows 
through their movements. When Koznyshev is about to confess to Varen’ka, they walk closely to 
one another and away from the crowd of children, forging alone into the woods. When 
Koznyshev fails to propose, they return to the estate together, but do not touch. The gap between 
their bodies reasserts their alienation. Despite their mutual sympathy, both of them decide 
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against the marriage rationally rather than emotionally. Their lack of corporeality, which results, 
Tolstoi seems to suggest, in their insufficient attraction, weakens their wish to be wed and thus 
undermines their evolving bond. Their physical proximity never results in physical contact, just 
as their mutual sympathy never concludes in unity.  
 While Koznyshev fails to offer his “hand” to Varen’ka in marriage (figuratively 
speaking), Varen’ka’s previously discussed “impassive” hand seems too meek to reach out to 
Koznyshev, too. Neither of them is “corporeal” enough to facilitate their unity. Kitty summarizes 
Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s failed connection with what seems to be an idiomatic expression, 
which is also imbued with haptic meaning:  
Кити не нужно было спрашивать Вареньку; она по спокойным и несколько 
пристыженным выражениям обоих лиц поняла, что планы ее не сбылись. 
— Ну, что? — спросил ее муж, когда они опять возвращались домой. 
— Не берет, — сказала Кити […]. 
— Как не берет? 
— Вот так, — сказала она, взяв руку мужа, поднося ее ко рту и дотрогиваясь до нее 
нераскрытыми губами. — Как у архиерея руку целуют. 
— У кого же не берет? — сказал он смеясь. 
— У обоих. […] (19:138–39; emphasis added) 
 
On the one hand, Kitty’s expression “не берет” may derive from an idiom, perhaps something 
like “брать за душу/touch somebody’s heart,” thus suggesting Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s lack 
of passion for one another. On the other hand, if read literally, the expression has a particularly 
haptic connotation and refers to implied hands: “[it] does not take/grab.” The latter, then, may 
refer to Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s non-meeting hands, the gap between them embodying their 
failed unity. Their alienation from the corporeal layer of life reflects their equal reluctance to 
desire and thus “grab” the desired, which hampers their chance for unity.
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Conclusion  
Drawing on haptic theory, this dissertation has demonstrated the relationship between 
Tolstoi’s views on morality and his representation of sensory, and particularly haptic, 
experiences in Anna Karenina, arguing that the characters’ moral strengths and weaknesses 
affect (by facilitating or frustrating) their physical contact with one another and the world. In 
keeping with his anxiety over human sexuality, Tolstoi depicts sexuality as a force that, if 
indulged, severs human relations, dividing people on both emotional and corporeal levels. 
Stiva’s sensuality, reflected in his sensory indulgence in mundane phenomena, interferes with his 
touch with his wife. His ambiguous morality and promiscuity lead to Dolly’s emotional 
alienation and introduce a gap between their hands. In keeping with Merleau-Ponty’s conception 
of touch as an instant of “entwinement” between two individual bodies who form a single 
“intercorporeal” whole, Stiva and Dolly’s interrupted touch reveals that Stiva’s sensuality 
breaches rather than facilitates this “entwinement.” Tolstoi’s representation of Dolly’s haptic 
experience (the pain in her nipples from breastfeeding) suggests that her identity is that of a 
mother, rather than of a sexual being, and reveals that Dolly is an embodiment of one of 
Tolstoi’s moral ideals in the novel (along with Levin and Kitty). The fact that Dolly’s haptic 
experiences are few suggests that she has found a balance between body and soul, something that 
other characters still seek and to which their ample haptic (and sensory) experiences seem to 
testify. 
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While Anna manages to re-connect Stiva’s family members through her touch at the 
beginning of the novel, her evolving passion for Vronskii jeopardizes her touch with not only her 
husband and her children, but also with Vronskii himself. Anna’s eyes become “impenetrable” to 
Karenin’s gaze, indicating that her sexual desire erects a barrier between her and her husband. 
Anna’s “impenetrable shield of lies” seems to cover not only her eyes but also her skin, delaying 
the sensation of Karenin’s touch and thus enabling her to conceal her physical aversion to him. 
The “impenetrable” visual and haptic “wall” between Anna and Karenin indicates that Anna’s 
passion divides them into two individual entities, rendering her unwilling to reciprocate 
Karenin’s gaze and touch and thus preventing them from merging into an “intercorporeal” 
whole. Although Anna never stops loving her son by Karenin, she chooses her passion for 
Vronskii over her motherly love. The way in which Anna uses Vronskii’s picture to unstick her 
son’s and the way in which her attention seamlessly shifts from her son to Vronskii, as she 
unsticks the picture, reflect the shift in Anna’s feelings. Her passion for Vronskii begins to 
dominate her love for her son, just like the picture of Vronskii dominates her attention in the 
scene. Anna is also alienated from her daughter by Vronskii: she touches her child as if out of 
duty, feeling no genuinely emotional attachment to her. Tolstoi suggests that Anna’s passion for 
Vronskii diminishes her motherly love for their daughter. While Anna and Vronskii consummate 
their passion on a physical level, they fail to form a stable, emotionally close unity. Unlike Levin 
and Kitty, Anna and Vronskii overcome their disagreements only temporarily. They prove 
unable to maintain a mutually respectful relationship and care for one another, rather than acting 
on their individual interests regardless of the other party’s feelings. Tolstoi shows that the 
characters’ carnal attraction, in place of genuine affection and respect for one another’s 
personality and needs, cannot serve as a foundation for their emotional bond, resulting not only 
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in their emotional but also corporeal (haptic) estrangement. Their mutual reproaches cause 
tension in their relationship and consistently interrupt their physical contact, revealing that their 
carnal attraction is not a sufficient means to bind them into an “intercorporeal” whole. In 
addition, the fragmentation of Anna’s increasingly distorted haptic experiences and other 
sensations reveals that her sensuality has estranged her not only from other people but also from 
external reality in general. 
The haptic experiences of Karenin, Vronskii, Koznyshev, and Varen’ka suggest that 
sexuality is not the only cause of alienation between people. Karenin’s fear of empathy causes 
him bodily discomfort: he cracks his knuckles as if relieving the discomfort of a dislocated joint 
every time he has to deal with a matter requiring his emotional involvement—either at work or in 
his relationship with Anna. His irritation with her and his desire to take revenge for the pain 
caused by her unfaithfulness complements this emotional distress with a physical one: the 
irritation makes his body sore while riding in a carriage, causing him to move and stretch to 
ameliorate the ache. He accidentally displaces a warm rug and exposes his bony, sensitive legs to 
the winter cold. The fact that Karenin’s physical suffering derives from his reluctance to forgive 
indicates that his lack of empathy hurts him as much as it hurts Anna. Karenin’s bodily 
discomfort conveys Tolstoi’s notion that Karenin’s restrained sensitivity, associated with 
religious hypocrisy, is his moral flaw. In addition to Anna’s passion for Vronskii, Karenin’s 
emotional restraint erects the second “impenetrable” barrier between them, rendering him first 
unable and later unwilling to reach out to Anna. Their haptic interaction reflects Karenin’s 
alienation from Anna: his restrained but gentle touch before Anna’s romance transforms into a 
violent grab so strong that it presses Anna’s bracelet into her skin, causing her pain. Karenin’s 
physical contact with Anna during her postpartum fever is the sole exception to his emotional 
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restraint, when he succumbs to empathy. The transformation in Karenin’s emotional state is 
reflected in his touch: when he touches Anna’s burning body, he senses the heat of Anna’s skin. 
Karenin’s physical sensitivity to Anna’s body reflects his emotional compassion for her 
suffering.  
Vronskii’s haptic experiences reveal his self-absorption and ambition as moral flaws. 
Vronskii’s acute awareness of his bodily sensations and especially his self-touch (on his leg, still 
hurting after the race accident, and on his hand, on the spot where Anna had touched it) reflect 
his self-absorption. His self-absorption leads him to ignore the harm that his selfish pursuits have 
caused both Kitty and Anna, and thus associates bodily awareness with amorality. Vronskii’s 
failure to synchronize his movements with his horse during the race suggests that his ambition 
undermines his kinesthetic perception. Vronskii urges Frou-Frou to run unnecessarily fast, 
wishing her not only to win the race but also to come in a long first. When Frou-Frou manages to 
gallop faster, Vronskii fails to keep up with her speed and movements, landing on her back 
earlier than the movement requires, breaking her back, and losing the race. Vronskii’s ambition 
not only results in failure, revealing his aims to be vain, but also forefronts his insensitivity to the 
horse’s injury. Realizing that he has lost the race, Vronskii cruelly kicks his horse in the stomach 
with his boot. Although he seems to feel some compassion for her when he comes to his senses, 
he quickly forgets about both his failure and Frou-Frou’s death (a result of the accident). He 
joyfully delights in the pain of his leg, hurt by the fall, as early as the next day—having the 
recollection of his fall, but no guilt for Frou-Frou’s death. The absence of his haptic memory of 
the event reveals his absent moral sense in the early stages of his relationship with Anna. 
Although Vronskii undergoes an emotional and moral transformation, learning to empathize with 
Anna, his unwillingness to give up the active social life that is now inaccessible to her aggravates 
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her jealousy and resentment. Vronskii’s acting on his own interests, regardless of the pain which 
his actions cause Anna, suggests that his moral sense remains limited although it begins to 
evolve. Vronskii and Anna’s resentment alienates them from one another on both emotional and 
haptic levels, reflected in instances of their interrupted touch.     
Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s haptic experiences testify to the dominance of their 
intellectual rather than sensual makeup, which Tolstoi reveals through their alienation from life’s 
corporality: Koznyshev avoids proper, manual engagement with the world of nature, and 
Varen’ka, for all of her work at the spa, has a meek, unmuscular hand that suggests a lack of 
sensuality. A haptic analysis suggests that Koznyshev’s and Varen’ka’s alienation from the 
corporeal reflects their lack of passion. They doubt their wish to marry, despite their mutual 
sympathy, which undermines their communication and prevents them from revealing their 
feelings. Koznyshev only pronounces his confession of love in his mind—without actually 
proposing to Varen’ka. Guessing that Koznyshev has come to see her in order to propose, 
Varen’ka becomes anxious and distracts Koznyshev with a mundane question about mushrooms 
instead of any encouragement. Kitty’s haptic description of their relationship epitomizes 
Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s unsuccessful romance: because of their alienation from the corporeal, 
they are unable to “grab” one another’s hands. Although Koznyshev’s and Varen’ka’s lack of 
sensuality is not a moral flaw (both of them are portrayed as good, and Varen’ka even as 
virtuous), their rational mindset does represent a flaw. It prevents them from being immersed in 
the natural, physical flux of life, forming a marital union, and procreating. Since their profession 
of love never takes place, their hands never touch, as one would expect if they had revealed their 
feelings. (For instance, Kitty puts her hands on Levin’s shoulders when Levin visits the 
Shcherbatskiis the morning after his their profession of love for one another.) In keeping with 
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Merleau-Ponty, the absence of Koznyshev and Varen’ka’s intimate touch suggests that, despite 
their mutual sympathy, their rationality and lack of sensuality prevent them from merging into a 
single “intercorporeal” whole, so they remain separate entities.             
Unlike Koznyshev and Varen’ka, Levin and Kitty are not devoid of sensuality, but their 
sensuality does not dominate their personalities as it does for Stiva and Anna. Levin and Kitty’s 
sensuality complements their emotional and moral kinship, resulting in their forming an 
“intercorporeal” union. Tolstoi endows both characters with long-range vision, which, in the 
context of Platonic philosophy, suggests their spiritual rather than carnal predispositions. He also 
endows them with kinesthetic (muscular strength and bodily dexterity) rather than cutaneous and 
tactile sensations, which emphasize their physical but not sensual engagement with the world. In 
keeping with Tolstoi’s suspicion of sexuality, because Levin and Kitty’s tactile interaction is 
limited, they eventually transcend the boundaries of their individual bodies to become “one 
flesh,” or an “intercorporeal” whole through the sacrament of marriage. Karenin’s anger, 
Vronskii’s self-absorption, and Anna’s jealousy render them insensitive and propel their 
hostility. Levin and Kitty’s love, on the contrary, renders them mutually compassionate. Their 
compassion imbues them with an ability to sense one another’s pain, as the parties of the 
“intercorporeal” whole should do, and encourages them to settle their temporary disagreements.  
The Haptic in Tolstoi’s other fictional writings 
Although haptic elements are particularly prominent in Anna Karenina, Tolstoi’s other 
fictional works also lend themselves to haptic analysis. Since Tolstoi’s preoccupation with 
sexuality is consistent throughout his literary carrier, a haptic reading of his fiction written before 
and after Anna Karenina may reveal a correspondence between Tolstoi’s level of anxiety about 
sexuality and his representation of a person’s sensory contact—particularly touch—with others 
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and the world. For instance, Tolstoi’s depiction of mother-son tactile interactions in the novel 
Childhood anticipates Anna Karenina, but emphasizes Tolstoi’s growing suspicion of human 
sexuality. In both novels, a mother-child touch proves to be an expression of their profound 
physical and emotional bond. However, Childhood portrays the touch between mother and child 
as healing, though Anna Karenina represents it as compromised by a mother’s sensuality. When 
Nikolai Irten’ev, Childhood’s protagonist and narrator, recalls his late mother’s touch, he seems 
to overcome the gap between present and past, recapturing not only the tactile sensation but also 
the love that was communicated. Describing Nikolai’s recollection, Tolstoi shifts the 
grammatical tense from past to present, narrating little Nikolen’ka and his mother’s touches 
entirely in the present tense:  
…она присела [past tense] на кресло, на котором я сплю, своей чудесной нежной 
ручкой провела [past tense] по моим волосам, и над ухом моим звучит [present tense: 
here and further on to the end of the scene] милый знакомый голос: 
— Вставай, моя душечка: пора идти спать. 
Ничьи равнодушные взоры не стесняют ее: она не боится излить на меня всю 
свою нежность и любовь. Я не шевелюсь, но еще крепче целую ее руку. 
— Вставай же, мой ангел. 
Она другой рукой берет меня за шею, и пальчики ее быстро шевелятся и 
щекотят меня. В комнате тихо, полутемно: нервы мои возбуждены щекоткой и 
пробуждением; мамаша сидит подле самого меня; она трогает меня; я слышу ее 
запах и голос. Все это заставляет меня вскочить, обвить руками ее шею, прижать 
голову к ее груди и, задыхаясь, сказать: 
— Ах, милая, милая мамаша, как я тебя люблю! 
Она улыбается своей грустной, очаровательной улыбкой, берет обеими руками 
мою голову, целует меня в лоб и кладет к себе на колени. (emphasis added; 1:43–44) 
 
 Although Tolstoi often shifts tenses throughout the novel, the temporal shift in the depiction of 
Nikolen’ka and his mother’s physical contact reflects the immediacy, the contemporality of his 
experience. The chapter which describes Nikolai and his mother’s touch is called “Childhood,” 
reinforcing the significance of the narrator’s mother and his youthful innocence. Nikolai’s 
recollection of his mother’s touch reflects his longing not only for her love but also for his past 
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purity. Just as Nikolai’s recollection of his mother’s caress seems to recapture her love, as if 
collapsing the temporal gap between then and now, the recollection of his youthful innocence 
proves healing, cleansing and “exalting [to] his soul”: “Воспоминания эти освежают, 
возвышают мою душу” (1:43).   
Unlike those of the Childhood narrator, Anna’s son Serёzha’s recollections of his mother 
after her tragic death do not prove healing. While Nikolen’ka’s memories of his mother allow 
him to regain his sense of childlike belonging, Serёzha’s recollections of his mother hurt him and 
alienate him. Serёzha falls gravely ill after his mother’s surprise visit on his birthday, and 
everything that reminds him of her upsets him even after he recovers. When his uncle Stiva visits 
and wants to speak to him, he recognizes his mother’s features in his uncle and feels confused 
and upset. When Stiva touches his hand, Serёzha pulls away, and then, when Stiva releases his 
hand, he rushes out of the room:  
Дядя подозвал мальчика и взял его за руку. 
— Ну что ж, как дела? — сказал он, желая разговориться и не зная, что сказать. 
Мальчик, краснея и не отвечая, осторожно потягивал свою руку из руки дяди. 
Как только Степан Аркадьич выпустил его руку, он, как птица, выпущенная на 
волю, вопросительно взглянув на отца, быстрым шагом вышел из комнаты. […] 
Увидать дядю, похожего на мать, ему было неприятно, потому что это вызвало 
в нем те самые воспоминания, которые он считал стыдными. […] И чтобы не 
осуждать того отца, с которым он жил и от которого зависел и, главное, не 
предаваться чувствительности, которую он считал столь унизительною, Сережа 
старался не смотреть на этого дядю, приехавшего нарушать его спокойствие, и не 
думать про то, что он напоминал. (19:305) 
 
When a tutor notices that Serёzha is upset and wants to help, Serёzha asks to be left alone, and 
he says it with such intense emotion that it seems as if he addresses not only the tutor but also the 
entire world: “— Оставьте меня! Помню, не помню... Какое ему дело? Зачем мне помнить? 
Оставьте меня в покое! — обратился он уже не к гувернеру, а ко всему свету” (19:306). 
Anna’s romance with Vronskii introduces a gap of emotional alienation between Serёzha and his 
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uncle as well as with other people, revealing how Anna’s carnality continues to fragment her 
family, alienating its members, even after her death.  
It is true that the difference between the Childhood narrator’s and Serёzha’s emotional 
responses to their mothers’ deaths can be explained psychologically. Unlike the narrator of the 
other story, Serёzha is still a child, deeply hurt by the recent loss of his mother. However, one 
may also suggest that, by depicting Serёzha’s emotional and physical estrangement, Tolstoi 
emphasizes the lasting disruption of Anna’s sexuality, thus imbuing Serёzha’s estrangement with 
moral meaning. While Nikolai’s recollection of his mother’s touch in Childhood brings back his 
lost youthful innocence, closing the gap between past innocence and present corruption (as he 
views adulthood), Serёzha’s recollections of his mother open up an emotional and haptic gap in 
his relationships with other people.    
Although sexuality is not Tolstoi’s central preoccupation in Childhood, as it is in Anna 
Karenina, his angst about the corruptibility of human flesh already lurks in the novel—revealed 
in his depiction of the holy fool Grisha’s treatment of his body. Peeking at Grisha praying in his 
room, Nikolen’ka notices that Grisha wears heavy chains. Grisha wears the chains in order to 
mortify his bodily desires, which may endanger his spiritual aspirations. It is true that Tolstoi 
portrays Nikolen’ka’s naïve sensuality as non-disruptive, and the nanny Natalia Savishna’s 
inherent morality as an ideal, contrasting rather than comparing them to Grisha’s bodily self-
mortification. However, Grisha’s ascetic practice anticipates Tolstoi’s later writings—for 
instance, his story “Father Sergius,” wherein he represents self-mortification as a means of 
taming carnal desires, and thus hints at Tolstoi’s nascent anxiety about human physicality as 
early as Childhood.  
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In War and Peace, the representation of the haptic is less prominent than in Anna 
Karenina, but is nonetheless present. For instance, Natasha Rostova’s impulsive kinesthetic 
movements—when the young adolecent Natasha “accidentally” runs into a living room at the 
beginning of the novel, or when she, already a mother of three, nearly breaks into a run with 
impatience to greet her husband at the end of the novel—reflects her ingenuous emotional 
spontaneity, her typical “impulses” (“порывы”). Natasha’s kinesthetic spontaneity indicates her 
child-like purity, which she preserves even as she matures.  
Tolstoi also uses Natasha’s body to show her empathetic nature as she helps her 
distraught friend Sonia overcome her alienation. When Natasha finds Sonia crying, she herself 
breaks into tears out of compassion: 
... Соня … лежала ничком … и, закрыв лицо пальчиками, навзрыд плакала, 
подрагивая своими оголенными плечиками. Лицо Наташи, оживленное, целый день 
именинное, вдруг изменилось: глаза ее остановились, потом содрогнулась ее 
широкая шея, углы губ опустились. 
— Соня! что ты?... Что, что с тобой? У-у-у!.. 
И Наташа, распустив свой большой рот и сделавшись совершенно дурною, 
заревела, как ребенок, не зная причины и только оттого, что Соня плакала. (9:79–
80) 
 
Tolstoy depicts the transformation of Natasha’s facial expression in the instant that she perceives 
Sonia crying: her face changes suddenly, her eyes freeze, her wide neck shudders, the corners of 
her lips sink, her large mouth gapes. The transformation of Natasha’s face demonstrates how 
immediately she reciprocates her friend’s grief, even before she knows its cause. The way in 
which Sonia’s emotion initiates Natasha’s crying produces the impression that they have become 
one body, suggesting the instance of their “intercorporeal” unity.  
Tolstoi’s depiction of Sonia’s and Natasha’s bodies in the scene corroborates their 
“intercorporeal” entwinement. Describing Sonia, he depicts her body up to her neck (she is lying 
on her chest, shoulders shuddering as she sobs), but her face is concealed from the reader’s view 
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(she hides it in her hands): “Соня … лежала ничком … закрыв лицо пальчиками, навзрыд 
плакала, подрагивая своими оголенными плечиками” (9:79). Tolstoi then shifts focus and 
describes Natasha’s reaction to seeing her friend cry, leaving only her face visible to the reader 
and omitting her body: “Лицо...Наташи … вдруг изменилось: глаза ее остановились, потом 
содрогнулась ее широкая шея, углы губ опустились […] распустив свой большой рот … 
заревела, как ребенок” (9:80). While Tolstoi emphasizes Natasha’s “wide” neck—
uncharacteristic of a slender, twelve-year-old girl—he uses a diminutive in the depiction of 
Sonia’s neck a few pages later, suggesting that her neck is thin ("шейк[а] с выступавшими 
костями груди" (9:83). Sonia is trying but cannot express her grief by either crying or talking—
that is, by using her neck as a passageway for her oppressive emotion. The composition of the 
scene suggests that Natasha’s face and “wide” neck visually substitute for Sonia’s face and thin 
neck, demonstrating that while Sonia is unable to let out her grief, Natasha’s “wide” neck is able 
to release not only her own but also her friend’s emotions. When Natasha bursts into tears at the 
sight of Sonia sobbing, she seems to participate in her emotion to the extent that she gives an 
outlet to Sonia’s suffering, so Sonia’s emotional state begins to improve: she rises slightly and 
starts to share her grief with Natasha (“Наташа плакала, присев на синей перине и обнимая 
друга. Собравшись с силами, Соня приподнялась, начала утирать слезы и рассказывать” 
9:80). The episode ends with Sonia and Natasha rejoining other children and singing a song all 
together, thus confirming that Natasha’s compassion has helped to relieve Sonia of her grief and 
to overcome her alienation.       
Tolstoi’s attention to Natasha’s and Sonia’s necks in this scene suggests another 
important aspect of Tolstoi’s representation of the body in War and Peace, though it concerns 
oral-aural perception rather than haptic. According to Merleau-Ponty, hearing and vociferation 
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are two aspects of a single sound-related sense, whose function is to facilitate a person’s 
intertwinement with the world as touch does. In keeping with Merleau-Ponty, Tolstoi shows the 
way in which Natasha overcomes her alienation after Anatol’ Kuragin nearly seduces her 
through singing, when she regains her ability to produce sound (vociferation). Stricken by grief, 
Natasha finds herself unable to sing. Every time she tries, she feels that the tears of shame and 
humiliation will suffocate her. Only after she fasts does she regain her good spirits, along with 
her ability to sing. Tolstoi portrays Natasha’s recovery through her relationship with sound. He 
shows how, during the service, her inner voice responds to the words of the prayer that she hears. 
Natasha’s hearing the prayer (and responding to it with her inner voice) is the first, receptive 
aspect of the auditory-oratory sense, and it leads to her vociferation when she is able to sing 
again. Natasha’s lost and regained ability to sing reflects her alienation and reconnection with the 
world. Sound-related actions, however diverse and seemingly unrelated (wailing, listening to a 
prayer, inability and ability to sing), may be considered another means (in addition to touch) 
which Tolstoi uses to show human interconnectedness and alienation in War and Peace.   
Since Tolstoi’s attitude towards human physicality becomes more ascetic in the 1880s 
and 90s, his representation of the senses in the later story “Father Sergius” suggests that he 
begins to view the senses (vision, touch, hearing, and smell, since Tolstoi typically omits taste) 
as equally disruptive. Robert Jackson, who writes about the story in his article “Father Sergius 
and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall,” mentions sensory elements as something that creates a 
“powerful sense of the erotic”: “what Sergius and Makovkina are feeling and experiencing … is 
conveyed through smells, sounds, smiles, laughter, groans, prayers, and crushing silences” (469–
470). In contrast to his earlier writings, Tolstoi portrays human community in “Father Sergius” 
as something that endangers Kasatskii’s spiritual quest. Thus, it is perhaps not accidental that the 
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senses, including hearing and touch, which Tolstoi portrays as facilitators of human community 
in his earlier works, trouble the story’s protagonist the most. Sound has the capacity to penetrate 
physical boundaries (which, for instance, vision cannot), making it a dangerous means of 
seduction. Kasatskii’s night guest Makovkina deliberately produces loud sounds as she walks 
barefoot on the cell floor and takes off her clothes to evoke seductive images in Kasatskii’s 
imagination—while he hides in an adjacent room, trying to avoid the temptation. He manages to 
subdue his desire for Makovkina through, as Jackson comments, symbolic “self-emasculation” 
(Jackson 471)—cutting off a finger and thus, one can say, preventing himself from touching 
Makovkina. While he succeeds in resisting Makovkina’s seduction, he fails to resist the 
temptation of the half-witted Maria. Maria seduces Kasatskii more straightforwardly—not 
through suggestive sounds but directly, through touch, which Tolstoi portrays as a more 
powerful means. When Maria takes Kasatskii’s hand and draws it to her chest, having him touch 
her body, he finds himself overcome with desire.  
Other instances of Kasatskii’s interactions with people or nature show how images, 
sounds, and smells stir up his feelings and jeopardize his spiritual resolve. For instance, during a 
service, he sees his parishioners’ improper behavior, hears their frivolous conversations, smells 
the scents of cigars and wine—all of which incite his judgment and distract him, so he tries to 
redirect his vision and hearing towards spiritual scenes (icons, lit candles, and prayers): 
Борьба состояла в том, что его раздражали посетители, господа, особенно дамы. Он 
старался не видеть их, не замечать всего того, что делалось: не видеть того, как 
солдат провожал их, расталкивая народ, как дамы показывали друг другу монахов - 
часто его даже и известного красавца монаха. Он старался, выдвинув как бы шоры 
своему вниманию, не видеть ничего, кроме блеска свечей у иконостаса, иконы и 
служащих; не слышать ничего, кроме петых и произносимых слов молитв, и не 
испытывать никакого другого чувства, кроме того самозабвения в сознании 
исполнения должного, которое он испытывал всегда, слушая и повторяя вперед 
столько раз слышанные молитвы. […] 
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Все лицо игумна, среди седин красное и улыбающееся, как бы одобряющее то, 
что говорил генерал, выхоленное лицо генерала с самодовольной улыбкой, запах 
вина изо рта генерала и сигар от его бакенбард - все это взорвало отца Сергия. 
(31:14–16) 
 
Since Tolstoi begins to see the natural world and its reproductive forces (of which human 
sexuality is a part) as an obstacle to a person’s spiritual development, he portrays not only 
images of corruption (as in the scene above) but also images representing the beauty of nature as 
distracting. While young Tolstoi views nature as a part of the spiritual realm, Tolstoi of the 
1880s portrays it as a force that conflicts with the spiritual. In particular, Tolstoi associates 
Kasatskii’s susceptibility to the impressions of nature with his loss of faith. The beauty of nature 
(especially thriving in the spring) appeals to Kasatskii’s visual, auditory, and tactile perceptions: 
he sees the colors of blossoming trees and the radiant sunset, he hears the singing of birds and 
peasants, and the noises of bugs:      
Черемуховые кусты за вязом были в полном цвету и еще не осыпались. Соловьи, 
один совсем близко и другие два или три внизу в кустах у реки, щелкали и 
заливались. С реки слышалось далеко пенье возвращавшихся, верно с работы, 
рабочих; солнце зашло за лес и брызгало разбившимися лучами сквозь зелень. Вся 
сторона эта была светло-зеленая, другая, с вязом, была темная. Жуки летали, 
хлопались и падали. (31:35)  
 
Kasatskii is irritated because he feels that these impressions distract him from reading a psalm 
renouncing the world, seeming to seduce him in a similar way as Makovkina did. Tolstoi 
suggests that, without steadfast faith, Kasatskii cannot find the spiritual strength to renounce the 
world, and the world of nature keeps stealing up to him when he is trying to renounce it. When 
the natural world directly touches him (Kasatskii feels a bug crawling on his skin), he suddenly 
questions the existence of God:  
И он сложил руки и стал молиться. Соловьи заливались. Жук налетел на него и 
пополз по затылку. Он сбросил его. “Да есть ли Он?... Что, как я стучусь у 
запертого снаружи дома... Замок на двери, и я мог бы видеть его. Замок этот – 
соловьи, жуки, природа.” (31:35)  
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His encounter with a childhood friend, the humble Pashen’ka, leads to Kasatskii’s inner 
transformation and renders him, one can say, insusceptible to physical contact with the external 
world: it can no longer stir up his feelings, be a cause of irritation or pleasure. Kasatskii’s 
transformation is reflected in his tactile interaction with Pashen’ka. When he comes to see her, to 
ask her to teach him how to live a proper spiritual life, he does not take her hand:  
— …Только не Сергий, не отец Сергий, а великий грешник Степан Касатский, 
погибший, великий грешник. Прими, помоги мне. 
— Да не может быть, да как же вы это так смирились? Да пойдемте же. 
Она протянула руку; но он не взял ее и пошел за нею. (31: 39–40)  
 
He does not pull away his hand from Pashen’ka’s once he humbles himself, admitting and 
confessing his corruption:  
— … Пашенька! я не святой человек, даже не простой, рядовой человек: я 
грешник, грязный, гадкий, заблудший, гордый грешник, хуже, не знаю, всех ли, но 
хуже самых худых людей. 
Пашенька смотрела сначала выпучив глаза; она верила. Потом, когда она 
вполне поверила, она тронула рукой его руку и, жалостно улыбаясь, сказала: 
— Стива, может быть, ты преувеличиваешь? 
— Нет, Пашенька. Я блудник, я убийца, я богохульник и обманщик. (31:41) 
 
Pashen’ka’s two touches: one that he rejects and the other that he accepts, reflect Kasatskii’s 
spiritual transformation: he rejects the past identity of a venerated monk and accepts a new 
identity of humility, recognizing his sinful, corrupted nature and thus ascending to a higher 
spiritual state.   
 Kasatskii’s humility proves to be the true way of faith. While monastery walls and 
prayers could not protect him from the impacts of the external world, stirring up his irritation or 
desire, his humility becomes a kind of shield that makes him invincible to contact with the 
outside world.  When a man on a street comments (in French, thinking that Kasatskii does not 
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understand him) that he recognizes Kasatskii’s good breeding, gives him twenty kopeks, and pats 
him on a shoulder, Kasatskii only thanks the man, takes off his hat and bows low before him:   
Барин с барыней на шарабане, запряженном рысаком, и мужчина и дама верховые 
остановили их. Муж барыни ехал с дочерью верхами, а в шарабане ехала барыня с, 
очевидно, путешественником-французом. 
Они остановили их, чтобы показать ему les pélérins,[pilgrims] которые, по 
свойственному русскому народу суеверию, вместо того чтобы работать, ходят из 
места в место. 
Они говорили по-французски, думая, что не понимают их.  
У француза нашлась мелочь. И он всем роздал по двадцать копеек. 
— Mais dites leur que ce n’est pas pour des cierges que je leur donne, mais pour 
qu’ils se régalent de thé [Tell him that I am giving him the money for tea] чай, чай, — 
улыбаясь, — pour vous, mon vieux [to you, old man], — сказал он, трепля рукой в 
перчатке Касатского по плечу.  
— Спаси Христос, — ответил Касатский, не надевая шапки и кланяясь своей 
лысой головой. 
И Касатскому особенно радостна была эта встреча, потому что он презрел 
людское мнение и сделал самое пустое, легкое — взял смиренно двадцать копеек и 
отдал их товарищу, слепому нищему. Чем меньше имело значения мнение людей, 
тем сильнее чувствовался Бог. (31:45–46) 
 
The traveler’s offensive comments and unceremonious physical contact do not incite Kasatskii’s 
judgment, as they would have in the past. While Kasatskii had avoided touch before his spiritual 
transformation, feeling that his faith was endangered by physical contact with the world, he can 
now accept touch without distraction. The newly-gained ability to accept touch reveals that his 
true faith eventually immerses him in, rather than alienates him from, the world and its human 
community.  
        The haptic analysis of Anna Karenina conducted in this dissertation, as well as the above 
examples of haptic analysis of Tolstoi’s other fictional works, demonstrates that the investigation 
of the haptic in Tolstoi’s writings is fruitful research worth further pursuit. Haptic readings of 
Tolstoi’s other fictional works can shed further light on the way in which his depictions of the 
act of touch reflect not only his interest in the accurate representation of human bodily or 
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psychological experiences, expressed through the corporeal, but also his meditations on the 
relationship between the spiritual and physical realms—and thus his moral message.  
249 
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